Droning Out the Competition: Situating China’s Role as a Leader in UCAV Exports
By Hadi Ali, Queen’s University
In conceptualizing the global movement of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), three nations dominate the export market. The United States, Israel, and China all share commonality in their success of moving drone technology across various regions, yet the trio seems to hold an intriguingly different approach in state-use. Given the rapid growth of UCAV implementation within military arsenals, there seems to be a disconnect between China’s use of combat drone strikes in tactical operations, in comparison to its trade competitors. In assessing the hegemon’s lack of engagement with UCAV technology, this report argues that Chinese UCAV usage will remain relatively low for years to come, despite continuing on as a major export leader.
China’s rise as a major export leader in drone technology is relatively easy to situate, given its market competitors. It stands as no secret that the United States and Israel have become quite friendly, thanks in part to now-former President Trump’s unique diplomacy methods. The result has paid off nonetheless, seeing as Donald and Bibi have found beneficial outcomes in economic and military interests for both nations. This is due largely in part to a strategic plan of commanding the Middle East, whereby both the U.S and Israel can control various threats and objectives through their alliance. UCAV exports are a prime example of this plan, seeing as neither nation has been willing to share their technology with others in the region. This no-sell attitude, however, explains China’s dominance in the market. Essentially, China has risen to dominate the market by selling to whoever the US and Israel refuse to negotiate with. Pakistan, Nigeria, and the UAE are just a few examples of relatively unpopular nations in the eyes of the US, which have sought to buy into the alternative stream of Chinese technologies.
Where China’s position becomes more difficult to situate however, is in their lack of engagement with this technology for state-purposes. Existing literature seems to struggle in finding a true consensus as to exactly why the Chinese government refuses to execute lethal drone strikes. In posing potential reasoning for this lack of usage, some analysts turn to regional factors which complicate Chinese military action in its current setting. Whereas Israel is justified for its threat prevention in its deep-rooted hostility with various neighbors, China holds a shared sense of allyship across most of the Asian region. Even nations with historical hostility seem to get along with the hegemon, due in part to the massive trade benefits which come with Chinese partnerships. The result of this affinity across the region has meant a relatively low requirement for tactical UCAV operations.
In addition, this attitude of maintaining said affinity stands as yet another potential reason for China’s refrainment from UCAV usage. Some analysts point to China as intentionally fostering this zero-drone approach in Asia, standing in as a major power and leading by example. In rare instances of direct conflict such as the recent border skirmish between India and China, both nations withheld from using any combat drones, thereby preserving the posed norms set in place. Although this theory is difficult to confirm, praise can be given to the superpower for its relatively successful attempt to prevent unmanned havoc in the region.
A shot at China’s two competitors is appropriate here, given a contrast in approach to stability and peace within certain regions. Whereas the US and Israel have racked up the drone strike kill count over the past decade, China has led by example in its counterterrorism efforts. Given a commonly used justification of counterterrorism in regard to lethal drone strikes, China’s only consideration of lethal use came in 2013 when planning the elimination of a Burmese war criminal. An alternative capture was employed in place of UCAV usage however, keeping China’s UCAV kill count at exactly zero. The US in contrast, conducted approximately 400 strikes over a decade of Pakistani counterterrorist efforts, killing approximately 3,000 targets.
More so, the moral and ethical debate surrounding UCAV strikes is consistently seen as the leading concern when discussing the topic, yet China has consistently steered clear from any association to its use. Although there is arguably something to be said about the moral dilemma behind supplying the very technology which one refuses to use, China has strategically placed itself out of view when considering lethal drone strikes. This disassociation shelters the nation from many ethical ramifications which plague its market rivals, thereby solely profiting off of the technology without ensuing international backlash. Again, this fails to grant complete liberation from the moral and ethical ties of manufacturing UCAV technology for others to use, however, from a strategic standpoint, China can effectively be tucked away from the infamous spotlight which regularly shines upon the subject of lethal drone strikes.
All factors considered, a chain of reasoning has prevailed for the discrepancy between China’s export rates of UCAVs and its state use of said technologies. The combined factors of a UCAV-free establishment across an already-friendly region, as well as the ethical liberty which comes with a net zero kill count from drone strikes seems to be guiding China’s strategic approach. The resulting outcome is one of high profits for the hegemon, and a relatively unscathed reputation as its products continue to effectively and efficiently eliminate unsuspecting targets.
Hadi Ali is an undergraduate student at Queen’s University, completing his final year in Political Studies alongside a Certificate in Law. Outside of class, Hadi enjoys writing on politics in the Middle East and Central Asia, some of which can be found here.
