Cognition after the representation war (part 2) — 4E Cognition

With the 4E approach, the “representation war” goes from being an ontological issue to an epistemological debate.

Through the issue of mental representation addressed in the previous article, it is possible to get a first idea about the theoretical discontinuity between traditional cognitive science and more recent approaches gathered under the umbrella of so-called 4E Cognition. In fact, in many cases those latter reflect — directly or in a collateral way — the attempt to overcome the problem of representation in human cognition, even thought, as we’re going to say, this doesn’t entail a unite consensus at all.

4E Cognition has not to be seen as a specific and well-defined theoretical system, rather, it is a term referring to all those works (hypothesis, theories, experiments, etc.) which deviate from the traditional representational-computational model of cognition (see part 1), taking a dynamic and enactive approach, namely, conceiving cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive and extended (that’s why 4E). In a nutshell, mental states and cognitive processes would be: embodied when they are partly constituted by bodily processes; embedded when there is an essential causal dependence between such states and processes and the environment; enacted when the actions of the subject can partly constitute these states and processes; and extended when objects or processes in the environment can partly constitute those states and processes [4].

Here you can find a quick conversational introduction to 4E cognition made by professor Shaun Gallagher:

As mentioned above, the 4E approach does not presuppose a definite view on representation, rather, it comprises a varied range of viewpoints within it − while some of them propose explanations in total discontinuity with traditional representational models of cognition, like Chemero’s radical embodied cognition [1], some others still rely on some form of representational relations-mechanisms, albeit the concept of representation has been significantly revised and its explanatory role has been reassessed, as appears from the Clark’s work [2].

Furthermore, even within the anti-representationalist side, as well as the so called “eliminativists”, which advocate a complete rejection of any form of representation, we also find those who even if they observe the epistemological inadequacy of the concept of mental representation, they still recognize its useful explanatory role. A good overview of this debate is provided in Downey’s paper [3].

In other words, within the context of 4E cognition, despite the “representation war” is still ongoing, it seems to have lost its metaphysical-ontological valence, having narrowed down the issue to a series of doubts of an epistemological and explanatory nature.

However, this theoretical rift is still one of the main discriminating factors in the distinction within the area of 4E cognition, between the so called radical enactivism − mostly associated with an anti-representational-computational view, and a more moderate enactivism − which regarding the issue of representations maintains a certain continuity with traditional models.

In conclusion, we want to stress the point that although the discontinuity between 4E Cognition approaches and traditional cognitive sciences is partially based on the reassessment of the “problem of representation”, it does not stem exclusively from it. Rather, as we are going to show in forthcoming articles, this discontinuity is much deeper and is related to the general understanding of cognition in holistic and ecological terms. For instance, as well stated by Tobias Schlicht [5], a significant aspect about 4E cognition is that this approach calls into question − sometimes actually rejecting− traditional distinctions, such as the rigid boundaries between perception and cognition, between (intentional) action and (non-intentional) behavior, between causation and constitution, or between cognitive systems and the environment.

[1] Chemero A. Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT press; 2011 Aug 19.

[2] Clark A. Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action, and the embodied mind. Oxford University Press; 2015 Oct 2.

[3] Downey A. Predictive processing and the representation wars: A victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism). Synthese. 2018 Dec 15;195(12):5115–39.

[4] Loughlin V. Mark Rowlands. The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2013 Dec 1;12(4):891–7.

[5] Schlicht T. Critical Note. The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. 2018 Aug 23:217.