Officer Growth and Development: Using Feedback

CCL KOW
CCLKOW ProChat
Published in
5 min readApr 11, 2016

Wednesday was a week two months in the making for me. Before you get overly excited for me or offer your congratulations, let me warn you that Wednesday was, by no means, a day I won’t soon forget. Nevertheless, it was one I was looking forward to. Sixty days ago I submitted a request for feedback through the Army’s Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback site. This week’s #CCLKOW isn’t meant to be a “rousing call against the man” or a jab at the Army’s attempt at crafting yet another website in the black hole of websites, rather, this is a call to the rest of us who complain about the system, but are actually part of the problem.

A number of years ago, the Army directed the use of the MSAF360 IAW AR 623–3 and AR 350–1 and has made a requirement for raters of officers to include a contentious bullet about whether or not the rated officer has initiated a MSAF this rating period. Furthermore, Army directive 2016–06 (http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/ad2016_06.pdf) added a requirement for CSL select commanders to complete a CDR360 and discuss the results with their raters. Whether or not this is a “good” idea isn’t the point of this piece. I’ll leave that up for the masses to decide. When I initiated a MSAF 360 event 60 days ago, I did so seeking some honest and useful feedback. My hopes weren’t high as this wasn’t the first MSAF 360 event that I initiated, but I remain a hopeless romantic for the MSAF 360, hoping one day to get enough results that the data I receive can perhaps be used in some sense. The Army’s intent behind the MSAF360/CDR360 is to “facilitate a leader’s growth and development by providing information on the leader’s capabilities from multiple perspectives to facilitate more informed coaching, counseling, and dialogue.”

This brings me to my first point of order. The MSAF requires the rated officer to select three superiors, five peers, and five subordinates to receive feedback from. In my latest report I received seven responses of the required 13 in order to be more reliable. Of the seven responses I did receive, five were from subordinates (I requested six), one was from a superior, and two were from peers. Without being overbearing, I did send a “reminder” at the halfway point and once one week before the end of the 60 days that I gave to my population to submit feedback. It’s very difficult to craft a personal development plan when the number of perspectives one receives isn’t enough to provide feedback. The only accountability on behalf of the individual giving the feedback comes from the pestering of the rated officer; which could skew feedback. The MSAF system didn’t deliver quantitative feedback on peers and superiors because I simply didn’t receive enough responses. Effectively, it’s like I received only five responses since the feedback from my two peers and one superior weren’t interpreted.

While I may not have received all the responses I needed, I was excited to read the ones that I did get. In the era of relatively little “snail mail”, MSAF feedback gives me the same thrill as opening a letter from friends and family. I am aware that the noble wisdom that “we are our greatest critics” is fairly accurate, but the responses that I received were beyond my wildest expectations. There were way too many “100%” responses. This isn’t meant to be an attempt to gloat, but a chance to highlight my second point of order. We know that the Army has, or had, a problem with “toxic leadership.” I don’t know how many people would say that they’ve experienced toxic leadership at some point in their career, but I’d venture to guess that the number is high. I once served under a toxic leader as well, but when we’re presented with the opportunity to provide those leaders with feedback, so many resort to selecting the left/right justified responses instead of taking the time to provide targeted feedback. I make that assessment based on my own experience with multiple MSAF reports and conversations with peers who have some of the same frustrations. Your experience will be the basis for a discussion question this week. The “perception gaps” (IFR Guide 7) that the MSAF attempts to identify, the delta between how a leader perceives his/her leadership effectiveness and how others view it, is skewed when inaccurate feedback is given.

The power of the MSAF as a leader development tool can be an excellent. Those of us within the Army who call for our evaluation system to more closely resemble that of our civilian counterparts have the ultimate opportunity to grant that wish in the MSAF system. What we must not forget to do in the MSAF process is what I call the “follow through.” Just like the expert golfer, his/her form wasn’t developed over night. The follow through is rarely done and it is the part of the MSAF where the rater/subordinate discuss the results and evaluate which of the qualitative comments are actionable and develop concrete goals together for working on any issues. This achieves the Army’s desired goal of quality coaching and counseling between raters and their subordinates. In its current form, the chatter that I hear is that the MSAF system isn’t working. I’d like to propose that we look more inwardly at the source of the issue related to the MSAF to evaluate why it isn’t working. This will serve as the source of our discussion questions:

Question 1) What has been your experience with the MSAF? Has it “worked” for you? Why? Why not?

Question 2) Do we propagate the problem of toxic leadership across the military by not giving honest feedback during the MSAF and other feedback symposiums?

Question 3) Rapid Fire Question: If you could make one change to the Army’s MSAF, what would it be?

This week we’ve included two pieces of recommended additional reading on the subject. Each provide great feedback about coaching and counseling our subordinates; a cornerstone of our duty as professionals.

ttps://medium.com/@FrontLineLeader/developing-competent-leaders-through-feedback-and-performance-assessment-4c9c7292e142#.bx656emcp

References:

United States (2008). IFR Analysis Guide, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Dept. of the Army.

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CCL KOW
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