Russia says: nuclear weapons are here to stay
By Pia Brinkschulte, Uppsala University
Nuclear weapons are, quite literally, the ultimate ‘be all and end all’ weapon. Many weapons of mass destruction, and even conventional weapons, are incredibly destructive both in the short-term and long-term, but nukes remain in a class of their own.
Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have seemingly disappeared as the weapon of choice on the global stage. During the Cold War nuclear missiles were more than just an idle threat, they were a very real possibility. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the focus has slowly shifted away from nuclear to more conventional weaponry. Occasionally nukes do come back on the map, usually when one of the significant treaties is due for renewal, such as NEW START, or when a treaty is cancelled, such as the infamous Iran deal. News outlets worldwide remain quick to cover a country conducting nuclear missile tests or when countries announce their intention to actively renew their nuclear arsenal, as we have seen Russia, China, and the United States do in recent years. But until recently the possibility of nuclear war has stayed in the shadows, too outrageous to even think about as a realistic possibility.
This sentiment abruptly changed when President Putin announced, only days into the war with Ukraine, that Russia’s nuclear arsenal readiness changed to the high alert level. Putin’s actions swiftly reminded the world that Russia is one of nine nuclear weapon states. While Russia does not have a ‘no-first-use clause’, it certainly does not say it is not willing to use them first either. While Russia has not used nuclear weapons in the conflict with Ukraine yet, the threat remains ever present. It is therefore especially vital as the resistance of Ukrainian fighters, both military and civilian, foil Russia’s plan of a swift invasion every day.
Tim Marshall’s statement, that if only Russia had mountains towards Ukraine, highlights that Russia’s geography shapes its foreign politics. Since 2014 Russia has stated its intentions toward Ukraine; the annexation of Crimea and the Kremlin’s belief that NATO encroaches too closely upon Russian territory clearly being the catalyst. The increase in NATO expansion is a more likely reason for Russia’s call to war, especially after its large-scale military exercise near its border with the Baltic countries in the summer of 2018.
Militarily, Russia pursues an increasingly hawkish stance on nuclear weapons, as stated in their military doctrines of the last thirty years. Both the 1993 military doctrine and the 2000 military doctrines states that Russia would not retaliate to any acts of aggression with nuclear weapons because of the potentially catastrophic consequences. This course of action directly contrasts the 2010 and 2014 doctrines that clearly state that any conventional war could escalate into a nuclear conflict if needed. At the same time, the doctrines state that “a war […]involving the utilization of both conventional and nuclear means of attack on the territory of the region” is not a problem for them. The military doctrine aims to prevent “a nuclear military conflict [to] maintain strategic stability and the nuclear deterrence potential at an adequate level”. Stability is the keyword here. Earlier this year, at the beginning of February, nuclear weapon states, including Russia, announced that nuclear war is unthinkable and to be avoided at all costs.
Nevertheless, within the first three days of the war with Ukraine, Russia announced it was moving its arsenal a step higher on the alert level. A clever move by the Kremlin to remind its opponents that it has nuclear weapons and is more than willing to use them to secure stability in the region. Nuclear technology has advanced since the Cold War, and more targeted and precise smaller-scale strikes are possible.
At the start of the Ukrainian conflict in February of 2022, world leaders descended on Moscow to negotiate with Putin and determine what sanctions they potentially must implement to deter Putin from declaring open war. The fact that world leaders all came to Russia was a distinct power move on Putin’s behalf, reminding leaders not to underestimate Russia. Putin’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union and the power it held can only explain part of his strategic defence motive.
While Putin has not yet used his nuclear arsenal, and it remains unclear if he will, he has served the world a timely reminder of the capability of these weapons. This is a tactic he used when Russian forces started to surround Chernobyl and take the nuclear power plant there. Chernobyl is, to this day, a haunting warning of the power and long-term cost of these weapons. The war between Ukraine and Russia is a reminder that war on European soil is never far away. Russia is highly critical of NATO and its enlargement and actively feels threatened by its military capabilities. The recent announcement of Finland‘s intention to finally join NATO has Russia repeating its rhetoric against NATO and the West. One can only speculate how this will affect the war in Ukraine. So much so that Russia is using nuclear weapons as its leading military and political deterrent, reminiscent of the Cold War doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction that the Kennedy Administration used to its advantage in the 1960s.
Ultimately the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons may come down to the use of proportional force and retaliation. Russia has never backed down from the active use of force before and using nuclear weapons as a deterrent ensures Russia’s status as a hawkish and more dangerous opponent. Put simply, do not poke a sleeping bear. But what should Ukraine do when the bear actively comes after it? The nuclear dimension should never be forgotten and must always be calculated.
Pia Brinkschulte is a recent graduate of the Uppsala University Master of Russian and Eurasian Studies program. She also received a Master in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada with top honours, having focused on nuclear weapon programs for both of her graduate degrees. She specifically focuses on issues surrounding the strategic advantage of nuclear programs, which was first sparked during her undergrad in Political Studies at Queen’s University.
