‘Unstable Stability’ in North Caucasus: strategies and challenges of the Russian Federation to ensure security
Introduction
The Caucasus region has historically presented a security dilemma for the surrounding powers — Russia, Turkey and Iran — as it is home to different nationalities and is at the gateway to Europe and Asia.
In the republics of the North Caucasus, belonging to the Russian Federation, the situation is even more complex because it is home to numerous nations — historically combative of Russian authority — which present low rates of socio-economic development and create a potential source of instability.
This multiplicity of nations, added to a difficult geographical context, made it possible for this to be a challenging territory when it comes to effectively controlling it and imposing state authority. One of the most recent memories is the two Chechen wars of secession during the early 1990s and 2000s.
Despite the imposition of Russian authority and the impediment of state disintegration, the region presents a marked economic and social backwardness as a result of the aftermath of prolonged conflicts. This creates an adequate breeding ground for the proliferation of religious and nationalist radicalism, undermining the current weak stability in the medium and long term.
Taking into account this tense context, the Kremlin has been developing different strategies to stabilize the region. From economic measures, such as subsidies and infrastructure projects, to policies such as relating to local power elites and co-opting their loyalty. However, these strategies, being dependent on economic financing and concessions to regional leaders, can present serious challenges to their effective long-term results.
The North Caucasus region today
The most important feature of the current situation in the region is the stark contrast between the visible stability on the socio-political surface and the underlying fierce struggle between actors competing for power, economic gain, and social influence outside the domain of public policy. (Ivanov, 2009) In this context, it is important to understand the role that clans -groups united by special economic and political interests- have in society and that fight for influence in most of the republics of the North Caucasus occupying long-standing spaces. term and well protected in local political and economic structures. (Ivanov , 2009)
Another point to highlight from the current situation is the low levels of living standards in the region. The levels of unemployment and poverty are very high compared to the Russian average. This to led to the resurgence of historic ethnic tensions and grievances between different ethnic groups. Frequent wars and invasions led to numerous population movements among many ethnic groups in the region and a large number of unresolved reciprocal territorial claims between them, exacerbating the violence (Ivanov , 2011 ).
Contrary to the secessionist wars in Chechnya during the 1990s, there is little evidence to show that the current violence occurring in the region is motivated by secessionist aspirations. The legacy of the Chechen wars remains fresh in the collective minority and there seems to be a tacit recognition among the republics that the region could not function as independent states ( Kuchins , Malarkey, and Markedonov (2011).
Kremlin strategies to ensure regional stability.
Regarding economic issues, a significant sum of federal subsidies has been provided within the so-called “Strategy for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus Federal District.” According to this, the main objective is “to increase the development of production in the region and improve the quality of life of its residents. It is expected to change from a policy of support to stability to the economic impulse”( Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation , 2010.p.3).
Regarding subsidies, they took two forms. The former, called “subsidies for the alignment of budgetary capacity,” are distributed among federal subjects according to an established methodology, which accounts for budgetary expenses and tax capacity in individual subjects. A second set of transfers or “subsidies to guarantee a balanced budget” are more arbitrary when it comes to distributing them. The goal of these transfers is to address financial needs that are not adequately met by the first set of grants. These create a condition of dependency in the region and limit the potential for separatism; sustained economic growth in the region would probably have a compensatory function with respect to regional integration in the Russian state. (Holland , 2016 )
Regarding political strategies, Moscow seeks (a) to trust the loyal heads of the republics to impose at least a superficial order and ensure acceptable electoral results; (b) the implementation of administrative reforms (for example, of local self-government structures) to create focal points of influence at the local level independent of the “clan network”; and © use of a federal law enforcement and security apparatus to overcome criminalized structures (Ivanov, 2009)
The most emblematic case is the Chechenization strategy — the transfer of important political, administrative and military functions to the Chechens (Ivanov , 20009 ) began in 2003 and was accentuated in 2007 with the arrival of Ramzam Kadyrov . to power. The dynamics of Chechen society, thus far, have worked to the benefit of Kadyrov and Moscow, because most Chechens still want to identify themselves as loyal to the Vaynach (Chechnya) nation , rather than embrace radical Islam and erase their identity. (Dzutsati , 2016 ) However, territorial conflicts between ethnic groups added to the ambitions of Ramzan Kadyrov , in particular, have made the neighboring republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, worried about possible disputes ( Hedenskog , Holmquist , and Norberg , 2018)
Final comments
Relations between the peoples of the Caucasus and Russia have historically been complex, making it difficult for the Kremlin to impose authority in a land considered vitally important to Russian internal security. The numerous violent conflicts and prevailing instability have made it a region prone to religious extremism as a result of a lack of job opportunities and a future for young people.
To prevent this weak stability from collapsing, various strategies have been carried out: economic (through subsidies) and political (through rapprochement with local elites). However, the difficulties of the Russian economy and the new sources of instability generated by Kremlin loyalists such as Ramam Kadyrov can pose serious challenges to medium- and long-term stability in the region.
Author — Nicolás Font is a fellow at the Caucasus-Asia Center.
[Disclaimer- The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Caucasus-Asia Center or its members.]
References
Dzutsati , V (2016) Strategic assessment : Russian policy in the North Caucasus remains in flux. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 13 (175)
Holland, E (2016) Economic Development and Subsidies in the North Caucasus. Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 63: 50–6.
Hedenskog , J Holmquist , E, Norberg , J (2018) Security in the Caucasus: Russian policy and military posture. Swedish Defense Research Agency.
Ivanov, A (2009) Strategic conflict assessment North Caucasus. INCAS Consluting Kuchins , A Malarkey , M , Markedonov , S (2011) The North Caucasus: Russia’s volatile frontier. Center for Strategic and International Studies
Documents consulted
Strategy for the Socioeconomic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District until 2025) (September 6, 2010), Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation
