1970: The Chilean Revolution
Fifty years ago today, at the end of a hard-fought electoral campaign that served as the culmination of decades of struggle by the organized working class of Chile against the forces of the country’s traditional oligarchy, its modern, monopolist bourgeoisie, and the forces of imperialism, Salvador Allende Gossens was elected President of Chile.
Paraphrasing the lyrics to a popular song written following the victory, this victory was not a simple question of changing one head of state out for another, but a fundamental shift in the balance of power that put the working class of Chile into the position of chief executive.
The significance of the moment was not lost on any of its main protagonists.
As the workers, students, shantytown dwellers, and peasants filled the streets to celebrate the electoral victory of the Popular Unity ticket, the wealthy residents of the fancy neighborhoods they marched through, shuttered their doors and boarded their windows in anticipation of the mob violence that never came.
The domestic opposition — including the sitting president Eduardo Frei Montalva of the center-left Christian Democratic Party whispered to his advisors about the possibility of the military taking control of the situation.
Military leaders, both with and without Frei’s knowledge, began to plot various schemes to prevent Allende from ascending to power.
Meanwhile, when he heard the news, Nixon gave carte blanche to the CIA to prevent Allende from serving as president. With Kissinger publicly acknowledging just 10 days later in no uncertain terms in Chicago that an Allende presidency in Chile would be intolerable to the United States’ vital national interest.
The victory on September 4, 1970 is a watershed moment, both for the history of Chile and for the history of the world. And yet for most, especially in the US, the importance of this moment is overshadowed by what took place three years and one week later, when the Armed Forces of Chile, led in part by their commander in chief, one Augusto Pinochet, launched a military attack on their own government, bombarded the presidential palace, and effected a coup d’état against the Popular Unity government.
The deadly aftermath of the coup cannot be overstated. Even low-level government functionaries and party members were kidnapped, rounded up, tortured, and executed, in the most vicious and horrific ways imaginable (the documentary work of Patricio Guzman is especially poignant in its portrayal of this brutality, and no visit to Santiago should be complete without a visit to the Museo de la Memoria, whose collection of first-hand accounts is a chilling and poignant testimony to the barbarity of the dictatorship).
Without dwelling on the macabre details, the Left in particular also tends to dwell on the significance of the defeat of the Popular Unity on September 11, 1973, oftentimes with an ideological axe to grind — some pointing to the role of imperialism and its calculating efficiency at eliminating ideological threats, others seeking flaws in the supposed theoretical and strategic deficiencies of the Allende government, the Popular Unity coalition, and in particular critiquing the commitment of both to the rigidly idealistic “Chilean road to socialism.”
But the strengths of the Popular Unity coalition, the 1970 presidential victory, the decades of workers’ struggles that preceded it, as well as the merits of the Popular Unity government’s 1,000 days in power also cannot be ignored— in what they were able to achieve against the strong headwinds of an unfavorable international economic situation, in the shadow of a hostile world economic power, and against the domestic turbulence of right-wing vigilante violence and economic and political sabotage by the ruling classes as well as in terms of leading a united working class in a revolutionary struggle to remake Chilean society.
Of course it’s critically important to analyze and understand the failings of the Popular Unity coalition, its political philosophy, and its inability to overcome the combined resistance of the forces arrayed against it. It would be dishonest not to acknowledge and dangerous not to take to heart the real strategic and tactical lessons that were paid for with the blood of the Chilean workers and their leaders, first among them Salvador Allende himself.
But it’s just as necessary to recognize that Chile in the 1970s lived an authentically revolutionary moment, and from this recognition, it’s incumbent to understand its roots in history, the conditions of its making, and the dynamics of its development.
Political Economic History of Chile up to 1970
In 1970, Chile, through the Agrarian Reform, was on the verge of toppling the base of traditional political power it had inherited from colonial times.
The basis of this political power was a centuries-old system of land ownership and a form of semi-feudal tenant farming. The consolidation of land ownership in Chile is the political and economic basis of the class structure in Chile.
The economic basis of the tenant farming system, called the latifundios, was exportation — first of animal products to Peru in the 1600s, then later grain to the same up until the time of independence in 1810. Setting the dominant pattern in the Chilean economy up until the present day — exploitation of the laboring masses to produce raw materials for export, and importation of commodities largely consumed by the middle and upper classes.
Shortly after independence from Spain, silver was discovered in the Norte Chico region of Chile, and the export of silver along with wheat to new grain markets in California and Australia — thanks to the gold rushes in each respective area and Chile’s strategic placement as a transit hub to both — fueled a boom in Chile’s economy. Notably, this also added mineral extraction for export to the existing economic paradigm. Exploitation of mineral resources led to a more industrialized political economy, with an ascendent, small mining elite, often with ties to the Great Britain and the United States.
As soon as the silver mines were exhausted, the Chilean republic immediately went to war with Bolivia and Peru for control over what was then Southern, coastal Bolivia, an area in which Chilean mining interests had invested heavily in following the silver rush. It was the protection of these interests that launched the War of the Pacific, from which Chile emerged as the victor, winning territory in the North whose mineral production continues to drive the economic development of the country to this day.
Today, the North of Chile is known for its copper production, but it’s also home to the richest natural deposits of sodium nitrate — or Chile saltpeter, known as “white gold” — in the world. Saltpeter’s value as a fertilizer and in the production of gunpowder made it an extremely lucrative business (copper mining took a backseat), one which came to be dominated by the United Kingdom, for its ability to provide the industrial capital capable of efficiently exploiting saltpeter resources.
Simultaneously, the Chilean state solidified its dependence on private, monopoly saltpeter mining by foreign interests through a tax structure that made state revenue highly dependent on sodium nitrate mining, effectively subordinating the Chilean economy to British capitalism, which also came to dominate the internal consumer market through importation of British manufactured goods.
Saltpeter mining, being heavily dependent on manual labor, also served to absorb the excess rural population, and on the one hand fueled an increasing urbanization in Chile, creating a growing commercial class of petit bourgeois merchants in Chilean cities, while on the other gave rise to the first labor unions in Chile.
When German scientists discovered a means to synthesize sodium nitrate, natural sources of saltpeter were no longer necessary. The subsequent collapse of the saltpeter economy in Chile led the Chilean ruling class to seek two potential remedies — opening up greater trade links to the United States to prop up a collapsing export market in saltpeter, and the development of industry internal to Chile through protectionist policies, leading to the growth of the state and of “intermediary” urban economic activity and thus the development of urban middle classes.
At the same time, a crisis in wheat production fueled a process of displacement of rural peasants to the peripheries of major cities.
All of this set the stage for the principal social conflict from the era of 1920 (when saltpeter production began to decline) through 1973. Here’s how the alignment of social forces stood:
- Traditional, landowning oligarchy: political power based on the domination of land and the peasants who worked it and expressed in the Conservative Party
- Nascent, “dependent” bourgeoisie: a loose, heterogenous combination of commercial, industrial, and financial interests with deep ties to English and US capital, represented by the Liberal Party
- Middle classes: Composed of small, urban merchants and state bureaucrats, and other upwardly mobile sectors, often favoring redistributive policies, most directly represented by the Radical Party, but also finding political expression in various other political formations
- Popular classes: Rural campesinos (peasants), miners, urban industrial workers, and displaced rural workers living in shantytowns called poblaciones, who first formed political alliances with the middle classes and bourgeois against the landowning oligarchy, but increasingly found political expression in a growing union movement and popular political parties, such as the Communist Party and the Socialist Party
With the economic crisis triggered by the collapse of saltpeter production, the popular classes saw an opening of the political system as various social group began vying for power. In particular, the battle over the role of the state in the economy — whether it should support traditional agrarian economic interests by remaining laissez-faire or engage in ascendent industrial development and protectionism, took center stage, along with what would become the chronic problem of controlling inflation.
The key questions for the strategic orientation of the Chilean revolutionary process are:
- The relationships between different dominant and subordinate classes, domestically and internationally
- The relationships between the popular classes and their (at least nominal) political leadership (trade unions, political parties, coalitions, and eventually government)
- The role of the state (and various institutional elements of the state) in mediating, exacerbating, and engaging in class conflict
To answer these questions, we need to take an in-depth look at the historical processes that led to the formation of the relevant social classes in Chile up to 1970; the political history of Chile; and the formation, composition, and political orientation of the relevant political parties and trade unions.
History of the Political System of Chile
The political and institutional history of Chile is deeply tied both to the conditions that led to the development of the revolutionary process in Chile as well as the prevailing political philosophy of its protagonists.
A certain conception of the political history of Chile lies behind not just the concept of the “Chilean road to socialism,” and some attitudes towards the possibility of a coup d’état, but also the attitudes of the Popular Unity coalition’s erstwhile opponents in the Christian Democrat party.
The mythos of Chilean liberal-democratic institutionality at the time of Allende’s election traces a continuity from the 1833 constitution of Diego Portales, a minister of President José Joaquín Prieto charged with drafting a new constitution. Even on the left, the 1973 coup was referred to as the end of 140 years of democracy, citing a kind of Chilean exceptionalism that traced a long and democratic tradition in Chile. But the system of government inaugurated by Portales was less of a modern liberal democracy and more a consolidation of power by a small clique of elite rulers, with a veneer of republicanism.
Nor was there a consistent line of constitutional government from 1833 to 1973. While Portales’s constitution was not replaced during the Civil War of 1891, the war pitted congress against the presidency and the Navy against the Army.
And when the constitution of 1833 was finally replaced, it was only after a military coup had ousted the president and then was itself ousted by a counter-coup of left-wing forces within the Armed Forces who reinstalled the president and had him write a new constitution with a stronger presidency.
Two presidencies later, including the authoritarian populist military leader Carlos Ibáñez, who instituted a kind of Chilean perónismo. After resigning in scandal, Ibáñez’s successor was once again ousted by a military coup, led by Marmaduque Grove, who had been involved in the previous coup and with his other co-putschists declared the Socialist Republic of Chile in 1931, which was not actually popular with the Armed Forces.
Only under the threat of mutiny did the Socialist Republic organize elections and center-right candidate Arturo Alessandri won the race.
So while it was technically true that some semblance of legal continuity, and certainly institutional continuity did extend from 1833 to 1973, it was hardly a straight line of uninterrupted, pacific democracy that was breached in 1973.
Not only that, the Chilean military’s history is rife with intervention in the affairs of the civil state, from the Civil War of 1891 to the coups of the 20s and 30s.
The Cuban Revolution
If there was any one key event that set the stage in terms of the International politics at play in Chile during the revolutionary process from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, it was the Cuban Revolution.
Not only did the Cuban Revolution act as inspiration and the primary reference point to all manner of Leftists in Chile during this period, it also set the stage for the reaction of North American imperialism to the possible ascendancy of a left-wing Marxist government on the southern tip of the Americas.
Two simultaneous campaigns were led by the United States in Latin America — first, coordination and training of the armed forces of Latin American countries. The Armed Forces of Chile trained in counter-insurgency and anti-guerilla tactics alongside troops from across South America. These are not just tactical trainings but ideological indoctrination that primed militaries across Latin America to orient towards “internal enemies.”
Class struggle
Starting during the years of government in the 1940s by the Radical Party, supported by a Popular Front alliance coalition that saw working class parties allied with and subsumed to the interests of the petit bourgeois Radical Party, the “popular classes” increasingly sought political independence.
The growing power of militant syndicalism as well as the growth of popular left-wing political parties came increasingly to be seen as a political threat to both the landowning oligarchy, whose political basis was eroding, and the foreign-dependent bourgeoisie (who feared the loss of US investment).
As successive governments attempted to address the prolonged economic problems, particularly inflation, they attempted to do so mainly on the backs of workers and urban salary-earners, both of whom became increasingly radicalized through struggles for adequate cost of living increases in the face of continuously rising prices. By the 1960s, general strikes against government policies aiming to limit worker wage increases in order to solve the problem of inflation became common, led by an increasingly unified labor movement, under the auspicies of the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT).
The final stage of social conflict came with the presidency of Eduardo Frei, whose policies were explicitly designed to co-opt and tamp down the worker’s movement, simultaneously conceding key reforms like the Agrarian Reform, while attempting labor reforms explicitly designed to break the power of the militant, unified union movement.
Revolutionary culture
The rise of the working classes of Chile coincided with an artistic and cultural flourishing in the country that arose from the same social milieu as the revolution itself.
The Nueva canción chilena was a musical folklore movement tied to the immortal figure of Violeta Parra, who not only catalogued and recorded traditional folk songs from among the Chilean campesinos, but artfully advanced the artform of Chilean folk music, infusing it not only with themes of personal anguish but also working class, left-wing politics. Her songs about strikes, police violence, electoral opportunism, and exploitation of workers quickly became standards in a growing Chilean folk music scene.
Visual art in this revolutionary period also flourished in the form of a grassroots street muralist movement headed up by the Brigada Ramona Parra (no relation to Violeta), young muralists tied to the Communist Party who worked under the cover of dark to produce striking and vibrant representations of working class political consciousness.
Popular Unity
The most critical component in the recipe of the revolution in Chile in the 1970s was the Popular Unity coalition itself.
The class alliances it forged — between campesino, industrial worker, students, and salaried employees, between slum-dwelling pobladores and a city-dwelling middle class — were the basis of a new revolutionary power with roots in workers struggles, that developed beyond the 1970 election through the years of the Allende government.
The fact of worker’s power being embodied in the executive branch, through popular elections in a liberal democratic system stands in stark contrast to the period of co-optation that preceded it. And the full consciousness and unity of the working class movement—far from being dissipated by the supposedly reformist project of the Popular Unity government—on the contrary was only strengthened. Meanwhile the antagonism with the ruling classes—the traditional oligarchy and foreign-dependent capitalist class, and aligned elements of the middle classes—was only heightened.
The fact that there existed both grassroots worker organization alongside the “official” state power wielded by the Allende government and a “bureaucratic” expression of the workers movement within the state itself, with varying degrees of collaboration and independence between one another doesn’t discount the revolutionary character of the Allende government or the Popular Unity coalition. The failure of not “activating” and enhancing the workers’ self-defense groups, the cordones industriales, was not a decisive error.
Nor does it change the significance that the workers’ movement (not to mention its class enemies both domestic and foreign) saw the Allende government as the legitimate leadership of the class. Even the cordones industriales, sometimes touted as a more revolutionary “alternative” power, were organized on this basis—this was not a question for any of the primary participants on either side of the class struggle in Chile in the 1970s. Even partisans of the ultra-leftist MIR viewed the capture of state executive power as an authentic, critical achievement of working class struggle.
The outgrowth of poder popular—“popular power”—as the grassroots expression of the Popular Unity movement is a critical achievement in the revolutionary process in Chile in the 1970s. The fact that the connections and coordination between poder popular, the Popular Unity coalition of political institutions, and the Popular Government of Salvador Allende were not as strong as they could be or indeed needed to be is one of the key lessons of this period, but it does not mean by itself that the revolution was dashed by the lack of cohesion between these three elements of the process.
Why does it matter today
On the night of his election, 50 years ago today, Salvador Allende spoke to the assembled crowd, from the balcony of the Federation of Chilean Students.
He eloquently described the meaning of that particular moment, not just as an electoral victory, but as a turning point in history:
“Thousands and thousands of Chileans sowed their pain and their hope in this moment which belongs to the people. From beyond these borders, from other countries, people look onto our victory with deep satisfaction. Chile is opening a path that other peoples across America and the world will be able to follow. The vital power of unity will break the dams of dictatorships and open the course for other peoples to be free and to build their own destiny.”
Our context today is far different, and though the long shadow of Pinochet hangs over the entire revolutionary project in Chile, the lessons to be learned are not entirely premised on the strategic and tactical errors made by the leadership. The revolutionary process in Chile, and its roots in Chilean history, are a rich source of inspiration and critical reflection.
On September 4, 1970 a new day dawned in Chile. May the same new day dawn for us all one day.
