The Oakland Ghost Ship Fire: Preventing Disaster In Your Own Jurisdiction
A Tragedy of Far-Reaching Consequence
“This was no natural disaster, no earthquake, no terrorist shooting. This disaster was avoidable; 36 people were victims not just of the smoke and fire, but of recklessness, bureaucracy, and indifference. The harrowing stories of that night…tell a heartbreaking tale of what was lost and who should have known better.” — East Bay Times Reporters Julia Prodis Sulek and Matthias Gafni
On Friday, December 2, 2016, at approximately 11:24 p.m., Oakland, California firefighters responded to a fire at the Ghost Ship Warehouse, located at 1315 31st Avenue. Firefighters arrived to a chaotic scene with heavy black smoke billowing from a two-story warehouse. It would ultimately require three alarms and approximately 52 firefighters to extinguish the blaze that resulted in the deaths of 36 people (Oakland Fire Department, 2017, p. 3).
The Ghost Ship was a two-story building divided into living and working spaces. On the night of the fire the second floor of the building was being used to host a live music event (Oakland Fire Department, 2017, p. 3). There were approximately 100 guests in the structure that evening. It is likely they had no idea the building lacked fire protection systems such as fire sprinklers and smoke alarms. It is also unlikely they knew it was illegally operating as an event and living space and that Oakland building inspectors had tried unsuccessfully to gain access the building just two weeks prior. They were likely oblivious to the many dangers they were subjecting themselves to as they entered the building (Sulek & Gafni, 2016, paras. 17–18).
The fire was first detected at approximately 11:20 p.m. As it quickly grew from a small fire to a larger fire, attempts were made to quell the flames with fire extinguishers, but to no avail. It was then that a chaotic evacuation ensued. Those that escaped ran to the nearest fire station, approximately a block and a half, or about 500 feet, away. Firefighters had already been alerted via 911 and were in the process of responding. They arrived at approximately 11:27 p.m., just three minutes after receiving the first 911 call. It was already too late for the 36 individuals who were unable to escape, however (Sulek & Gafni, 2016, paras. 22–32). As the event unfolded, “some victims, realizing that they were facing death, texted family members to tell them they loved them and to say goodbye.” Firefighters found some victims “protecting each other, holding each other” (Rocha, Karlamangla, Panzar, & Hamilton, 2016, paras. 13–14).
Prior to becoming of the deadliest fire in Oakland’s history, the Ghost Ship was an affordable place for artists of all types to congregate, work, and live. There were makeshift staircases constructed from discarded wooden pallets as well as electrical and heating systems haphazardly cobbled together. Approximately 10,000 square feet in size, the interior was maze-like making finding an exit difficult. Lofts were constructed in order to accommodate more residents in an already overcrowded space. The building contained large amounts of all manner of things including musical instruments, paintings, and furniture (Bailey, 2017).
The Ghost Ship was home to artists, musicians, and poets who needed a place to live and create in an area where rent was cost-prohibitive for individuals involved in these pursuits. The building was leased in 2013 by Derick Almena who “reimagined it as a 24 hour creation space.” It was intended to be “a refuge and platform for artistic people who could not get a foothold in the creative economy.” People for whom it was true, as Almena put it, “you can’t pay your rent because your dream is bigger than your pocketbook.” Almena allowed a variety of payment options, even allowing some to pay by the day (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 3).
Many residents were aware of the dangers the building presented. One described the conditions stating “that place was a death trap. You turned on a heater and your electricity — everybody’s electricity would go off, so it was completely overloaded” (Bailey, 2017). Another stated “it was kind of exciting at first and then quickly became terrifying” and that he would sleep with a fire extinguisher every night. Yet another stated that locating an exit was difficult and that he “got lost there the first time I went in” (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 5).
The story of the Oakland Ghost Ship is one of avoidable tragedy. Sulek and Gafni (2016) write “this was no natural disaster, no earthquake, no terrorist shooting. This disaster was avoidable; 36 people were victims not just of the smoke and fire, but of recklessness, bureaucracy and indifference.” It is a “heartbreaking tale of what was lost and who should have known better” (paras. 7–8). This case study will provide details of the events leading up to the tragedy, the aftermath of freedoms and careers lost, and end with discussion generating questions designed to help prevent similar tragedy in the future.
The Precursors
The conditions leading to tragedy at the Ghost Ship represented a perfect storm that came together on the evening of December 2, 2016. There were several notable factors worthy of study to aid in the prevention of future incidents of this type. What follows are descriptions of the some of these precursors that led to this incident.
Oakland Hills Fire Inspections
“…Fire inspections are not necessarily important. Consistent training, increasing controls, and including policies and procedures over the inspection process would likely help ensure the accuracy and completeness of inspections and may help to further mitigate fire risk.” — Oakland City Auditor Courtney A. Ruby, 2013
The Hills section of Oakland was the site of another tragic fire in 1991. The wildfire killed 25 people and resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes. As a result of the fire, Oakland had put inspection processes into place intended to prevent the future occurrence of destruction of this magnitude. Specifically, Oakland firefighters had been tasked with inspecting residential properties for conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires (Debolt, 2016, paras. 1–2).
Emails obtained by Debolt (2016) in the days following the Ghost Ship fire paint a picture of a deeply flawed inspection system when it came to the Hills properties. It appears that it was a common occurrence to sign off on properties “despite overgrown vegetation around homes that clearly posed a high fire danger.” In fact, spot checks of previously inspected properties revealed hazards present at as many as 28 properties previously cleared by firefighters (paras. 2–3).
The apparent lack of attention to the Hills inspections raised questions as to whether or not the Oakland Fire Department (OFD) could adequately handle inspections of any kind. The inspection load was, and is enormous. There are approximately 21,000 residential properties that firefighters are tasked with inspecting prior to each fire season. “They are supposed to check for overgrowth of trees and bushes, tall weeds and grasses, dead vegetation, and even ivy growing on houses, which can act like a ladder for a fire.” There are currently two full-time civilian inspectors, and a few part-time seasonal inspectors, who are responsible for vacant lots and open spaces. These civilians also respond to complaints which often results in them looking at properties previously inspected by firefighters. It is on these re-inspections where the falsification of inspection records often comes to light (Debolt, 2016, paras. 10–12).
Failure to properly document inspections actually performed was another issue. It was determined that Oakland firefighters had “routinely failed to enter inspection results into the city database.” Further, some were not completed because firefighters claimed the inability to locate or access the properties (Debolt, 2016, paras. 25–26). An audit performed by then-City Auditor Courtney Ruby revealed issues dating back to at least 2011. Ruby identified the need for “stronger supervision, quality control measures, better oversight” after determining there was a poor attitude among firefighters that “fire inspections are not necessarily important” (Debolt, paras. 13–14).
According to a former employee and whistleblower, at least prior to October, 2015, OFD inspectors were mostly interested in collecting a paycheck. He claimed, in a letter to mayor Libby Schaaf, that he had found evidence of rampant falsification of fire inspections and had previously been told it would be corrected, although the issue had yet to be addressed. The picture painted is one of a tremendously broken culture (Debolt, 2017, paras. 18 & 27).
Building Fire Inspections
Like many fire departments across the nation, the OFD was struggling with completing fire and life safety inspections of the buildings within its jurisdiction. According to Debolt (2016), the Ghost Ship had never been inspected although it had been registered as a city business (para. 10). It was determined after the fire that the structure had not been inspected in at least 30 years (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 5).
At the time of the fire, the OFD had 6 fire inspectors. These inspectors were also responsible for the aforementioned Hills properties inspections (Peele, Gafni, & Debolt, 2017, para. 5). In the aftermath of the fire, lack of staffing within the Fire Prevention Bureau was cited as one reason that many inspections had fallen through the cracks (Peele et al., para. 28).
A system did exist within the OFD where firefighters could refer fire code issues observed to the Fire Prevention Bureau. The system was intended to provide a vehicle by which Bureau inspectors could officially be made aware of unsafe conditions, perform follow up inspections, address violations, and enforce compliance through citations and fines, if necessary. This is often a long and laborious process (Peele et al., 2017, paras. 1–3).
A typical process of this type would begin with firefighters observing an issue or issues and notifying the Fire Prevention Bureau. A bureau inspector would then perform an official inspection of the site and provide the person responsible with written notice of any violations along with a correction deadline. A follow-up inspection would then be performed on or after the correction deadline. In cases where violations are not corrected, citations may be issued if it is apparent that the occupant is not making good faith effort towards correction. If it appears good faith effort is being made, deadlines may be extended. The process continues until all violations are adequately addressed.
Records obtained indicated that 879 such referrals were made between 2011 and the time of the Ghost Ship fire. Included within these reported facilities were apartment buildings, commercial buildings, and schools. From these records it was determined that hundreds of these referrals were never followed up on. Specifically, 696, or 79 percent, of the buildings referred did not receive fire inspections. 183, or 21 percent, of the buildings were inspected although it was not uncommon for it to take months or years to complete the inspections (Peele et al., 2017, paras. 1–3). It was also determined that fires had ultimately occurred in 15 of the buildings referred but not inspected (Peele et al., para. 15).
There were indications that there were issues with the inspection program prior to the Ghost Ship fire. An Alameda County Grand Jury investigation in 2014 determined that “more than a third of commercial buildings went unchecked despite city code that at the time had required annual inspections.” In 2015 the state certification required to perform inspections in high hazard occupancies such as gas stations and industrial facilities was revoked. The revocation effectively took the ability out of the hands of the OFD to ensure code compliance in what could be considered the jurisdiction’s most hazardous facilities. This represented the first revocation of this certification within the State of California (Debolt, 2016, para. 11).
Firefighter Awareness
Debolt (2016) writes that there was a fire station within walking distance of the Ghost Ship (para. 10). In fact, firefighters responded to a couch on fire outside of the building approximately 2 years prior to the tragic fire. It was at that time that they also toured the interior of the building. One firefighter reportedly told the holder of the lease, Derick Almena, that everything was fine as long as he maintained marked fire exits. Firefighters then twice returned the next day to partake in a private party with live music and dancing. There existed at that time the aforementioned illegal living spaces, an inordinate amount of highly flammable objects and materials, as well as the staircase fashioned from wooden shipping pallets (Gafni, 2017c, paras. 1–4).
In spite of Oakland firefighter attendance at parties in the Ghost Ship, no conditions were reported to the OFD and no records of fire code enforcement efforts were found. The firefighters who attended the party in 2014 did not report any concerns or try to ensure violations were corrected. Upon learning of this information, OFD officials painted a picture of dereliction of duty stating there was “direct evidence of misuse of property” and that firefighters were “being negligent by not responding properly” and “ignoring telltale signs of danger.” One retired fire marshal weighed in stating that firefighters “are the eyes of the department” and their failure to immediately report the conditions represented “a problem that obviously needs to change” (Gafni, 2017c, paras. 6–9).
An additional fire department employee named “Brian” reportedly had occasion to enter the warehouse approximately 2 months before the fire. While there he recommended that the tenants fix some exposed electrical wiring simply by covering it up (Gafni, 2017d, paras. 1 & 11). Additionally, in the 2 years preceding the fire, police had been called to numerous parties at the warehouse and numerous complaints had been filed with the city by neighbors. Specifically, three complaints had been filed concerning hazards within the building between 2014 and 2015, and 18 complaints filed about an adjacent vacant lot between 2008 and 2016 (Rocha et al., 2016, para. 20). In spite of these complaints, Fire Chief Teresa Deloach Reed claimed that the OFD was not aware that the Ghost Ship was being used as a residence or for parties (Sernoffsky, Veklerov, & Fimrite, 2017, para. 38).
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the Ghost Ship tragedy brought about negative repercussions for many people. Included in these were the operators of the facility itself, Oakland Fire Chief Teresa Deloach Reed, and the operators of many similar facilities not only in Oakland, but nationwide. What follows are descriptions of how this incident negatively affected lives and has begun to bring about change.
Criminal Charges
As a result of the inferno, criminal charges were filed against leaseholder Derick Almena and tenant Max Harris (McLaughlin & Gast, 2017, para. 1). Each was charged with 36 counts of involuntary manslaughter which could result in up to 39 years in prison, according to prosecutors (Sernoffsky et al., 2017, para. 4). According to California law, the two are culpable as they created an environment in which 36 people ultimately died (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 2).
In an interview with the “Today” show, Almena was defensive claiming the space had been legal when he first rented it, although it had gone through many modifications since (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 1). Alameda County District Attorney Nancy O’Malley has seen things differently, however, stating that the two men “knowingly created a fire trap with inadequate means of escape. They then filled that area with human beings and are now facing the consequences of their action” (McLaughlin & Gast, 2017, para. 3). O’Malley continued stating “paying guests were faced with a nearly impossible labyrinth to get out of the building” (Sernoffsky et al., 2017, para. 3). Finally, O’Malley has claimed that the men allowed up to 25 people to live on the premises, stuffed “floor-to-ceiling” with highly combustible items, while purposely concealing these facts from building ownership and city officials (McLaughlin & Gast, para. 10). Former employees of Almena claimed he had been made aware of the hazards but had “laughed off those warnings” (Noyes, 2016, para. 2). As of the writing of this case study, the criminal charges are still unresolved, currently making their way through the criminal justice system.
Oakland Fire Department Leadership
“We have been doing what we always did, and up to this point, it worked. But now we’ve discovered that maybe what we’ve been doing isn’t working.” — Oakland Fire Chief Teresa Deloach Reed
Along with criticism of the OFD’s inspection programs, the Ghost Ship fire has generated harsh criticism of departmental leadership. Specifically under scrutiny was then-Fire Chief Teresa Deloach Reed. Although there was new criticism of the OFD’s inspection programs in the days immediately following the fire, Hills residents had long complained about a department with “a preference for fire suppression, not fire prevention” (Gafni, 2017a, para. 4). According to Debolt (2017), the North Hills Community Association wrote a letter to city leaders soon after the deadly fire raising concerns about fire inspection quality of their properties which was mostly identical to one written a year earlier (para. 12). Gafni (2017a) expresses his thoughts stating “our frustration is with her performance. There’s been a very long learning curve and we’re running out of time…When it takes too long to get something done, the buck stops with her office” (para. 5). According to Debolt (2017), inaction of the OFD is evidenced in a missed February deadline as well as missing a second summer deadline imposed by city officials to describe how the inadequacies in the Hills inspections programs would be addressed (para. 15).
Staffing had also been an issue under Reed’s tenure. Gafni (2017b) also criticizes the chief for allowing key leadership positions to remain open for too long. At one point, the city fire marshal position had gone unfilled for more than a year (para. 6). According to president of the local firefighters union, Zac Unger, understaffing in the fire marshal’s office had been a problem for years. This understaffing had made it impossible to keep up with inspections as the city aged and new construction continued. Unger claimed “had a fire inspector walked into that building and seen the conditions in there, they would have shut the place down” (Rocha et al., 2016, paras. 28–31).
Bringing further scrutiny upon Reed was her reaction to criticism during a meeting of hillside residents in which she was described as “temperamentally unfit for the job” (East Bay Times Editorial Board, 2017, para. 3). Gafni (2017a) describes a “10-minute rant” in which Reed “threatened to sue a homeowner and claimed the organization was biased against her and used her as a scapegoat for problems in the Hills” (para. 1). The East Bay Times Editorial Board (2017) goes on to contend that Reed “…must professionally respond to criticism of the Fire Department and of her leadership…She might disagree with critics, but threatening to sue them is beyond the pale…More significantly, Reed’s reaction reveals a defensiveness that makes constructive corrections impossible. Right now, there’s a clear need for radically reforming the deeply dysfunctional Oakland Fire Department” (paras. 4–6).
In response to the criticism of her department, Reed stated “we’ve been doing things as we always did, and up to this point it worked…But now we’ve discovered that maybe what we’ve been doing is not working.” In response to this statement the East Bay Times Editorial Board (2016) stated “apparently, she’s just discovered what the grand jury, the city auditor and hills residents have been saying for years. The department is broken. Its job is not just to put out fires but to prevent them. At that it has utterly failed” (paras. 13–14). In another editorial the East Bay Times Editorial Board (2017) put forth the opinion that Reed lacked the capability to fix the issues in the beleaguered department (para. 2). Within 4 months of the fire Reed succumbed to the pressure and retired (Gafni, 2017b, para. 1).
The DIY Community
“We really need people with institutional power to care about local art, to care about how vital these communities are and how life-saving they are.” — Pure Joy DIY Venue Board Member Jes Skolnick
In addition to initiating dialogue concerning fire safety and building inspections, the Ghost Ship fire has put the spotlight on the DIY performance and living community (Mejia, 2016, para. 2). Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf stated “in the wake of the Ghost Ship tragedy, unpermitted living, assembly, and workspaces are under heightened scrutiny” (Lefebvre, 2017, para. 3). Within days of the fire an undetermined number of Bay Area DIY spaces had been served eviction notices or “red-tagged” by the city (Mejia, para. 4). City officials also sent warning letters to many other venues suspected of operating illegally (Lefebvre, para. 12). This type of activity was not limited just to the Oakland area, however. Other cities found to be targeting these types of facilities included Denver, Colorado, and Baltimore, Maryland (Mejia, paras. 5 & 9).
According to Mejia (2016), “evictions are a sore subject in the Bay Area, particularly in Oakland” (para. 13). The incident generated a great deal of inspection activity with inspectors being sent to several facilities suspected of housing people illegally (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 7). There has been some speculation as to whether these inspections were random in nature or generated by complaints. Many believe the inspections are directly related to the fire at the Ghost Ship, regardless of claims, however. Others believe “these inspections are merely an acceleration of the inevitable…Ghost Ship is expediting something that was happening anyway for a while now” (Mejia, paras. 6–11).
There has also been speculation that landlords have used the tragedy as an excuse to carry out evictions. Described as “well-timed opportunism” landlords are “seizing hysteria and panic right now as an opportunity to oust tenants of properties that are more valuable after they redevelop, and they’re able to do so right now in the guise of safety” (Mejia, 2016, para. 12). These evictions have hit those in the “live-work” sector the hardest, particularly musicians and artists. Approximately one dozen operators of DIY facilities were evicted for safety reasons within months of the fire (Lefebvre, 2017, para. 3).
Response to increased inspections and evictions has come in two forms. Some DIY operators have begun to comply with laws and code requirements while others are receding further into the underground world (Lefebvre, 2017, para. 4). It has been found that many operators are “scrubbing their Facebook feeds of mentions of similar places, and communicating through an encrypted message system” (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 7). DIY facilities have common characteristics unlikely to change. They are “transient” and transform over time. What is likely to change with increased regulation is their visibility. Rather than comply with the laws, many of these venues are likely to be driven even further underground (Mejia, 2016, para. 26).
Those sympathetic to the plight of the starving artist have a different take on the situation. These are venues that “offer burgeoning creative, many of them marginalized, rare opportunities to thrive, especially in prohibitively expensive cities like San Francisco” (Mejia, 2016, para. 3). Many take the position that one dangerous situation, such as that presented in the Ghost Ship, does not mean that all of them present the same hazards (Wallace-Wells, 2016, para. 7). As written by Mejia, “we really need people with institutional power to care about local art, to care about how vital these communities are and how life-saving they are” (para. 27). Some claim authorities must “move away from a punitive system in which officials ‘red tag’ buildings and kick out tenants, and instead help underground spaces become safe for existing residents.” The current system often results in those seeking help being rendered homeless. The desire of the DIY community is “a new pathway to legitimacy” (Levin, 2016, paras. 25–26).
In the days following the deadly Ghost Ship fire, $1.7 million in grant funding “to support affordable and safe spaces for the city’s artists and art organizations” was announced. The grant was designed to assist “arts organizations facing displacement” and to “establish permanently affordable spaces for artists and art organizations.” The funding recognizes the vital role the arts play in the vitality of the community (Cameron, 2016, paras. 1–4).
Teaching Notes
Target Audience
Upper level fire administrators and fire chiefs, fire marshals, fire department prevention bureau and operations personnel, city administrators, policy makers, and elected officials.
Synopsis
The Ghost Ship tragedy was a historic event as it represents one of the highest losses of life due to fire within the United States in recent decades. The incident presents valuable lessons to be learned through the subsequent criticism of OFD leadership and departmental fire prevention efforts. It is imperative that anybody involved in the field of emergency management take heed so that tragedies like this may be avoided in the future. Decisions concerning fire prevention efforts, and their effects on all involved, are the core elements of this case study.
Learning Objectives
While there are direct correlations between actions taken and not taken leading to the Ghost Ship tragedy, there are many less obvious learning opportunities present within this case. While in the early stages of positive change, it appears that the OFD is taking steps to improve their culture and processes. Leadership issues have been addressed and there is renewed emphasis on fire prevention activities within the department. Some of the less obvious learning opportunities from the Ghost Ship tragedy include:
· It is important to conduct a Community Risk Reduction Analysis so that resources may be deployed in the most efficient manner possible.
· When it comes to potential hazards, if you see something, say something.
· If internal leadership does not ensure responsibilities are being carried out in and effective and ethical manner, someone outside of the organization will.
· Change in policies or programs in response to an incident such as this may be perceived as overbearing and unnecessary by some segments of the public.
· The news media will absolutely affect public perception of all factors involved in any incident it decides to report on. Careers may hang in the balance.
· When negligent practices come to light it is often departmental leadership who will take the blame, not the personnel delivering service at the street level.
· Management and response to emergencies is an inherently political process.
Teaching Strategy
Participants should be walked through the incident, precursors, and aftermath of the Ghost Ship fire as each contains valuable information concerning how a conglomeration of factors can lead to tragic consequences. The implications of decisions made and not made should become apparent throughout the study and lead to discussion of both technical and adaptive solutions towards preventing future tragedy of this type. Looking at the events pre and post disaster should provide participants with a context to generate meaningful discussion and solutions.
Questions for Discussion
· What leadership traits could have helped avoid the conditions which led to this tragedy?
· How would you have addressed attitudes, within your department, that fire inspections are not important?
· How would you have addressed evidence of fire inspection report falsification?
· How would you react to personal and professional criticism levied towards you as a leader of your department in the aftermath of an incident such as this?
· How do you as a leader survive political scrutiny manifesting as a result of both lack of enforcement efforts and escalated enforcement efforts?
· What are the ways a fire department can gain access to commercial occupancies?
· What technology can be used to track commercial occupancies and inspection intervals?
· How would you go about conducting a Community Risk Reduction Analysis?
· What technology can be utilized in conducting your Community Risk Reduction Analysis and gaining a better understanding of your local fire problem?
· How would you categorize the hazard levels of different types of commercial occupancies?
· How would you determine the needed inspection intervals of each hazard level?
· How many fire inspectors would you need to inspect each commercial occupancy in your jurisdiction at the appropriate intervals?
· How might we address hazardous situations while still allowing commercial ventures of all types to flourish?
· How might we address the hazards inherent with underground and poorly financed commercial ventures without forcing them further underground?
References
Bailey, M. (2017). Inside the Oakland Ghost Ship warehouse before deadly fire. New York Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com
Cameron, K. (2016, December 6). Oakland fire: Mayor announces $1.7 million grant to help artists. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Debolt, D. (2016, December 24). Fire department emails: Inspections flawed in fire-prone Oakland hills. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Debolt, D. (2017, January 13). Oakland whistleblower: I spent two years complaining about fire inspections. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
East Bay Times Editorial Board. (2016, December 27). Editorial: Ghost Ship exposes Oakland Fire Department dysfunction. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
East Bay Times Editorial Board. (2017, January 31). Editorial: Oakland fire chief clearly doesn’t get it, she should go. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Gafni, M. (2017a, January 20). Oakland fire chief threatens to sue hills residents in contentious meeting. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Gafni, M. (2017b, March 14). Oakland fire chief Teresa Deloach Reed retires. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Gafni, M. (2017c, May 8). Exclusive: Oakland firefighters attended a party at Ghost Ship, witnesses say. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Gafni, M. (2017d, June 29). Ghost Ship lawsuit: Oakland fire employee saw exposed wiring at Ghost Ship two months before deadly fire. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Lefebvre, S. (2017, June 2). Oakland artists after ‘Ghost Ship’ fire: ‘We knew things would never be the same.’ The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com
Levin, S. (2016, December 5). Oakland warehouse fire is product of housing crisis, say artists and advocates. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com
McLaughlin, E., & Gast, P. (2017, June 5). Two arrested in Oakland’s deadly Ghost Ship fire. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com
Mejia, P. (2016, December 28). DIY in crisis: Has Oakland’s Ghost Ship fire jeopardized the underground? Rolling Stone. Retrieved from http://www.rollingstone.com
Noyes, D. (2016, December 4). Ex-employees say Ghost Ship founder disregarded fire hazard warnings. ABC 7 News. Retrieved from http://www.abc7news.com
Oakland Fire Department. (2017). Origin and cause report. Retrieved from http://www2.oaklandnet.com
Peele, T., Gafni, M., & Debolt, D. (2017, July 16). ‘Huge failure’: 80 percent of Oakland firefighter warnings of unsafe buildings go unchecked. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Rocha, V., Karlamanga, S., Panzar, J. & Hamilton, M. (2016, December 6). Emergency declaration sought in Oakland after deadly warehouse fire. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com
Sernoffsky, E., Veklerov, K., & Fimrite, P. (2016, June 6). Ghost Ship: Authorities arrest 2 in deadly fire that killed 36. SFGATE. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com
Sulek, J., & Gafni, M. (2016, December 11). The last hours of Oakland’s Ghost Ship warehouse. The East Bay Times. Retrieved from http://www.eastbaytimes.com
Wallace-Wells, B. (2016, December 13). What happened, exactly, in Oakland’s Ghost Ship fire? The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com
