Droning On: A New Era of Targeted Killings Outside of Armed Conflict
By Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, University of St-Andrew’s
Introduction
The pinpoint killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, marked a significant evolution in the employment of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Conducting a targeted killing via UAV strike outside of conventional armed conflict zones against a prominent state official during peacetime was an unprecedented act for the U.S. government. UAVs, colloquially known as ‘drones’, have undergone a drastic development since the 1990s, becoming an integral part of the military arsenals of approximately 40 countries. Following 9/11, the U.S. became a leading producer of these weapons systems, championing its own use of armed UAVs as a major tool in counterterrorism operations, including targeted killings of high-value enemies of the state. Whereas under its “counterterrorism” portfolio the U.S. has primarily carried out these engagements in loosely governed areas of the world, the Soleimani strike took place at Baghdad’s International Airport. Nonetheless, the comprehensive use of this strategy has ultimately contributed to enabling and normalizing a growing culture of direct violence, whereby the material consequences of physically harming targets are highly visible and intentioned.
Spurred by America’s example, other nations are now more likely to threaten or conduct drone strikes to target militant networks in similar ways, and non-state actors have also been inspired to use them against their opponents.(i) This significantly heightens the risk of miscalculation and military escalation. Whereas U.S. targeted strikes generally struck rank-and-file members, with little to no state affiliations as part of operations against terrorist movements, what has emerged through the killing of Soleimani is the potential that high-ranking state officials may be targeted in an action framed as preventive. Furthermore, such a precedent is being set in the context of an increasing number of states acquiring UAV capabilities. The purpose of this brief is to highlight the implications of the evolution of the norms surrounding the use of armed UAVs. Drone exporters and users must demonstrate desirable standards of usage and conduct by developing a strong legally binding instrument to implement strict, clear, and publicly disclosed controls on drones to prevent further escalation of armed violence.
The U.S. as a Norm Entrepreneur (ii)
Although Israel initially developed these weapons in early 1970s, Washington can largely be credited for bringing drones to the forefront of defense armament through both the magnitude of its involvement in UAV programs and its near-monopoly on conducting drone strikes.(iii) Over the years, given the country’s geopolitical significance, it has been able to “shape the very nature of the international system.” More directly, in recent years America has been setting precedents “creating new understandings of what constitutes ‘appropriate conduct’ in counterterrorism operations.”(iv) America’s success in being a norm entrepreneur is owed to its ability to persuade others of the legitimacy of its actions. It does so by framing its behaviors in accordance with international principles, and thereby constructing a global order that is more permissive and lenient towards American policies. This has been seen in efforts made by U.S. administrations to challenge long-established meanings to make them conform to their policies, such as redefining assassination covered by international law, issues of imminence and self-defense, and the space where armed conflict takes place.(v)
It is by virtue of Washington’s high visibility that the justifications it provides inform different members of the international community and is able to reshape their perceptions of the usefulness and integrity of a practice.(vi) This was highlighted in the aftermath of the Bin Laden raid, when many preexisting differences between defenders and opponents of targeted killings were bridged as countries shared common perceptions of the vilified leader.(vii) Such an understanding helped to shift the attention from the damage suffered by the target to the different gains brought by the practice, which inherently increased its legitimacy and contributed to persuading the international community that Washington’s strategy of conducting targeted strikes in another country can reconcile with existing governance frameworks.(viii) This influence is also witnessed in the increased inclination to kill rather than capture terrorists. On this matter, law scholar Kevin Govern highlights that, “since the death of Bin Laden, this trend [towards killing instead of capturing] has been strongly influencing international responses to terrorism as well as that in the US… it is [also] seen in the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaqi, Samir Khan, and Ibrahim al-Bana.”(ix)
Normalization of UAV use
America’s institutionalization of targeted killing can be seen in the increased use of armed UAVs, transforming simultaneously the propensity towards conventional killing and how military force is applied in counterterrorism operations. The strategic policy of targeted killing can be defined as the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by a state or its agents acting under the color of law, against a specific individual who is not in the perpetrator’s custody.”
Since the first credible report of a lethal CIA UAV strike in 2002, out of the estimated 473 U.S. targeted killings carried out outside of combat zones, roughly 98 percent have been conducted by armed drones.(x) The drone program began slowly under George W. Bush, gradually increasing after the successful elimination of two major terrorist leaders.(xi) As a result of attacks striking unknown victims, the practice of ‘signature’ strikes, wherein targets are selected based on pre-assessed behavioral patterns, became a controversial hallmark of U.S. drone uses. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) estimates that 57 strikes were launched during the Bush presidency — a number that, although difficult to confirm given the program’s secrecy, pales in comparison to the 563 strikes by UAV conducted under Obama. The BIJ further reports that overall, Obama approved “ten times more air strikes in the covert war on terror” than his predecessor, predominantly in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. These numbers, resulting from improved UAV technology that enhanced targeting capabilities and limited the requirement for ‘boots on the ground,’ highlight an important strategic shift where drones became Obama’s weapon of choice.
Widening Aperture for Action
Although criticism was made of the transparency of U.S. targeting procedures under the Obama administration, the “Procedures for Approving Direct Action against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities” document established the legal and policy framework that regulated the UAV program. The document outlined that to take lethal measures required the “near certainty that an identified high-value terrorist is present [the lawful target], near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed, an assessment that capture is not feasible at time of the operation, and an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives than lethal action exist to effectively address threat to American people.”(xii) While these important parameters were put in place to avoid civilian casualties, they were at times difficult to respect, given the volatile context of the strikes, and were thus not always adhered to by the Obama government. Furthermore, the Trump administration is reported to have amended and even eliminated many of his predecessor’s requirements for targets to be authorized, which fundamentally lowers the threshold at which consent to exert force is given.
The effect of these changes was apparent in the attack of Major General Soleimani, where a foreign military official was targeted in the absence of detailed evidence of his posing an imminent danger to America. Given America’s overall standing and ability to undermine international standards, the strike set a dangerous precedent that highlights a weakening of the norms surrounding the limitations on the use of force.(xiii) Without regulatory control, the attack could serve as a stepping-stone for other states’ use of armed UAVs for the targeted killings of state officials outside of active war zones. Violating the rules is considerably different than transforming or making them. Nonetheless, these actions may overlap in initiating a process of change by providing norms for others to follow in rejecting or ignoring global standards. On this topic, scholar Wayne Sandholtz explains that “violations of international norms can lead to new or modified rules if other conditions are met… if an apparent violation is followed in subsequent years by similar behavior on the part of other states, then the new pattern of conduct can be evidence of an emerging norm.”(xiv) On a lower scale, such a pattern has been witnessed in the past when in 2011 Obama ordered the drone killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen located in Yemen, followed by the UK’s killing of a British citizen in Syria using an armed UAV in August 2015. Thus, this episode is indicative of how other nations can follow the U.S.’ bending of international legislation, and highlights the replication potential that Washington’s actions may have.
While the Trump administration initially justified the attack by claiming that Soleimani had developed plans to attack U.S. personnel throughout the region, other U.S. officials later on expanded on the rationale for the airstrike. Subsequent claims indicated that the strike was specifically “in response to an escalating series of attacks… to protect United States personnel, to deter Iran from conducting or supporting further attacks… and to end Iran’s strategic escalation of attacks.” Hence, in considering Trump’s justifications for the death of Soleimani, it is conceivable that a pattern of preemptive self-defense could gradually override the current proscription of the preventive use of force being normatively acceptable.
Changing Security Environment
The idea that a norm has emerged around what reporter Ariel Colonomos calls “the global targeted killing bandwagon” is further concerning given the diffusion of unmanned technology occurring at a faster pace than international regulations and legal obligations restricting its use. This creates a space for nations to behave much less discriminately as more acquire armed UAVs. Therefore, it is not implausible that more actors with these capabilities will be ready to carry out similar strikes.(xv) Such is the case of India announcing that it was equipping its domestic UAVs with precision-guided weapons to conduct “cross-border attacks on suspected terrorists.”(xvi) The concern over the current growth exportation patterns of advanced systems combined with states developing their own UAV programs stems primarily from the absence of a formally binding international body to directly regulate drone use and the expansion of targets. While the Geneva Convention does cover the concept of proportionality, it is not ‘drone specific’ and gets ambiguous when examining individual countries rules of engagement and who they label as terrorists.
Recommendation
In looking ahead, the U.S., along with other UAV-owning countries, must set strong examples of acceptable behavior, starting by advocating for the creation of a binding body that would lay out basic principles of conduct regarding these weapons systems. These standards should include requiring states to disclose all measures taken to control when authorities can use lethal force, the foundations for decisions to kill rather than capture, and after-action reporting on numbers of civilian deaths per operation. UAVs, if used appropriately, represent a capability that can considerably increase the precision and efficiency of war fighting. Unfortunately, oftentimes the advantages they offer are lost due to the different users’ governments’ ambiguity and covertness surrounding their deployment and effects. Adhering to some of the measures proposed above could be a first step into building a greater level of transparency and trust not only between different nations but also between the public and governmental institutions regarding drone operations. Such a step is necessary in reaching the ultimate goal of agreeing acceptable norms for their use.
Elisabeth is a postgraduate student from the University of St-Andrews in Scotland, where she completed her Master’s degree in Terrorism and Political Violence in 2020. She has a particular interest in international security and foreign policy that was sparked by her time studying the Middle East and Europe. She graduated from Queen’s University in 2019, where she majored in Political Studies. Get in contact with Elisabeth on LinkedIn.
Endnotes
i For more non-state actors using drones in their operations see “Non-State Armed and UAVs: Uptake and Effectiveness,” Armed Conflict Survey 6, no.1: 19–22
ii For greater detail see Andea Birdsall on the topic, “Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of International Law,” Global Society 32, no. 3 (2018): 241–262. She focuses on the U.S. as a norm entrepreneur which “purposefully works to alter prevalent norms related to the use of drones, more specifically through the country’s efforts of norm contestation process and its attempts to institutionalize specific meanings of norms in the international order.”
iii Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013, 4.
iv Lynn E. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security,” RAND Corporation (2014): 2–3.
v Birdsall, “Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism,” 250–257; Dennis Schmidt and Luca Trenta, “Changes in the law of self-defence? Drones, imminence, and international norm dynamics,” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 5, no.2 (2018): 215–225; Richard Jackson, “Language, Policy and the Construction of a Torture Culture in the War on Terrorism,” Review of International Studies 33, no.3 (2007): 355–358.
vi Birdsall, “Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism,” 261.
vii Betcy Jose, “Bin Laden’s Targeted Killing and Emerging Norms,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 10, no.1 (2017): 53.
viii Ibid.
ix Kevin Govern, “Expedited Justice: Gaddafi’s Death and the Rise of Targeted Killings,” JURIST Forum, May 2012, 1
x UN Human Rights Office, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” 7; Michah Zenko and Sarah Elizabeth Kreps “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report 69 (June 2014): 10; Christopher Fuller, “The CIA’s Drone War and the Civilianization of Warfare,” in The Civilianization of War: The Changing Civil-Military Divide, 1914–2014, edited by Andrew Barros and Martin Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 221–240.
xi Patrick B. Johnson, “Security Implications of Drones in Warfare,” in Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict, eds David Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst, and Kristen Wall (The University of Chicago Press, 2015): 124–125.
xii Rita Siemion, “Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” International Legal Materials 56, no.6 (2017): 1209–1210.
xiii Further discussion on the U.S.’ ability to delegitimize international norms: Renee De Nevers, “Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement,” International Studies Review 9 (2007): 53; Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no.3 (1996): 375–377; Ian Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics 44, no.2 (2007): 194–213.
xivWayne Sandholtz, “ Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no.1 (2008): 109.
xv Kenzo and Kreps,, “Limiting Armed Drone,” 4.
xvi Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko, “ The Next Drone Wars: Preparing for Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs 93, no.2 (March/April 2014), 72.
