The Votes Are In: Why Moscow Might Annex Luhansk
By Sergiy Sydorenko, Cornell University
On July 3, 2022, Russian forces captured Lysychansk, Ukraine’s last holdout in the Luhansk oblast. This is to say that all the territory claimed by the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) is now occupied by the Kremlin’s forces. As of writing this piece, there has been little-to-no news on Luhansk since the Ukrainians withdrew. However, given the circumstances and previous evidence, it is fair to expect the LNR to hold a referendum on joining Russia in the coming months. Make no mistake, such an event would be nothing short of a sham at gunpoint having pre-determined, Kremlin-orchestrated, and near-unanimous results. Over the years there have been numerous speculations of such a referendum taking place, but now would be the ideal time for Moscow to carry it out.
Since the collapse of the USSR, Moscow has been behind a number of rigged referendums around its former possessions — several in Ukraine alone. At the end of February 2014, unmarked Russian troops took over administrative buildings around the Crimean peninsula, effectively cutting out any Ukrainian government control. Three weeks later, the new Kremlin-appointed pro-Russian administration held a referendum, which allegedly saw 95.5% of Crimeans vote to join Russia. By this time, Russia was bolstering separatists in eastern Ukraine, who captured administrative buildings, and formed militias, with fighting breaking out by mid-April. In May 2014, separatists from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) held a referendum, claiming that 89% voted in favour of ‘self-rule’ with a turn out of 75%. In the same month, the neighbouring LNR referendum saw 96% vote for independence from Ukraine.
There’s much evidence that above-mentioned votes were deliberately rigged and pre-determined by the Kremlin. For its part, the Crimean referendum only gave two options, both of which saw the peninsula leaving Ukraine. Furthermore, it was leaked that only 50–60% voted for unification with Russia, while the voter turnout was only 30–50%. It’s also important to note, (1) that this was done only after the Kremlin’s infamous little green men captured administrative buildings in Crimea, and (2) that the vote lacked international observers. As for the eastern statelets, their 2014 referendums were strewn with allegations of double-voting and fraud, not to mention a complete lack of international observance and recognition. These votes were also evidently rigged, as independent polls in 2014 showed that even Russian-speaking Donbas residents were 58% in favour of Ukrainian territorial integrity, a number staunchly contradicts the narrative that over 90% of Donbas’ population wanted to secede. Furthermore, it is evident that the turnout rates were outrageously exaggerated. For comparison, in 2021, Switzerland — with its strong democratic practices and institutions — only had an average voter turnout of 57.8%, with an average ‘in favour’ vote of 48.9%.
These three cases took place eight years ago, back when the Russo-Ukrainian war started. While Moscow’s tactics have stayed the same, the circumstances have now changed. A good case in point can be seen in Ukraine’s southern Kherson oblast. At the end of June 2022, the Kremlin’s occupational administration in Kherson announced plans to hold a referendum on joining the Russia Federation within six months. There, the Russians had already begun ‘passportisation’ — a process where locals receive Russian citizenship and passports, thereby allowing the Kremlin to ‘protect Russians’. Furthermore, the Moscow-appointed administration is planning to teach Russian curriculum in schools, and the ruble is already being used as the local currency. However, as of writing, the Kherson oblast referendum has not yet taken place. There are two likely reasons for this. First, given the ongoing fighting, and the Ukrainians slowly pushing back towards Kherson, Moscow will find it hard and risky to stage a vote. Second, the population in Kherson is largely hostile towards the Russian occupation. This is evident not only by the mass protests held in Kherson at the beginning of occupation, but also by the vast partisan resistance in the occupied areas of southern Ukraine. Likewise, Moscow is unlikely to hold a mock referendum with threats of sabotage and resistance constantly looming.
This brings us to the expected LNR referendum. Luhansk has seen similar policies to Kherson; however, it’s been occupied for a much longer period. Moscow has been implementing ‘passportisation’ in the Donbas for eight years now. Likewise, the russification of the Donbas has been in the process since the start of Moscow’s intervention in 2014, with the Ukrainian curriculum and language having been effectively removed years ago. At the end of March 2022, LNR leader Leonid Pasechnik said that a referendum on joining the Russian Federation was to be expected soon. In April there were leaks that the Kremlin was preparing referendums in the Donbass for as early as mid-May. To date, no referendum has been taken place, but the strong intention is clear. This all mirrors the situation in Kherson. However, other factors make a Luhansk referendum more likely. Unlike Kherson, mass protests and wide-spread partisan resistance to Russian occupation hasn’t been seen and is unlikely to unfold in Luhansk. The region has historically been the least trusting of the Ukrainian government and has been favourable of close ties to Russia. Furthermore, a third of the Donbas has been under proxy control for eight years. This has given Moscow time to greatly diminish whatever pro-Ukrainian resistance there was in the region. It must also be noted that by May 2022, over 1.2 million Ukrainians were already deported from occupied areas, with countless more fleeing west instead. Those deported are being forced to give up their Ukrainian documents at filtration camps before being sent onwards to Russia. This ensures that little-to-no Ukrainian support is left in Luhansk, and those staying are the ones eagerly awaiting the Russians’ arrival. Lastly, there is the fighting itself, or, rather, lack thereof. While Kherson’s referendum has to hold off due to the fighting in the oblast, Luhansk has now been entirely occupied. Russia’s gains are now slowly grinding forward, making every mile count, and increasing the odds of Moscow consolidating what it can. These circumstances point to the obvious — now is the perfect time for the Kremlin to hold a manipulated referendum and add Luhansk to the Russian Federation.
Sergiy Sydorenko is a Ukrainian-Canadian master’s student in public administration at Cornell University. Being a research assistant at Cornell University’s Department of Government and a political science graduate of the University of Ottawa, he is interested in geopolitics, international relations, and the Russo-Ukrainian War.
