Lethal Assistance and the Ukraine Crisis
President Obama & the Decision to Arm Ukraine
Introduction
On February 9, 2015, United States President Barack Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a joint press conference in Washington, DC. The two leaders had met to discuss possible solutions to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. The issue at the forefront of their discussion was the option of sending lethal aid to the Ukrainian government to assist their fight against pro-Russian separatists. Evidence of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s civil war had raised international concerns about security in eastern Europe due to the apparent aggression of Russian President Vladimir Putin. While both leaders were in “absolute agreement” that they could not “stand idle and simply allow the borders of Europe to be redrawn at the barrel of a gun,” their views on a potential solution differed. The United States had been considering arming the Ukrainian government in order to “change Mr. Putin’s calculus” in regards to the Russian leader’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Obama stated that he believed Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was “bad for Europe [and] bad for the world”. He went on to say that “in the face of this aggression…we can’t simply try to talk them out of it,” and that the world needed to show Russia that it was “unified in imposing a cost for this aggression” (The White House). While the President’s condemnation of Russia’s involvement was generally agreed upon by international and domestic political leaders, the possible solutions to the Ukraine crisis created divisive disagreements. Sending arms to Ukraine was a popular proposal within the US government, achieving bipartisan support in Congress. Outside of Congress, the President’s nominee for Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, stated in his confirmation hearing that he was “very much inclined” toward arming the Ukrainian government, while Vice President Joe Biden made headlines with his remark that “the Ukrainian people have a right to defend themselves”. Chancellor Merkel, however, was a staunch critic of supplying weapons to Ukraine, citing the risk of military escalation with Russia. This opposition to sending arms to the Ukrainian government was shared by most of the United States’ allies in Europe, including France and Great Britain (New York Times). The United States had cooperated with the European Union to implement economic sanctions on Russia since their annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, but the sanctions seemed to have little effect on Russian military aggression in Ukraine. The conflict continued and a solution was needed, making President Obama’s meeting with Chancellor Merkel of pivotal importance.
The Ukraine Crisis
The Ukraine Crisis began in November of 2013, when then-president Viktor Yanukovych refused at the last minute to sign a trade agreement that would strengthen Ukraine’s ties to the European Union, choosing instead to enter an agreement with Russia. This prompted violent protests among pro-European citizens in Ukraine, resulting in the overthrow of President Yanukovych in 2014 and the installation of a new government. The new government and the cancellation of Yanukovych’s agreement with Russia were unpopular among the ethnically Russian population in eastern Ukraine. Protests began against the new government’s rejection of Yanukovych’s Russia agreement, eventually sparking an ethnic Russian separatist movement in eastern Ukraine and leading to a civil war.
However, the conflict in Ukraine quickly became more than a civil war. Russia entered the fray on the side of the separatists, providing military aid to the rebels and annexing the Crimean peninsula in March of 2014. While the Russian government vehemently denied arming the separatists, there was clear evidence that they were heavily involved. According to US security officials, Russia supplied heavy weaponry, including tanks, missiles, and artillery, to the separatist militias in eastern Ukraine. Due to the large quantities of these heavy weapons, it was clear that the separatists had not seized them from Ukrainian stockpiles, as they had claimed (Reuters). In addition to supplying arms to the separatists, Russia was sending personnel to fight alongside the separatists in Ukraine’s civil war. The initial leaders of the separatist armies were Russian citizens. Russian soldiers not wearing the Russian insignia, known as “little green men” due to their green Russian military uniforms, appeared in the Donbas region in early 2014. While the Russian government claimed these soldiers were volunteers and not connected to the Russian military, Ukraine saw them as evidence of a Russian military invasion.
President Obama seemed to agree with this accusation, saying that “Russia is responsible for the violence in eastern Ukraine,” and that the crisis was “not a homegrown, indigenous uprising” (PBS). Russia’s involvement made the Ukraine crisis an international issue, drawing the concern of other states.
On September 5, 2014, a ceasefire was agreed upon by Ukraine, Russia, and the separatist groups to halt the civil war in eastern Ukraine. The agreement, known as the Minsk Protocol, was brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Minsk Protocol called for an immediate bilateral ceasefire to be monitored by the OSCE. The agreement also included monitoring of the Russia-Ukraine border and the withdrawal of illegal weaponry and personnel, alongside measures to improve the humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine (BBC). The Minsk Protocol was an almost immediate failure, with both the separatists and the Ukrainian government accusing each other of ceasefire violations. A follow-up memorandum signed on September 19 banned offensive actions, created a no-fly zone, and ordered the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the combat zone, but the agreement still failed to create a sustainable ceasefire. The civil war continued, unimpeded by the Minsk Protocol.
The Battle of Donetsk Airport
On September 28, less than a month after the signing of Minsk Protocol, a new wave of fighting erupted at the Donetsk International Airport in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The airport had been the location of an earlier battle in May of 2014, leaving it the hands of the Ukrainian government. The airport held strategic importance for both sides. Positioned just north of the rebel-controlled city of Donetsk, controlling the airport gave the Ukrainian military a vantage point from which to observe the movements of the separatist forces. Holding the airport would also be a symbolic victory for the Ukrainian government in the rebel-controlled Donetsk oblast. For the separatists, controlling the airport would mean gaining a runway, giving them the potential to receive large supply shipments from Russia (Guardian). Ukraine’s victory in May of 2014 gave them a foothold in Donetsk.
In the days following the signing of the Minsk Protocol, separatist forces launched a new offensive on the Donetsk airport. The ceasefire existed in name only as both sides exchanged heavy artillery fire at the airport, ignoring the buffer zone demanded by the follow-up memorandum (Guardian). The intensified fighting prompted the Ukrainian government to accuse Russia of increased interference in the conflict, with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declaring that Russia had sent 9,000 soldiers across the border and into Ukraine, along with 500 tanks and armored vehicles (Telegraph). While Russia continued to deny any involvement, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg confirmed a “substantial increase in Russian heavy equipment” in eastern Ukraine, such as “tanks, artillery, and advanced air defense systems”.
The airport fell to separatist forces on January 21, 2015. The withdrawal of Ukrainian forces marked both a symbolic loss for the Ukrainian government as well as the complete collapse of the Minsk Protocol. Now in control of the entire city of Donetsk, Alexander Zakharchenko, leader of the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, declared that the rebels would “not make any attempts at ceasefire talks any more”. Between the failure of September’s peace talks and the evidence of increased Russian involvement, pressure grew on the international community to find a solution to the civil war in Ukraine. With violence in Ukraine reaching a new high and Vladimir Putin’s aggression becoming more overt, it was time for President Obama to re-examine US policy regarding sending arms to Ukraine.
Existing US Policy Concerning Ukraine
The existing US policy concerning the Ukrainian crisis had been economic sanctions against Russia and the supply of non-lethal aid to the Ukrainian government. The economic sanctions were implemented in cooperation with the European Union after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 and were increased several times, as Russia’s aggression did not cease. The sanctions targeted Russia’s finance, energy, and arms sectors, as well as imposing asset freezes and travel restrictions on dozens of Russian officials (BBC). While the US-EU sanctions were credited with the collapse of the Russian ruble and the 2014–2015 Russian financial crisis, they did not produce the desired effect of halting Russian backing of separatists in Ukraine.
The US was also supplying large amounts of non-lethal and humanitarian aid to the Ukrainian government. “Non-lethal aid” is material that “is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or material that is designed to inflict serious bodily injury or death”. The non-lethal aid sent to Ukraine by the US included materials such as body armor, night vision goggles, vehicles, radio equipment, and counter mortar radar (The White House). The United States Army also pledged to send personnel in order to train Ukrainian troops. By September of 2014, US non-lethal aid had reached over $219 million. However, logistical delays prevented much of that aid from reaching the battlefield (New York Times). While the non-lethal aid was appreciated, the Ukrainian government wanted more, hoping to balance the lethal aid that Russia was sending to the separatist armies. Addressing Congress in September of 2014, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko urged the US to provide weapons to the Ukraine military, saying that “blankets and night vision goggles are important, but one cannot win a war with blankets”.
Up to this point, the US had refused to supply lethal aid, meaning materials designed to kill or destroy. Ukraine had asked the United States for defensive lethal aid, seeking to protect their territory and raise the costs for attackers. Specifically, the Ukrainian government had requested anti-aircraft systems and anti-tank missiles, such as the Javelin missile (BBC). Arguments for supplying anti-tank missiles like the Javelin cited the large amount of armored vehicles and tanks that Russia had deployed in the Donbas region, which were devastating given the Ukrainian military’s lack of anti-armor weapons (Atlantic Council). With the influx of Russian heavy weaponry that occurred in January of 2015, the Ukrainian military appeared to need anti-armor capabilities more than ever.
Domestic Pressures to Arm the Ukrainian Government
Sending lethal aid to Ukraine had overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress. In a news conference on Capitol Hill, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee John McCain (R-AZ) said that it was imperative to “deter Russian aggression”. McCain argued that supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine would not directly threaten Russia’s security, but would instead “raise the risks and costs Russia must incur to continue its offensive”. McCain’s colleague, Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), argued that defensive weapons were essential to pressuring Russia into a solution, stating that the key to resolving the Ukraine crisis was “to give the Ukrainians the ability to defend their territory”. At the same press conference, Senator McCain criticized European leaders’ opposition to arming Ukraine, comparing their fear of escalation with an aggressive Russia to the appeasement policies that led to World War II. Senator Joe Donnelly (D-IN) added to this sentiment, stating that “if at some point we don’t stand up for our friends, it will only get worse” (Huffington Post). To these congressmen, not sending arms to Ukraine could be opening the door to future Russian conquests throughout Europe.
Support for arming the Ukrainian government was not new for Congress. In 2014, Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which outlined the United States’ policy on the Ukrainian Crisis. Along with allocating funds for non-lethal support, the legislation authorized President Obama to send lethal aid to Ukraine in the form of anti-tanks weapons. Despite this authorization, the weapons were never sent. Advocates for sending lethal aid to Ukraine also pointed to the Budapest Memorandum, a 1994 non-proliferation agreement in which Ukraine gave up their large nuclear weapons stockpile in exchange for for security assurances from Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The agreement also guaranteed that its signatories would “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”. Russian leaders claimed that Russia had not interfered in the Ukraine Crisis, and therefore had not violated the Budapest memorandum. However, members of the United States Congress disagreed, arguing that the US had a legal obligation to protect Ukraine against an aggressive Russia. Supporters of increased involvement in Ukraine argued that failure to support Ukraine in accordance with the Budapest memorandum would damage the credibility of all US security assurances and harm future non-proliferation efforts (Brookings Institution).
International Pressures Against Arming the Ukrainian Government
Internationally, the option of providing lethal aid to Ukraine was much less popular. German Chancellor Angela Merkel had consistently been a staunch critic of supplying Ukraine with weapons. Merkel, along with British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Francois Hollande, argued strongly against giving Ukraine lethal aid, fearing it might trigger escalation with Vladimir Putin. These European leaders believed that supplying the Ukrainian military with more advanced weaponry could spark a proxy war with Russia, immersing Europe in a full fledged war. Chancellor Merkel, the most outspoken of the European leaders about this issue, believed that there was no military solution to the Ukrainian Crisis and wanted to “shape security with Russia, not against it”.
While the United States’ allies in Europe would not endorse the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine, the policy of the US was still uncertain. President Obama had maintained that he did not see a military solution to the conflict in Ukraine, but as Congress and cabinet members began to support arming Ukraine, the President was forced to reexamine his policy, calling the United States’ cooperation with their allies into question. The potential disagreement between the United States and Western Europe created fears that there was a much deeper ideological split among western countries concerning relations with Russia. If the US were to send weapons to the Ukraine government, it would indicate a policy of actively opposing Vladimir Putin’s aggression. This would be inconsistent with the European policy of avoiding any form of conflict or confrontation with Russia for fear of escalation, severely damaging the image of unity between Western Europe and the US.
In an effort to re-establish a ceasefire and discuss a diplomatic solution, Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande arranged a meeting with President Poroshenko and President Putin. Despite the failure of the Minsk Protocol and rebel leader Alexander Zakharchenko’s declaration that the separatists were not interested in further negotiations, Chancellor Merkel insisted that diplomacy was given another chance. This new round of peace talks was set for February 11, 2015.
Factors Affecting the President’s Decision
In light of the diplomatic failures of 2014 and worsening conditions in eastern Ukraine, President Obama had a decision to make. After the separatist victory at the Donbas Airport, the conflict appeared to have reached a turning point. The separatists’ new military progress along with evidence of increased Russian assistance to the rebels created a new sense of urgency for addressing the Ukraine crisis. Between the separatist advances and heightened Russian aggression, President Obama needed to determine what the United States’ role would be in this conflict.
Congressional leaders from both parties were pushing the president to send defensive weapons to the Ukrainian government. Their argument was that supplying Ukraine with defensive weapons would deter Russian aggression by raising the costs of their involvement, making expansion into Europe too costly to be appealing. However, Russia had not responded to economic pressures earlier in the crisis. Economic sanctions causing the collapse of the Russian rouble and a severe financial crisis did little to discourage Russia’s interference. This lack of effect indicated the reality that Russia viewed influence in Ukraine a strategic priority, making it unlikely that Putin would back down due to increased costs. Because of this, sending lethal aid to the Ukrainian government ran the risk of escalating the conflict and pulling the United States into a proxy war with Russia. Sending arms could also potentially damage the United States’ relations with their European allies, as a disagreement over such a major policy would create a symbolic rift between the US and western Europe.
Alternatively, President Obama could refuse to send weapons to Ukraine and continue to pressure Russia through economic sanctions, as was the policy of the United States’ allies in Europe. European leaders opposed to arming the Ukrainian government argued that arming Ukraine would trigger a severe military escalation with Russia, raising the costs and risks for all parties involved. Leaders in Europe made it their highest priority to avoid such an escalation, instead opting for increased economic sanctions and continued peace talks. This would be more of the same policy for the conflict, but would avoid exacerbating the dispute. This “wait and see” policy would be risky domestically for President Obama, due to the lack of immediate political results, but would preserve cooperation with western Europe.
The Decision
On February 9, 2015, President Obama announced his decision to not send lethal defensive weapons to the Ukrainian government. Instead, the President chose to wait for the result of peace talks between Chancellor Merkel and Presidents Hollande, Poroshenko, and Putin scheduled for two days later. However, President Obama did not completely dismiss the possibility of supplying arms to Ukraine. The President made a point to keep the option of lethal defensive aid on the table as a threat. President Obama said that if diplomacy were to fail, he had asked his team to look alternative options, and “the possibility of lethal defensive weapons is one of those options” (The White House). Rather than make an explicit decision, President Obama chose to wait, saying that his policy would be determined based on the success of the coming peace talks.
Minsk II
Two days later, an agreement was reached in Minsk. The negotiating lasted for over sixteen hours before an agreement was reached. The agreement, known as Minsk II, aimed to restore the ceasefire of the original Minsk Protocol of September 2014.
Much like the original Minsk Protocol, Minsk II called for a bilateral ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry and foreign mercenaries by both sides, and monitoring of the ceasefire by the OSCE. The agreement also called for the temporary self-rule for the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in accordance with Ukrainian law, and stipulated that a dialogue was started concerning those regions’ political futures.
The immediate effect of Minsk II was a flare-up in violence before the ceasefire was officially enacted on February 15th. The ceasefire created a deadline for capturing territory, causing both sides to rush for last-minute victories before the ceasefire went into effect (Wall Street Journal). The fighting died down when February 15th arrived, making Minsk II an early success. However, the violence quickly started again: the OSCE teams tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and verifying the removal of weaponry reported that the ceasefire was frequently violated, creating doubts that the truce would last (Time).
This apparent diplomatic failure prompted new calls for action from Congress. On March 23rd, 2015, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on President Obama to provide lethal aid to Ukraine, urging the President to “fully and immediately exercise the authorities provided by Congress to provide Ukraine with lethal defensive weapon systems”. In June, a military policy bill was passed by Congress that approved $300 million in continued aid to Ukraine, but capped that aid at half of the approved amount unless 20% of it was earmarked for lethal weapons. After traveling to eastern Ukraine to observe the situation, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) declared that “the ceasefire with Russia is fiction” and criticized President Obama’s decision not to send lethal aid. Despite the apparent failure of Minsk II and renewed calls for arming Ukraine, President Obama did not act on the measures sent to him by Congress. Instead, the President continued to wait for a non-military solution.
Conclusion
After a shaky start, Minsk II appeared to take hold by September of 2015. While the truce was still frequently violated, the bulk of the fighting had ceased, bringing the conflict in Ukraine to a precarious close. According to the United Nations, the conflict left over 9,000 people dead and another 21,000 injured. Despite the substantial reduction in violence, the UN reported that the situation in eastern Ukraine was still “highly flammable” due to the continued flow of arms and ammunition from Russia. The conflict also left behind a humanitarian crisis. The fighting ended without a final settlement, creating a “frozen zone” where none of the governments involved claimed responsibility for rebuilding the destroyed regions. Creating these frozen zones in eastern Europe was a common strategy for post-Soviet Russia as a means to maintain influence in those regions (New York Times). The lack of a concrete settlement left the Donbas region in limbo, allowing Russia to continue interfering politically.
The Ukraine crisis did result in the United States sending arms to eastern Europe in 2015, but not to Ukraine. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter confirmed that the US was stationing tanks and other heavy military equipment to NATO member states along the Russian border, such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland. This was the first time that the US had stationed equipment in new NATO member states since the end of the Cold War. Secretary Carter confirmed that the US was sending these arms as “a response to Russia’s provocations,” stating that it was Russia’s “aggressive behavior” that was making NATO allies nervous. Sending arms to NATO countries created a deterrent for Russian invasion attempts. The US military equipment stationed in eastern Europe, combined with continued economic sanctions, created new pressures to restrict future Russian aggression.
