SUP Community governance proposal Amendment
SUP is the value capture token of MOV SuperTx and an important part of MOV.
As the governance token, SUP can:
1, determine the trading fees of the SuperTx protocol,
2, determine token pair listings in the liquidity pool,
3, determine the development direction of the SuperTx protocol (community proposal and voting).
Since the launch of SUP liquidity mining on September 17 of this year, 49,148 SUPs have been mined, and more than 46,000 SUPs locked. In more than a week, many SUP holders have put forward their own thoughts and suggestions about community governance. In this regard, the MOV team expresses its heartfelt gratitude. While all holders care and support MOV superconductivity, the team also hopes that the majority of community currency holders can participate in MOV superconductivity governance and pass reasonable governance rules. Transforming community opinions into standard executable proposals will make the development of MOV SuperTx more long-term and healthy.
On September 27th, the Bytom Chain Foundation released the MOV superconducting community governance draft V1, detailing the various rules of MOV superconducting governance.
From September 27th to October 12th, the community draft opinions were collected and based on 10.13–10.15 Community opinions, the MOV Team made comprehensive changes to SUP community governance.
The SUP community governance plan is now officially released. The rules are as follows:
1) Participants of protocol and related vote counting rules
Governance Participants are defined as: All SUP community members, that is, SUP holders in a broad sense, including direct holders of SUP, SUP trading pair liquidity providers, and SUP holders who choose “delayed gratification” (their tokens in lock up stage).
Among them, the counting rules are:
1 SUP = 1 vote
SuperTx liquidity will count votes based on the number of SUPs it represents. If an address currently holds 5 SUP/X BTM trading pair liquidity, the address will count 5 votes.
SUP holders who choose “ delayed gratification” will vote according to the number of SUP actually received, and 1 SUP = 1 vote.
(Delayed gratification is an option in SUP liquidity mining that offers participants the option can get more SUP).
Motivation: We hope that implementation of this rule will allow all true holders of SUP to participate in the governance of the SuperTx protocol.
2) Rules for proposal initiation
The sponsor of the proposal must hold at least 1,000 votes; after the proposal is initiated, the Dev team will conduct a review of the proposal (normative and risk assessment review), and give their feedback on the proposal within 48 hours after the time of submission.
After the proposer initiates a proposal, his or her 1000 SUP will be locked during the review and voting period. The locked 1000 SUP cannot be operated (transactions, transfers, etc.). The proposer cannot vote for his own proposal, but the locked 1000 SUP can still vote for other proposals.
Motivation: Through this rule, we hope to ensure that the proposal function is not abused and that the quality of the proposal, and the interests of the proposer and the SuperTx community, are aligned. At the same time, we aim to maintain objectivity of the vote as much as possible.
3) Voting period and related rules
Vote counting periods:
Once the proposal is released on the page, it will enter a one-day vote counting period. At the end of the vote counting period, the system will assess how many votes each member holds.
Voting will start after the vote counting period ends, and the voting period is 7 days.
During the voting period, community members can vote for a certain proposal and choose an option that they support. However, they cannot change their choice once they have voted.
Motivation: Through this rule, we hope to ensure that SUP holders can fully participate in each proposal, have enough time to prepare votes, and then evaluate the proposals and vote carefully.
4) Conditions for the proposal to take effect
At the end of the voting period, the number of votes participating in the voting needs to exceed 5% of the total votes to be considered as effective governance; the voting results will only take effect under the premise of effective governance.
In addition, for the dual vote of “Yes/No”, the voting result requires an absolute majority (>2/3) of the “agree” option to be regarded as approved.
Motivation: Through this rule, we hope to ensure that each proposal is fully discussed by the community and fully expressed, so as to ensure that the proposal is a real concern for the SuperTx community.
5) Handling of conflicting proposals
If any approved proposals conflict with each other, the most recently approved proposal will be given priority, and if necessary, a new proposal for voting on the conflicting proposal will be initiated.
Motivation: We want to determine the rules for conflicting proposals in advance.