BACK IN THE BUSINESS​:
​Reflections on Canada’s past and future as an International peacekeeper in Africa

By John Schram, Fellow, CIDP
Originally Published: 9 November 2017

Image credit: CAF Photo — MCpl Jennifer Kusche

Canada has promised the world that we are back in the business of working for global peace. Plans for new Canadian support for international peacekeeping are said to be imminent. This is good news. It is where Canada belongs, where we can work for Canadian values and objectives, and where we can make a positive impact for humanity.

But we know from past experience that peacemaking and peacekeeping are complex, challenging and costly undertakings. We need to grasp the lessons learned from earlier peacekeeping operations, adapting them to the new challenges whether these be from IS, al-Qaeda and its associates in the Sahel, Mali, or the Central African Republic, or arise from the near civil wars of Congo or South Sudan.

Here are ten such lessons as seen through the eyes of a Canadian diplomat and admiring observer of a number of Canadian peacekeeping operations in African countries. They are not new. But they certainly remain relevant.

  • It is the Prime Minister, not the armed forces or Global Affairs Canada, who ultimately makes the decision to intervene, and how. PM Trudeau’s decisions will reflect two major factors: how Canadians see the issue — will they vote for it — and how it fits into Canada’s overall interests.
  • If Canadians do not see such peacebuilding interventions as a priority or as a compelling Canadian foreign policy interest, or our like-minded partners are themselves not consumed by the issue at hand, the Canadian government should think carefully before embarking on a major peacekeeping operation.
  • Any intervention should be grounded on facts and realistic assessment of the demands and costs. The government must formulate the mandate, publicly specify the goals, and commit the resources for as long as it takes to do the job.
  • There is as much uncertainty in the getting out of a post-conflict situation as there is in the getting in, and that all the sophisticated planning and firepower won’t win the day unless the local people want us there, are willing to accept the intervention, with empathy flowing both ways.
  • It’s often hard to sell our concept of stability, tolerance and development to people who believe they face immediate threats to their land, political standing, economic security or, most pervasively, religion and culture.
  • People just emerging from a violent change of government or social confrontation have little interest in promises of future development assistance from Canada — if by development assistance we mean judicial training, government capacity building, or building a better education system. They will only be convinced to tolerate outside intervention, to support the local authorities on whose behalf we are intervening, if they can see fast and visible benefits — affordable food, electricity, water, local security, and functioning local markets.
  • Many conflicts are driven by non-governmental private interests, from large companies through shadowy diamond and oil traders to well-funded and popular international religious organizations. These entities are largely outside the control or ken of either Western or African governments. We have seen many times over in Africa that one can negotiate peace, reconstruction and demobilization with governments or with apparent leaders, but if there are major private and civil interests that thrive on continuing conflict, weak government and failing economies, all the effort at restoring peace and prosperity may well be wasted.
  • White faces throwing weight around are an instinctive affront to African national pride. This shapes a considerable amount of the debate in the AU and with African leaders when they are considering the role of NATO, US or Canadian interventions in Africa. Understandably, Africans are tired of being told what they should do by people of European extraction and perceptions.
  • We have to understand the context in which we are operating — not just in broad terms, but especially, who did what to whom, why, how can it be stopped, what forces and goals and methods will work in that particular society to achieve our and the country’s goals.
  • Canadians need to learn this through African eyes, not just from Western media, or donor country analysts. This understanding must come from “real” people in African countries — not just government ministers or diplomats — but business people, professionals, academics, the media — ‘ordinary’ members of each society.

In all of this, Canadian peacekeepers can indeed be a unique catalyst for sustained peace. But peace, reconstruction or change will not come about in any lasting or meaningful sense because of what Canadians tell people to do, or wish to make happen. Only Africans themselves will really fix the root of African conflicts and build lasting peace.

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Contact Report
Contact Report

Published in Contact Report

The CIDP is part of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is one of Canada’s most active research centres on international security.

Centre for International and Defence Policy
Centre for International and Defence Policy

Written by Centre for International and Defence Policy

The CIDP is part of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is one of Canada’s most active research centres on international security.