Thoughts on Women in Support Units and Lethality
CCLKOW is a weekly conversation on military affairs jointly hosted by the Center for Company-Level Leaders (CCL) at the US Military Academy at West Point and the Kings of War (KOW), a blog of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the US Army or the Department of Defense. Read the post and join the discussion on Twitter #CCLKOW
This week’s #CCLKOW is brought to us by an active duty Army officer. MAJ Lindsay Maples is a logistics officer and former commander of E Company (FSC), 2–25 Aviation Regiment. She currently attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Class of 2017, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Recently, a CCL member posed the question, “How have leaders, who are women and are in support branches, made their units more lethal?” As an Army leader, who is a woman and is in a support branch (Logistics), I was approached to answer this question. Before I answer, I’d like to pose my own question: “How have leaders made their units more lethal?” Generally speaking, if you can answer this question, you can answer the first.
ADP 1: The Army states, “Combat power can be measured many ways, but the most important determinant of combat power is intangible — leadership…leadership multiplies all other factors of landpower.” A leader can make or break a unit, and their ability to lead can determine the outcome of any mission. Whether you belong to a Maneuver, Fires, Effects; Operational Support; or Functional Support branch, leadership is the same. ADP 6–22 defines it as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” By providing that influence in the most optimal and efficient manner, a leader from any branch can expect to improve their unit’s “lethality.”
The original question asked about lethality. Lethality can mean different things in different types of units. Lethality will mean something different to an infantry unit than an ADA unit, for example (even though both are MFE branches). Since the member asked about support branches, I will answer in the support context that I’m most familiar with: Logistics. While Logistics Soldiers may be put in situations where they would need to “close with and destroy” the enemy, lethality for sustainment (of which logistics is a subsection of) means something totally different. ADP 4–0: Sustainment states that the sustainment warfighting function is “related to the tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolonged endurance…sustainment enables freedom of action…and is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative.” So a truly “lethal” logistics unit would ensure they are providing those elements with the utmost expertise to the unit(s) it is supporting.
As a Forward Support Company (FSC) commander for an aviation maneuver battalion, I realized that in order to make the unit I was supporting more lethal in terms of its mission set, I would have to make my company as “lethal” as possible in terms of my mission set. The battalion I supported was an assault unit made entirely up of UH-60s. However, through previous experiences and understanding higher’s mission, I knew that just because my battalion was platform pure in garrison, did not mean it would be so in training or operational deployments. I had to prepare my company to support a task force (TF) structure that would include CH-47s, OH-58s, and possibly AH-64s. My MTOE (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment) did not include 89Bs (Ammunition Specialist) required to load rockets and missiles into OH-58s and AH-64s, nor did it provide the storage capacity for the amount of fuel required to support CH-47s. Through working with my fellow FSC commanders and the Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), we were able to successfully manipulate our task orgs to better support the mission; not just for my battalion/TF, but the brigade overall. Additionally, logistics units are notoriously known to be tasked for various mission sets that include non-METL (Mission Essential Task List) tasks and required provide personnel to be OPCON’d for roles that have nothing to do with their MOS. My company was notified that it would be tasked to provide nearly all base security for a small FOB during an upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. Not only was that not a METL task that traditionally applied to my type of unit, but it was sure to deplete many resources we needed to support the TF’s daily mission. With the help of my battalion, internal company leadership, and information from the unit in country that we were going to take over for, I was able to set up additional training events that focused on base security, ECP/TCP, and detainee operations by determining which MOSs would be the most available for these additional jobs and cross-training other MOSs to ensure we had enough coverage elsewhere. This also came in handy when a number of my Soldiers were selected to become door gunners for UH-60 crews or members of a new Pathfinder company made up of infantry Soldiers that would be OPCON’d to our TF. Although I did not get the honor of commanding the FSC during the Afghanistan deployment, the unit performed exceptionally well and made the TF more lethal by allowing the maneuver units to focus on their mission requirements and not the support they needed.
The “woman” part of the original question is the most challenging to answer clearly. Ultimately, a leader is a leader. It does not matter what sex you are, as we are all capable of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. However, I cannot pretend that it is always that simple. I have had my fair share of overt, and subvert, opposition. Whether it was opposition simply because I am a woman, or a legitimate issue, I cannot say for sure. But, since I did not receive feedback from these individuals, I would have to assume it was because I was a woman in many instances. The best advice I have for this is to focus on yourself, your unit, and your mission. Prove others wrong through your actions and the actions of those you lead. There will always be opposition, but you’ll be surprised how many of your Soldiers will step up to defend you against those nay-sayers if you lead them with the best of your ability, with the best intentions in mind, and you truly care for them and your unit. Since all Army leaders are also followers in some capacity, it is a chance to lead by example. Give your own leaders the opportunity to lead without preconceived notions or prejudices. Treat them with the dignity and respect you desire from your own subordinates. If there is a legitimate problem with a leader, provide timely and honest feedback to the leader and/or raise the issue through proper channels while protecting your own unit’s morale by not degrading other leaders in front of them.
Leaders make their units more lethal by providing exceptional leadership and all the resources, time, training, and equipment they require to excel at their mission. The most important thing about making a unit more lethal is to remember that, as a leader, you must do what you can to make the unit more lethal far into the future, not just for your time in that leadership role. This includes not only ensuring your Soldiers are trained and equipped, but paying it forward through leader development. All of your Soldiers are currently leaders or leaders-in-training. Take the time to really focus on leader development by giving those junior leaders the opportunity to lead and the opportunity to fail in a safe environment. Provide constant, clear, and concise feedback and allow them to work on their developmental needs through new experiences and challenges. By doing this, you’ll not only make your own unit more lethal, but the future of the Army more lethal as well.
References
United States (2012). The Army, Army Doctrine Publication 1, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
United States (2012). Army Leadership, Army Doctrine Publication 6–22, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
United States (2012). Sustainment, Army Doctrine Publication 4–0, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
