Why the CAF Cannot “Eliminate Harmful and Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour”

By Allan English, Fellow, CIDP
Originally Published: 3 February 2019

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Operation Honour is the capstone document that articulates publicly the response of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to the report of Justice Marie Deschamps, “External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces.” The Deschamps report, issued in March 2015, had identified serious problems related to the culture of the CAF. It concluded that sexual harassment and sexual assault were the result of an “underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGTBQ members.” Op Honour’s stated mission is to “eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF,” and gave the CAF twenty-two months to complete this mission. Despite some vague subsequent references to converting Operation Honour into an “ongoing, enduring mission,” the original plan was for the CAF to be in a position to “Maintain and Hold” its required culture change “in perpetuity” starting on 1 July 2017.

However, just over five months into Operation Honour’s “Maintain & Hold” final phase, an event involving the senior leadership of the CAF gave us an indication of how successful Operation Honour had been in meeting its culture change goals, especially those related to rebuilding trust between CAF members and its senior leadership. The “party flight” was a series of incidents which occurred between 2 and 5 December 2017 as part of a “morale tour” planned by the CDS’s office. Two of the most senior leaders in the CAF, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the CAF Chief Warrant Officer, as well as members of CDS’s office, were among the 20 to 25 passengers on board. Afterwards, there were reports of partying in the aisles, extreme abuse of alcohol by some passengers, and cabin crew members being sexually harassed and inappropriately touched by some passengers. This resulted in two formal complaints of sexual assault by aircraft crew members, one of which is before the courts.

The episode did not reflect well on DND. Two of the most senior leaders in the CAF on board the flight were widely seen to have been indifferent to what was happening. The CDS’s initial reaction to the incidents was to say that “what happened on the flight might have been exaggerated.” Two months passed before a formal investigation into the incidents was convened. The message that many in the CAF and among the Canadian public will take from the “party flight” episode is that, despite Operation Honour being in effect for over two years, situations involving the abuse of alcohol that are associated with increased risk of sexual misconduct and that in this case resulted in “harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour” still occur in the CAF, even in the presence of its senior leadership.

Why Did Culture Change Not Occur? One of the principal reasons that Operation Honour did not produce the desired culture change was the lack of an overall strategy addressing the causes, not just the symptoms, of the CAF’s “sexualized culture.” As a result, Operation Honour’s instructions on culture change were modified a year later to be now “linked very closely” to other government diversity programs, and particularly the CAF “Diversity Strategy” released in May 2016. This direction diluted Operation Honour’s emphasis from cultural change necessary to “eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF” to “creating and fostering a culture of respect and inclusion for all CAF members.” This change of focus is typical of new initiatives displacing old ones or operational priorities derailing “non-operational imperatives” in past CAF change initiatives when no comprehensive strategy for change was created.

In addition, both Operation Honour and the “Diversity Strategy” rely on changing the CAF’s demographics to effect culture change. For example, the Chief of the Defence Staff has directed that women should make up 25 per cent of the armed forces by 2026. However, longstanding failures by the CAF recruiting and retention system, as documented by the Auditor General in three reports dating back to 2002, especially the absence of strategies to achieve its goals, will likely thwart any efforts to increase the diversity of the CAF:

…it is unlikely that the Regular Force will be able to reach the desired number of members by the 2018–19 fiscal year as planned. We also found that although the Canadian Armed Forces had established a goal of 25 percent for the representation of women, it did not set specific targets by occupation, nor did it have a strategy to achieve this goal.

Finally, the CAF’s hyper-masculine, sexualized warrior culture is one of the most deeply rooted causes of sexual misconduct in the CAF, and a major barrier to culture change and diversity because of its emphasis on a narrow range of acceptable behaviours in a homogenous warrior culture. Not only is there no clear strategy to change this culture, but there are also mixed signals being sent by senior members of the CAF. For example, when senior CAF leaders state that “harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour” must be eliminated while “upholding the warrior ethos,” it will almost certainly frustrate any culture change initiatives designed to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour caused by the CAF’s current culture.

The Prognosis. Therefore, until the CAF adopts a long-term culture change strategy that can modify the values, attitudes and beliefs of its members in a way that complements the short-term bureaucratic methods used to date, any change will be ephemeral and inconsequential. Unless the CAF addresses the causes of its problems, not just their symptoms, and its actions are monitored by effective external oversight, the “comprehensive culture change” initiatives required by Justice Deschamps and acknowledged as necessary by the CAF are likely to meet the same fate as their predecessors — disappointment and future problems as the causes of the CAF’s sexualized, toxic culture remain in place.

Note: This Contact Report is based on a paper by Allan English written for the IUS Canada Conference, Ottawa ON, 20–21 October 2018 titled “‘Comprehensive Culture Change’ and Diversity in the Canadian Armed Forces: An Assessment of Operation Honour after Three Years and Implications for the latest CAF ‘Diversity Strategy’” and which is available on request.

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Centre for International and Defence Policy
Contact Report

The CIDP is part of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and is one of Canada’s most active research centres on international security.