Re-thinking Canadian-Inuit Arctic sovereignty in the face of climate change
By Benjamin Hawkin, Former Visiting Research Fellow at the CIDP
Who owns an area of land, and how do they prove it? In layman’s terms, global governance uses a system of who was there first — the classic schoolground rule of law. If you saw an area and settled it, it was yours. Through the ‘seen it, claimed it’ mechanism, the Canadian government has selectively used indigenous history as a basis for claims to Canadian state sovereignty over the Arctic region, and the resources and the shipping routes that come with it. By successfully claiming regional sovereignty, a more secure and stable Arctic is envisioned by Canadian policymakers. In 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) published ‘A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic’, detailing their view and stance on the matter. This offered a comprehensive view of the Inuit position towards Arctic sovereignty, challenging the definition of sovereignty in a region and demonstrating that it is not a fixed terminology or legality. It also heavily stresses the need for the Inuit to be engaged as active partners — working together with Arctic partners tackling environmental security issues, not just as a means to prove that ‘we were there first’.
Whilst the existence of Inuit groups in the north has been used to legitimise Canadian claims to Arctic sovereignty, indigenous groups are under-represented members of society and often ignored federally in the regional and global climate change discussion. It is apparent that cooperation and integration with the indigenous people living in the area is vital, and to treat them as regional stakeholders is a key issue. If indigenous peoples are so crucial to creating and maintaining the image of Canadian sovereignty in an increasingly international Arctic, should the Inuit push for consideration as international actors?
Dr. Exner-Pirot has argued that this should not be the case from both the Canadian and indigenous perspectives. The Inuit are better protected under Canadian law than international and have much greater influence as a voice within Canada than as an independent actor. From a state perspective, their use as ‘proof’ of sovereignty is misleading at best and exploitational at worst. There are large swathes of Arctic territory that do not fall under Inuit territory and have historically been uninhabited. Furthermore, tying the people so closely to the land is a problematic discourse as it can serve to rob the Inuit, and other Arctic inhabitants of their agency by treating them as a romanticised part of the land.
The Canadian government has a history of focussing on the profits and resources that Arctic climate change can bring rather than on how they can protect the people that live there. The hypocrisy of using indigenous peoples as a tool through which to push state sovereignty, and in so state security, becomes more apparent when also considering the mistreatment of Inuit groups, including the killing of sled-dogs, forced relocations, and mining resources without consulting regional indigenous groups, and as a result, violation of their security. In addition, the entire concept of regional sovereignty is one that is western and state-centric. The Inuit inhabited the Arctic region generations before European state actors conceived of the notion of sovereignty over a region. It is counterproductive to shoehorn Inuit groups into state-centric forms of identity.
It is obvious that the Inuit must be participants in discussions of Arctic sovereignty, as citizens of Canada and of the Arctic. As the main inhabitants of the region, with the most security at stake in the face of climate change, not including indigenous Arctic peoples in the discussion would disadvantage both the peoples themselves and the federal government. However, mutual cooperation could be beneficial. Reliance on historical Inuit presence in the Arctic does not provide legitimacy for full Canadian Arctic sovereignty, but it is the basis for much of it. Cooperation with indigenous groups in the area is essential for mutual safety and benefit.
There may be no simple solution to the discussion of sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic, but researchers and practitioners should move away from ‘traditional’ concepts of sovereignty in the Arctic region. Changes happening in the present day are taking place in a dynamic manner that is not conceptualised sufficiently by current international relations scholarship. Trying to fit the Arctic security and sovereignty puzzle into a state-centric box does not work. While it is beyond the scope of this piece to develop a new conceptual framework, it is something that international relations scholarship and practice should pursue. The tension between indigenous people’s needs, sovereignty, and ‘progress’ (whether that be resource extraction, scientific research, or something else entirely) is not unique to the Arctic. In the context of the recent Mauna Kea protests on Hawaii, and the continuing plan for a trans-Canada pipeline, it is clear conflicts between state or commercial actors and indigenous peoples are not going away. By developing a new framework and moving beyond the engrained western concepts of sovereignty and legal ownership of a region, we can develop the conversation on who has a seat at the table of governorship for Canada’s Arctic, and what the relationship between the sovereign state and its citizens in a changing environment should look like.
Ben’s master’s research is based on Canada’s posture towards the Arctic over the past 10 years. During his time at the CIDP he wrote a policy brief on the Canada’s changing Arctic defence policy. Out now!
Read about Ben’s experiences at the CIDP here.
