What To Expect At The Vilnius Summit 2023
By Simone Benson
The NATO Summit is a pivotal gathering of the North Atlantic Council, where member states and their partners convene to evaluate and tackle matters of utmost political or strategic significance amid crucial political junctures. The NATO Summit has ensued since 1949, with thirty-two total summits, and is held on an ad-hoc basis when the Council deems a meeting necessary. Since 1990, the summit has been held more frequently to address the increasing rise in the Alliance’s new security challenges. The summit is an opportunity for the Alliance to redefine their goals and procedures to fit within their agenda under the current political climate.
The upcoming NATO Summit is scheduled to take place in Vilnius, Lithuania, from July 11–12, 2023, under the chairmanship of the current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. Civil society needs to remain updated on what their states are doing, and an optimal way for individuals to stay knowledgeable about their country’s interests is through foreign policy and affairs. The Vilnius Summit provides an opportunity to keep up to date on the diverging narratives in the Alliance on critical issues. This article aims to debrief the essential and critical narratives regarding policies and goals for the upcoming NATO Summit to stay current on what the Alliance is doing to maintain and stabilize international security and peace. This July, the summit’s primary focus will be membership statuses and defence spending.
Membership for Ukraine
One of the summit’s primary topics will be whether the Alliance is ready to initiate the accession of Ukraine to become an official member of NATO. According to Stoltenberg, all members have agreed that Ukraine will eventually become a member of the Alliance. However, neither he nor the member states have decided when this will happen, and they hope to gain greater clarity at the summit. Nevertheless, there appears to be a consensus between member states that membership will not be given out at the summit, as many are hesitant to bring Ukraine into the Alliance while they are still fighting off Russia. By giving Ukraine membership now, it may entail the obligation of direct involvement from NATO to defend Ukraine in the conflict, which has the possibility of creating much more disastrous consequences on a global scale. Likewise, Stoltenberg has stated that Ukrainian membership is “not something that will happen in the midst of war.” At the summit, Stoltenberg hopes that the Alliance will agree on the steps and measures they can take to support Ukraine through a multi-year program with the hopeful outcome of moving them closer to NATO standards.
Ukrainian leaders have articulated their expectations for this year’s summit as the invasion from Russia has been prolonged since February 24, 2022. Ukraine’s senior cabinet has been vocal about their expectations regarding membership and receiving security guarantees from NATO. They are focused on achieving accession into the Alliance as soon as possible, with Russia being a persistent threat to their security. One thing to note about their wishes for membership is that they do not want to go through a Membership Action Plan (MAP), as it will further delay earlier membership. MAPs are NATO programs that offer guidance, services, and practical support to states that want to join the Alliance and prepare them to meet NATO’s status quo. The MAP process provides aspiring states with specific and direct feedback on their progress toward membership. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba, has been particularly persistent about NATO soon deciding on an accession timetable for the state, arguing that they do not need a MAP, considering they meet all of the requirements. Whatsmore, Kuleba has also intensified the topic of Ukraine’s accession, stating that the Alliance will continue the shame of the Bucharest Summit in 2008 unless a membership decision is made. At the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance agreed that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members of NATO and that their next steps toward direct membership included a MAP. In a panel with the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, Kuleba explained the mistake made after the declaration in Bucharest was that Ukraine was not given a MAP for NATO, which he argues is the reason for their recent “troubles and tragedies,” including the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the current invasion.
Moreover, when it comes to security guarantees, President Zelenskyy has stated that these security guarantees will be crucial to all nations’ survival but that these guarantees must not replace or delay their membership in NATO. There is already a private document on said guarantees being shared between world leaders, but little is known to the public. However, a statement released by the Ukrainian Presidential Office has alluded that the document combines concepts from the Kyiv Security Compact and previous guarantees allocated to Israel.
While there is consensus among all NATO members that Ukraine will eventually join the Alliance, there are differing views on the timing of its official membership. Currently, Estonia and Lithuania are the only two members that have publicly expressed their desire for Ukraine’s accession into NATO sooner rather than later. Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margus Tsahkna, has declared that Estonia would like to see a straightforward path for the state to receive membership, alluding to skipping a MAP. Further, Lithuania’s Prime Minister, Ingrida Šimonytė, states that they fully support the accession of Ukraine into NATO and want them to be the ultimate winner of the summit. On the other hand, most of the central member states in the discussion are looking for alternative ways to support Ukraine or see their accession through a MAP. So far, significant countries in the discussion, including France, Germany, and the United States, have all made statements to continue supporting Ukraine and agree that security guarantees are the best way forward.
Conversely, other member states are in the middle — they agree that Ukraine should go through a MAP but also would like to see Ukrainian membership sooner rather than later. Ultimately, many members of the Alliance do not see Ukraine’s accession as the most urgent action while they are still fighting with Russia but will provide the state with the resources and finances they need. In total, NATO countries have donated over 100 billion dollars to Ukraine through government funding, financial assistance, military resources, and humanitarian aid.
NATO’s Defence Budget
NATO has created ambitious goals and expectations regarding member states’ defence spending budgets. The initial goal established for all members of the Alliance included having their defence spending budget eventually equal two percent of their state’s GDP, which was agreed upon at previous summits and to be met by 2024. However, the narratives from some member states have indicated that this will be a challenging collective goal to achieve. Less than one-third of member states have met or surpassed this goal, including the United States, Greece, Lithuania, Britain, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Stoltenberg has emphasized the importance for NATO to adhere to a defence spending budget with an established framework that can provide security and guarantees for all allies to deter their threats. That being said, Stoltenberg and NATO’s Resource Policy and Planning Board (RPPB) are looking to create a new agreement on defence spending — where the two-percent budget is set as the floor for defence budgets towards NATO.
Many members of the Alliance have been vocal about the defence spending budget. Along the eastern flank, member states have articulated their support of increasing the defence spending budget, especially Lithuania and Poland, articulating that this increase of resources will benefit the entire region in feeling much more secure while strengthening their deterrence and defence policy. Lithuania’s Prime Minister, Ingrida Šimonytė, has stated that more substantial military spending commitments from the member states are a crucial objective on their agenda for the NATO summit, which also has been echoed by Polish President Andrzej Duda. North America has also created much discourse around NATO’s defence budget. While the United States has announced they plan to introduce a new Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) at the summit, their neighbour, Canada, has been a part of the conversations for contrasting reasons.
Other NATO members are calling out Canada for their defence spending budget, as they are not fully committing to the collective security of NATO. A leak reported by the Washington Post revealed that Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, has stated that the country will never meet NATO’s baseline defence spending goal of two percent of its GDP and is only allocating around 1.3 percent of its GDP towards its defence budget. Considering the current political climate and high alert within the Alliance, this declaration concerns all other member countries committed to meeting the spending goal and has put Canada in an awkward position regarding its international reputation. Alliance members have expressed their concerns towards Canada, like Germany and Turkey, who both made statements regarding their military capabilities to provide international aid while meeting the pledges it has made to NATO. More specifically, the United States has expressed their discontent regarding this statement, as experts in Washington believe that their “widespread defence shortfalls” are hindering its military capabilities while simultaneously straining its relationships with partners and its contributions to the Alliance.
Sweden’s Membership
A third recurring topic expected to be discussed at the summit is how NATO will move forward with Sweden’s membership bid. Sweden has been looking to join the Alliance for some time and is now justifying their aspirations to join the Alliance by pointing to Russia. Swedish Prime Minister, Magdalena Andersson, states that the invasion of Ukraine undermines the European Security Order that Sweden has built its security on and articulates that being the only country left in the Baltic Sea region not part of the Alliance puts them in a vulnerable position against Russian pressure. For the most part, Sweden has had a smooth journey of getting closer to NATO’s accession process. Most Alliance members hope Sweden can become an official member soon. Specifically, the United States hopes securing Sweden’s position in NATO will strengthen the outreach and European security.
However, this process has been stalled because of the tension between Türkiye and Sweden. NATO is a consensus-based organization, meaning every member state must agree to a motion to accept it. Since Türkiye states they cannot favour Sweden joining the Alliance, they have blocked Sweden’s opportunity to join. Türkiye’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, justifies his actions to block Sweden’s membership bid due to the increasing anti-Türkiye sentiments in the country and their lack of legal action against recognized terrorist organizations. Multiple demonstrations in Sweden have featured symbols of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and there have also been two significant incidents of anti-Turkish sentiment since January 2022: the mock-hanging of an effigy of Erdoğan and the burning of the Quran outside the residence of the Turkish ambassador in Stockholm.
Although Sweden’s officials have denounced these actions and pointed out that these events have not violated their laws, Türkiye does not accept their explanations. Due to this, Erdoğan states that this lack of respect for Turkish and Muslim beliefs would cost Sweden any support from Turkey for ratifying their membership bid. Additionally, Erdoğan is blocking Sweden’s bid because they have refused to extradite multiple suspects linked to outlawed Kurdish fighter groups and a failed coup attempt against Türkiye back in 2016. At the previous Summit in Madrid, Sweden agreed with Türkiye to work harder to fight against terrorism and outlawed fighting groups by intensifying their work on the extradition and deportation of suspected militants. However, Sweden’s courts have blocked some of these extraditions, which has created more discontent in Türkiye.
Nevertheless, Türkiye’s decision to block the ratification of Sweden’s bid for NATO membership has also created ramifications for themselves. By blocking Sweden’s bid, it damages its image by feeding perceptions of the state as an unreliable and disruptive actor during critical and intense political decision-making within the Alliance. Many have expressed their opinion that their decision to stand in the way of Sweden during times of war and “geopolitical paradigm shifts” is not something they should be proud of. Everything considered, the core of the issue between Türkiye and Sweden stems from the disconnect between their legal interpretations, expectations, and realities. It is an important subject to discuss at the Vilnius summit to finally ratify Sweden’s membership bid and welcome them into the Alliance, as they are seen to be the ‘next-in-line’ country now that Finland has become an official member.
Conclusion:
Overall, there appear to be two prominent themes one should be aware of at the NATO Summit in Vilnius: membership statuses and defence spending — neither of which there is a clear direction on what will be decided at the summit. Hopefully, the summit will provide more unambiguous answers on an official timeline for Ukrainian membership, an updated security defence budget agreement, and mitigate discussions between Türkiye and Sweden so Sweden can finally have their membership application ratified.
I want to acknowledge and thank Queen’s University’s Undergraduate Summer Student Research Fellowship (USSRF Program), Canada’s Research Chair in Gender, Security, and the Armed Forces, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for supporting my summer fellowship at the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP).
Simone Benson is in her third year at Queen’s University, studying Political Studies and pursuing a certificate in International Studies. She also works as a research assistant at the Centre for International and Defence Policy.
