#CCLKOW: ‘My Correct Views’ on Generalship
This week’s discussion centers on the subject of Generalship. Positing that it exceeds the bounds of previous levels of command, the piece examines its unique facets to distill a basic model to describe the qualifications for a ‘good general.’ I will not claim that this model is right, but I do think it correct. Which brings me to the title. It is borrowed from another author, whose own use was an appropriation from someone else, and so is perfectly applied here.* Its point is to describe a state of scholarship which is appropriately based upon the evidence but which makes no claim as the only answer. Enjoy the post, consider the model and the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.
We turn this week to the matter of Generalship.
Most accept we understand intuitively that the rank enjoys a uniqueness from the others, in stature and responsibility. It is that fact which make the question of understanding good generalship so contested. To begin, there is the problem of favoritism in scholarship. Everyone — including myself — has them, and as icons which demonstrate an ideal of some sort, there is nothing wrong with them. However, there is a point at which this becomes blind hero worship, and that is of no use to either practical study or academia.
But even in its uniqueness, a good understanding of this character is often hindered by overstating their singular relevance. We ought to question seriously the scholarly attention they receive. It is too easy to fall in love with the bright lights, to over-value them, to look only to the top and ignore so much that is important in understanding military history and contemporary practice. Thus, while they stand at the head of events, they are not the sum of them.
Against this historic status, though, we must also reckon appropriately the limitations of the rank within societies which separate the military from the civil authority. A good general, no matter the brilliance of tactic or strategy, cannot retrieve a bad policy or unachievable end.
Within the extant force structures that have governed for more than two centuries and given this tension between power and constraint, and placed within the context of historic events, the requirements and qualifications are thus a complex balance of forces in context. Good generalship is more than officership, leadership, or command, and includes executive, governmental, and public concerns. Put simply, it is the balance of the political, institutional, unit, and personnel needs according to the situation and strategy.
Of course, the terms of these force need unpacking.
By political, I mean a very large collection of things. At the most basic, this is the policy ends to which military means are applied. More broadly, it also includes both the basis of governance and the politics of the state. To grasp these demands a good awareness of the society, culture, economy which sustain the state. And finally, there is the international political and diplomatic system within which military force operates.
Turning to institutional, we must acknowledge the general’s obligation to the organization and its survival. Whereas the survival of a company, battalion, regiment, or division is in the long term irrelevant except as a matter of pride, that of the army is a matter of life and death. Generals are the keepers of the institution in perpetuity. This is also important because more so than any other rank, the general is the ultimate product of the institution: truly bad generals are mistakes, but the overall quality of the rank is the expression and reflection of the relative virtue of the institution. If there is a problem with the generals, there is a problem with the army.
The unit and personnel factors are the same as those found at other ranks, only magnified in scale. This characteristic matters because at scale things change. The rate and quality of delegation expands remarkably, as do the implications of responsibility. Thus, whereas the institution represents the general’s responsibilities to the holistic organization at the political and administrative level, the unit and the personnel represent this responsibility to the constituent pieces in the execution of their functions.
As an example of the model applied, consider Washington. His political acumen as to the individual and collected states, that of the enemy, other interested foreign parties, and the Colonial culture and economy was legion. He was acutely committed to the strength and health of the infant army he helped to create. And he was finely attuned to the use and support of his subordinate commands and soldiers. Taking all of these forces into consideration, he led a strategy suited to the strengths and weaknesses of the state, society, and armed forces which would most likely achieve the ends of the war. I would suggest a similar assessment could be made of Wellington at Waterloo or Marshall in WWII. Furthermore, one can also see the contours of failure for a Rommel or a Lee in this model as well, demonstrating the fallacy of conflating grand tactical acumen with the full spectrum of generalship’s demands.
Intending this as a starting point rather than an end, let us now turn to the questions:
Is this a sufficient model to explain generalship? What might you add, delete, or modify? Why?
To be clear, this piece is predominantly based upon a landpower view of the flag rank. To what extent does the model reflect or not the requirements for the same in the naval and air services?
(*) Peter Novick, “My Correct Views on Everything,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Jun., 1991), pp. 699–703. The article, by the way, is definitely worth a read if you want to understand something of the nature of history and historians.
