Safe Science: The Council of Canadian Academies Report on Quantum Potential is a Boon for Defence Development

Claire Parsons

Thomas Prior / TIME

The role of academics extends beyond producing research to ensure its ethical application, particularly in the fields of security and defence. As such, the continuous evaluation and review of quantum technology necessitates extensive ethical scrutiny from security and defence experts.

What is Quantum Technology Anyway?

Quantum technology leverages the unorthodox behaviour of atoms to create new and revolutionary technologies that are more precise and efficient than their classical predecessors. Quantum technology generally operates on two principles of quantum physics; entanglement and superpositioning. Entanglement can be described as particles’ ability to affect one another instantaneously across any distance, while superpositioning allows particles to exist simultaneously in two states prior to observation. Such principles have created three domains of interest for states developing technology which will be of dual-use to both commercial and defence fields. This section of quantum physics is known as Quantum 2.0.

The most considered and conventional domain of quantum technology is that of the quantum computer. These quantum computers would easily surpass their classical counterparts on optimization-based logistics and solve issues in a matter of minutes, issues that would take classical computers hundreds of years to solve. Another domain is that of quantum communications, which works on transmitting information from one location to another and cannot be cracked by the aforementioned quantum computer. The last domain is the most mature: quantum sensing. Quantum sensors utilize superpositioning to infer information about its environment at a higher accuracy rate.

The Quantum Potential for Canada

The Quantum Potential report, published by the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA), shares crucial insights from an expert panel on the development of quantum technology. The majority of the report relates to the commercialization of quantum technology and the potential benefits and consequences of developing industries like resource extraction, defence, and healthcare. The role of the supply chain is a major focus. Additionally, the report focuses on the ethical, socioeconomic, and regulatory practices associated with a pro-innovation approach and recognition of potential bad actors. The report concluded with recommendations for responsible research and innovation to reduce potential threats and impacts of quantum technology. In sum, the CCA writes a compelling report concerning the future of ethics and application of quantum technology for states but misses the mark of specific recommendations to prevent bad actors from taking advantage of this new innovation.

Connection to Canada’s Existing Quantum Strategies

The panel’s findings affirm the concerns and recommendations of Canada’s quantum strategies as outlined in the DND/CAF Quantum S&T Strategy and Quantum 2030 as well as Canada’s National Quantum Strategy. The Quantum S&T Strategy places a strong emphasis on the importance of developing, attracting, and retaining highly qualified personnel (HQP) to advance Canada’s innovation, a value that the Quantum Potential panel supports.

Quantum 2030, the DND/CAF implementation plan for the Quantum S&T Strategy, also overlaps with the CCA panel’s findings. The most evident similarity is the concern around bad actors and malicious use of quantum technology. The panel writes that regulation should be approved to prevent malicious actors from accessing quantum tech and breaching privacy rights. Securing communications and focusing on sensing are part of Quantum 2030’s four missions towards quantum development and are seconded by the report, which advocates for more funding while recalling the necessity of regulation for new technologies.

Connections between Quantum Potential and the National Quantum Strategy are clear because the former directly cites the latter. Most notably, the two documents agree that developmental frameworks and roadmaps must keep up with quantum development as it impacts Canadian society. Legal frameworks are recommended to protect against privacy breaches, to increase equity, and to reduce barriers to adopting technology. The National Quantum Strategy has laid out funding to commercialize quantum technology with Quantum Potential providing insight on potential avenues. As such, Quantum Potential builds on the plans of the National Quantum Strategy to integrate quantum technology into Canadian markets and services.

Recommendations

The CCA created nine recommendations in Quantum Potential for the consideration of policy makers. Based on this brief’s security lens, the following recommendations have been highlighted:

1. Information security is an integral part of all quantum technology and is necessary to address security threats.

The most specific of the recommendations, the CCA’s choice to amplify the importance of quantum communications is the most perplexing of the security recommendations. The use of quantum communications is highlighted as a benefit towards Canadian economic success and protection from bad actors. The report reinforces professional opinions that quantum key distribution (QKD), a form of quantum communications, will only be a temporary solution. However, QKD has not been recommended by DND/CAF itself, stating that there are many technical hurdles to overcome. This protection is necessary due to the economic benefits associated with quantum communication which could result in a projected nearly 7% of Canadian GDP. If QKD is not recommended by Canada’s defence establishment, how can Canada plan to protect a booming economic sector from bad actors?

2. Anticipation of malicious use will be essential in the development process.

Reinforcing Quantum 2030, the report repeatedly returns to the theme of malicious use and bad actors utilizing quantum technology. The report makes no effort to leave the title of bad actors to ambiguity, directly referencing concerns of technological development in Russia and China. Particular threats include using quantum technology to spread misinformation, limit global funding, and slow the evolution of quantum technology in allied nations like Canada’s NATO allies in the United Kingdom and the United States who are both pursuing their own quantum programs and working alongside Canada.

Other potential bad actors include private industry corporations who, left to their own devices, may use quantum technology to their own benefit with direct harm to foreign jurisdictions and economies. As a result, the CCA have emphasized the need for regulation and criteria for those who will get access to quantum technology once all domains are fully realized. While this may be a good recommendation in a broad sense, the CCA does not indicate which private industries to regulate or how to regulate them. In particular, privacy information and data sharing has been a dominant concern for experts who have monitored the interests of private corporations.

3. Seek international collaboration and address a winner-takes-all approach to this innovation race.

It is essential for Canada to pursue international collaboration with its allies in this quantum development race. Canada will have to rely on allies for a safe supply chain and the specific materials for quantum development. Canada will need to rely on allies to inform them should there be malicious activity elsewhere.

International alliances such as the Five Eyes and NATO have been spotlighted as avenues to further safety and developmental cooperation. Other states will vie for leadership without question, however in order for Canada to make a quantum impact, it needs to hold a niche such as the sensing domain that it can cater to the needs of its allies. The winner-takes-all approach is realistically not something that Canada can control, and as long as Canada and its allies and adversaries are vying for the same technology and high quality personnel, there will always be competition amongst states for leadership and success. Instead, a more fruitful option would be continual collaboration with allies to gain leadership for a series of states instead of opting to ignore an inevitable competition.

4. Pursue diverse high-quality personnel.

The final recommendation and perhaps the most quintessential for success is the acquisition of a diverse and highly qualified personnel. Recruiting qualified candidates to the Canadian development team appears in all of Canada’s quantum strategies. The report recommends a domestic program where underrepresented groups are trained, attracted, and retained to the quantum field. This would include educational reform to create joint-programs, quantum strategies at the secondary level, and creating mechanisms to give students greater access to quantum research facilities. At the wider scale, the CCA also advises immigration reform, encouraging a start-up visa program for foreign entrepreneurs.

Final Thoughts

Quantum technology is an avenue that Canada must pursue if it wishes to remain on par with its allies and adversaries across the globe. Despite this, quantum technology is viewed by Canada as increasingly dangerous despite being riddled with potential. The CCA’s recognition of such a revolutionary opportunity and its decision to remain in support of quantum innovation is a promising sign for the development of the sector. Canada must find a balance between the benefits and quantum technology and the new threats the developments could produce. Further research is recommended for the risks that private industry presents if they were to have access to unregulated quantum technology.

Funding Disclosure

The research was funded through the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security Targeted Engagement Grant “QFVEY: Quantum Security, Strategy, and Technology in Five Eyes Nations.” The PI of the project is Dr. Michael Murphy. The opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect an official position of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, or Queen’s University.

--

--

Centre for International and Defence Policy
Contact Report

The CIDP is part of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is one of Canada’s most active research centres on international security.