Red Tape in the Morning, Staff Officer’s Warning
Greetings CCLKOW readers. Today we bring to you a new guest author, @fightingsailor, an officer of the Royal Navy whose biography you can find below. In this piece he discusses the implications of budgets, efficiency and effectiveness. With the latest Strategic Defence and Security Review eagerly awaited here in the United Kingdom, the matter of managing defence in an era of constrained budgets weighs heavily upon the proceedings. In this piece, our author contends with the conflicts and contradictions of the various means to ‘do more with less.’ Although focussed on issues facing defence in the UK, as the American defence establishment grapples again with the demands of sequestration the piece should resonate with the audience on that side of the pond. So, read the piece, consider the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.
“My department’s budget may be rising again but there will be no let-up in getting more value for money… Efficiency savings mean we will be able to spend more on cyber, more on unmanned aircraft, more on the latest technology, keeping ahead of our adversaries.” — Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence [1]
In this short essay I will examine what value for money means in the context of Defence and whether the inevitable SDSR [2] drive for greater ‘efficiency’ is, in fact, counter-productive in achieving the purpose of the Armed Forces.
As the Secretary of State alludes, the drive for ‘Value for Money’ in Defence is usually shorthand for efficiency. Efficiency is the ratio of output to input. In other words, the drive for greater efficiency means attempting to do more with less or, at least, doing the same with less or more with the same. There are a couple of issues here for defence strategists. First, there is an inherent assumption that we understand what our outputs are. We go to great lengths to define these and set up business agreements between the different parts of Defence to ensure that everybody plays their agreed part in delivering them. This implies, generally, that the purpose of the Armed Forces is to output Forces ready to be used for operations. In part this is true, especially if one applies the POSIWID principle [3], but surely the purpose of the military is to deliver successful Government policy outcomes. Many of the outputs of Defence may not be relevant to achieving such outcomes in any given crisis. Take the recent Operation GRITROCK, the UK Military’s contribution to the fight against Ebola in West Africa. This wasn’t part of any Force Design or Force Testing scenario that I am aware of, and was delivered using Forces whose justification for existence (and thus attribution of input resources such as funding) was for other Military Tasks [4], yet a positive policy outcome was achieved for Her Majesty’s Government. The point here is that where Military Forces exist, they are rarely used for the specific purpose for which their requirements were set, but rather they have broader utility as instruments for Government policy; providing that they exist in the first place. This is particularly true of units such as warships where the variety of missions that, say, a Type 23 frigate is able to undertake is far in excess of the predominantly anti-submarine mission for which she was originally designed. So, the Value for Money is generated by buying as much capability as you can afford that is useable in the broadest range of scenarios.
Except; this logic forces you down a route of planning for the most likely scenario. In risk management terms this is planning for the expected outcome. This approach works if you’re an insurer and can aggregate your risks across many thousands of policy holders; or a health service whose usage rates by a population can, on average, be meaningfully planned for. But the Military instrument is not like that. We have been seduced into thinking that military campaigns have a steady drumbeat of 6 monthly roulements through theatres: whether Iraq, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland or one of the many routine operational deployments of the Royal Navy. If we gear our entire establishment around this model we will achieve efficiency (of sorts) but we will fail strategically. I say this because what really defines successful use of the military is its response to crisis, and the sort of crisis that becomes generationally defining. The Falkands in 1982 is the obvious post-WW2 example but Sierra Leone, Iraq in 1991and the Kosovo intervention are other examples where it went well. Operational failure in warfighting, especially when vital national interests are stake, changes the international balance of power and can redefine a nation’s place in the world order — the outcome is of strategic significance. It’s the stuff that brings down Governments. To be ready to respond to crises which are, by their nature, largely unexpected takes systemic agility. This agility comes from diligent contingency planning and meticulous preparation but necessitates a substantial degree of spare capacity in the system that can be drawn upon when the unexpected occurs. Spare capacity is, self-evidently, not a feature of an efficient system. This is not, therefore about the management of risks to outputs but, rather, about the uncertainty of outcome. The difference between risk and uncertainty? In the former the probability distribution of possible outcomes is known, in the latter it is not. It means you need a different set of management techniques. That’s why stockpiles and reserves must be maintained, even though they may not have been drawn upon for years, because if they are needed they will be needed in a hurry; and once the button gets pushed it will be too late if they do not exist. A push for efficiency at the expense of all else risks confusing activity with effect. So in all that we do we should prepare for the most extreme outcome: high-end warfighting against a world-class adversary. This should drive our requirements, training and manpower but importantly it should drive our intellectual preparation. Concepts and doctrine must drive the other lines of development towards dealing with the evolving character of warfare and novel technologies must drive, and be driven by, the need to retain operational edge. Of course, this will be constrained by the available resource but we need the moral courage to balance the activity of today with setting the conditions for successful effect tomorrow. Within a system incentivised by annual appraisal this is especially challenging. Ironically, and perhaps even paradoxically, the better we prepare to win wars, the less likely it is that we will have to fight them and thus our Forces can be used more readily for lower intensity operations. If you want peace, prepare for war!
But however we define our capabilities and capacities, surely within the Force Development and Generation cycles there are efficiencies to be had? Why don’t we just cut the ‘red tape’ and stop spending money on bureaucrats and pen pushers? This is an attractive battle-cry when it comes to seeking ways to save money on the generation of military capability and, indeed, in the spending of public money in the round. The problem, however, is that every bureaucrat, no matter how inefficiently they work, is there to service a process which fulfils a function. To get rid of the bureaucrat you need to establish that their function is no longer required (at least in the same quantity). But most of these processes are conducted to give a degree of management control and/or assurance over different aspects of the organisation: financial management and probity; contractual propriety; safety and environmental management; commodities management; human resource; etc, etc. So what functions can we do without? Well, none of them actually. We can reduce the amount of each that we conduct but, here’s the crunch, we must then be prepared to delegate and empower individuals to do make decisions and commit resources without the levels of assurance and managerial control that have been previously demanded. In short, we must take risk against these processes and this means that mistakes will occur more frequently; and we must accept that this is not failure, but the system working as it was now designed. And if we want individuals to hold such increased risk personally, then we may find that they need greater recognition and/or remuneration as part of the deal for doing so. Process and bureaucracy are like a kelp forest for a scuba diver — it is no one strand that substantially impedes your passage, but the overall effect means a disproportionate effort is required to make progress.
So, beware the inevitable ‘efficiency drive’ after the coming SDSR. Without a properly reformed system that removes management and assurance processes and delivers a commensurate increases in delegation, it will simply be code for reducing the number of people available to complete a similar amount of process. The strands of kelp get packed closer together and progress becomes harder than it was before. There is a real risk of not only achieving a less efficient system as a result, but also one less effective at delivering its real purpose, achieving desirable government policy outcomes using the military instrument. And during the SDSR process the arguments must be made to retain as much high-end warfighting capability as we can possibly afford in order to give the agility to deliver such outcomes, including novel ones like cyber and unmanned systems. And finally, having sufficient warfighting capability makes it less likely that you will have to use it for this purpose. If you think peacetime Armed Forces are expensive, try having a war!
. . .
Following this review of the issues of defence management and budgets, the following questions are put forward for consideration and discussion:
1. Have western defence bureaucracies gone too far in adopting modern business practices and values? That is, do the terms of prudence in the private sector apply well to requirements of defence?
2. What should drive peacetime budgets and military plans? Should the aim be to spend the least and hope for the best until war arrives?
3. Can armed forces and defence bureaucracies afford to reduce their processes and accept less control during peacetime?
4. What would you cut, and why?
. . .
@fightingsailor is a Royal Navy Weapon Engineer Officer with substantial operational and staff experience. At sea he has undertaken operational deployments to the Mediterranean (Libya), Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean (whilst participating in Operations DEFERENCE, ELLAMY, TELIC and KIPION); as well as to Arctic Russia, the Baltic region and the East Coast of the USA. Ashore he served in Afghanistan as the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Liaison Officer to Task Force Helmand. Staff appointments have predominantly focussed on capability planning, management and strategy. They have included: the Ministry of Defence, PJHQ J6 and the Maritime Capability Division of Navy Command HQ. A graduate of the UK Defence Academy’s Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) he has a keen interest in developing ‘good thinking’ in Defence.
Notes:
[1] Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 4 Oct 15, https://www.politicshome.com/foreign-and-defence/articles/news/michael-fallons-speech-conservative-conference accessed 10 Oct 15.
[2] Strategic Defence and Security Review. The UK Government’s quinquennial review of Defence and Security Strategy.
[3] The Purpose of a System is What it Does. Brilliantly explained on the thinkpurpose website: http://thinkpurpose.com/2012/11/07/3-brilliant-systems-ideas-that-will-explode-in-your-face-2/, accessed 11 Oct 15.
[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence/about accessed 11 Oct 15.