Apple Vs. FBI: The Technical Side To The Story

d‘wise one
Chip-Monks
Published in
5 min readMar 1, 2016

Why can’t the FBI unlock the iPhone themselves?

While we have already discussed the social, political and moral aspects of the Apple vs. FBI stand-off in the first instalment of the feature; then we explained why so much fuss was being created around FBI’s insistence, and Apple’s abstinence, in our second feature article. They’re both important articles, that will help you understand different, pertinent perspectives to this dichotomous situation.

This articles focuses on a few other critical things — explaining the technical aspects of the matter so as to elaborate on why the FBI isn’t being able to unlock the iPhone themselves, what help they need from Apple and why this particular case is different from other cases of a security agency breaking into a device to access the data.

Before we do that, let us recap the issue on hand. Apple, the technology giant, was asked by United States Magistrate, Judge Sheri Pym, in a court order to help FBI unlock an iPhone 5c that was used by Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the perpetrator in the San Bernardino shootings. Apple refused to abide by the order on various grounds, the prime reason being that of user privacy, and the two have since been involved in court battles.

Why Can’t The FBI Unlock The Phone Themselves?

Well, that is precisely what they want to be able to do. They have asked Apple for “assistance” and not to do the job for them. But Apple’s security system stands in their way. Apple’s security system is designed in a very complex manner, to ensure that a device can’t be broken into. Apple has always boasted of its security system on its devices and thus of course they maintain the highest of the standards.

On an Apple device, much like any other smart device today, one can set a passcode, or a password, to ensure their security. Once a passcode is set, if you enter the passcode wrong for more than 5 times, the devices starts enforcing time delays onto you. It starts with 1 minute then 5 minutes, then 15 minutes, and so on, the time keeps multiplying and increasing.

Another feature that is part of Apple’s security system is the self-erase feature. The idea is that you can set a particular number of times (usually 10) an attempt to feed password can be made, after which if a wrong passcode is attempted, the data on the device self-destructs and cannot be recovered thereafter.

It is because of these two features that FBI isn’t being able to break into the iPhone in question. The time delays make it harder, and the possibility of a self-destruct switch means that the data could become irretrievable altogether if FBI persists beyond a point, in using erroneous passwords.

What is FBI (and the Court) asking Apple to do?

The Court, and through them the FBI, is asking Apple to write a program that would help with breaking into the iPhone in question; ‘help’ being the keyword. FBI is not asking Apple to do the job for them.

Instead, they want Apple to write them a program that would help them bypass the two problems it is facing: the time delays and the possibility of a self-erase switch. In addition, the FBI is asking Apple to expand the program so that various passcodes can be entered via a computer generated program instead of having to be manually entered on the device.

Usual Apple passcodes are about 4 digits, numbers that is. But that is not compulsory for all the devices. Longer passcodes can also be set, and if the passcode on this device is a longer and more complex one then the FBI might still never recover the data. So, in short, even if Apple gives FBI what it wants, there is no guarantee that the data from the iPhone will ever be recovered. It will just enable the FBI to try harder.

Why is this case different?

This particular case is different from other cases of the security agencies asking for help to break into devices because of the need to write a program to render a solution. If Apple had had a master key that could unlock every iPhone, there would’ve been no issue.

Apple has helped break security for its devices before, with specialised tools that never leave their headquarters. It would demand that the device be brought to them, and when the job was done, the agency was provided the data in a flash drive or something equivalent. But this was before iOS 9. With the latest iOS 9 upgrade, devices can no longer be broken into the same way and thus, Apple can’t use its tools in the erstwhile fashion to help the FBI anymore.

Why can only Apple help and not a Freelancer?

The answer to that is one word: signature.

Hackers exist around the world, and hacking into a device is nothing new, much like hacking into an account otherwise. The question also is that why does FBI need Apple to help it, and why can’t it just pay one such hacking expert, supposedly a freelancer, to write the program it needs and help it break into the device?!

The answer to that is that FBI could, but the people back at Apple know the device better than anyone else. FBI does not need help so much with writing the program but with running the program on the device.

The experts at ArtTechnica have said this best: “The iPhone requires that its firmware have a digital signature that authentically demonstrates that the firmware was developed by Apple and has not been subsequently modified… It is instead asking for Apple to use its signing key to sign the custom firmware so that the iPhone will accept it and run it. It is this signature requirement that means the FBI cannot create the software itself.

While Apple remains rigid on its stand and refuses to budge, so does the FBI.
What makes matters more complex is that both of them have excellent standing in the law as well as in the social and security-related context.

A conclusion cannot be expected anytime soon as court battles continue amidst much heated discussions and debate.

Originally published at Chip-Monks.

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