Can China survive a foreign misadventure?
Should Taiwan feel apprehensive?
At the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many commentators asked if that was the right time for China to also invade Taiwan. As it happens, no Chinese invasion occurred. With the eruption of war in the Middle East, the same question is being asked again. This raises a number of interesting questions. Why would now be a good time for China to invade Taiwan? Does China have the capacity to invade Taiwan? What would be the international consequences of this occurring? And most importantly, would things end well for China? It is worth unpacking each of those questions in turn.
It is fair to say that the United States is currently distracted. The war in Ukraine occupies a large amount of American domestic politics, especially around the funding of Ukrainian resistance to Russia. Added to that, the US now has to act as a peacemaker in the Middle East as, presumably, Iranian influence has added to the pressure in Gaza. That is already leading some commentators to question whether or not the United States can handle three large military conflagrations at once, whilst not actually being at war itself. It is fair to say that the international calls upon US support — both military and financial — appears to be starting to exhaust the patience of the American people. It is happening during a Presidential election cycle, which means that short term considerations may set the tone for the medium term ahead. This reduced capacity to respond to a crisis in the Far East lies behind the view that now might be a good time for China to invade Taiwan. A distracted America, inwardly focussed, suggests diminished resistance to Chinese adventurism.
If that explains the timing question, there is then one of capacity. What we do know is that the PLA has been building capacity for over a decade. Chinese naval capacity has benefitted from a long term policy of shipbuilding, air capacity has been enhanced in terms of the number of aircraft and their technological sophistication, the area denial missile capability has been enhanced greatly. What we don’t know is whether or not any of this capability is of any use. China has not been involved in a military engagement this century. By way of contrast, the US military has been at war for nearly all of this century. In terms of the capability of the personnel available, the Chinese forces are an unknown quantity. Not only are they unknown to us, but also to Beijing as well. It is at this point that we start to pause for thought over the prospect of a military engagement across the Taiwan Strait.
In addition to the uncertainties of a military engagement, Beijing also has to be mindful of the international consequences of such an action. The reaction of Europe and North America to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given a foretaste of what the diplomatic, commercial, and financial consequences of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might be. The diplomatic fallout from a Chinese invasion, if Ukraine is a suitable template, would be the exclusion of China from the community of nations. This may have internal consequences as the authorities in Beijing would struggle to maintain the moral leadership that they have been cultivating on the international stage in recent years. This diplomatic exclusion is likely to be combined with the severe restriction of commercial ties and the possibility of the financial exclusion of Chinese entities on the world financial markets. It is easy to envisage a situation where Chinese assets have been frozen, possibly seized, and Chinese citizens and entities sanctioned in the American dominated global markets.
This could have a serious impact upon the stability of the regime in Beijing. The Chinese property market is currently in rude health and the Chinese financial system is starting to creak under the strains of excessive amounts of debt. Any downturn caused by a restriction of trade, or the ability to finance international trade, would call into question the ability of Chinese entities to service the debts they have taken on. To be sure, a Chinese financial crisis would have an impact elsewhere in the global financial system, but the main impact would be absorbed largely within China itself. It would be more like a very bad day elsewhere, but an epoch ending day within China.
This is only a first order diplomatic effect. If we then account for second order effects, the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan looks even more uncertain. For example, what if the United States and its allies decided to arm Taiwan in a similar way to which Ukraine has been armed? The Taiwan Strait is about 100 miles wide. That provides a great deal of water and airspace that any invading force needs to cover. An aggressive and stubborn defence of Taiwan against a Chinese opponent of an unproven quality might suggest that the conquest of Taiwan would not be as easy a conquest as some seem to suggest. The prospect of a protracted and opposed occupation of Taiwan is something that may weigh upon minds in Beijing. It is within here that things might not go well for China.
Just suppose we have a situation where there has been a military invasion of Taiwan. The invasion has only been partially successful because the Taiwanese are resisting the occupation. The United States and its allies have responded by arming Taiwan and by sanctioning the Chinese economy. This is leading to an economic downturn within China that is starting to cause a crash in the property and financial markets. As the incomes and wealth of the Chinese middle class start to drain away, there are calls for political reform. In some circles there are even whispers of regime change. If those whispers get louder, regime change may become a distinct possibility. In this sense, China would not be able to withstand a foreign misadventure.
There are two important caveats to this view. First, it is absurd to say that China would not be able to withstand a foreign misadventure. China as a Far Eastern landmass would still be there. It is likely that some form of political entity called ‘China’ would remain. Where the change would have an impact is that it is unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party, as it is currently formed, would still be there. The successor entity is necessarily speculative. It could be a reformed CCP. It could be a series of regional governments. It could be something completely different. What we can say is that it is unlikely to look like the present arrangements.
Which leads on to the second point. It is quite likely that the government in Beijing can use similar reasoning to ours. Military intervention is inherently risky. Success is not at all guaranteed, especially if hostile actors are intent upon the failure of one’s policy. The reactions of one’s opponents do matter and may have a critical impact. That critical impact may leave one in a worse position than otherwise would have been, in which case doing nothing would be the better option. It is highly likely that Beijing has made similar calculations, which suggests that an invasion of Taiwan, despite the speculation to the contrary, is not imminent. In this sense, China is unlikely to survive a foreign misadventure, which is why Beijing is likely to avoid one in the first place.
© Stephen Aguilar-Millan 2023
