Bitcoin as a Litigation Standard
It has previously been written how Francis Fukuyama regarded the end of History — not only in the form of a distrust for grand political ideologies, but in the dangers of empty consumerism:
“Fukuyama spoke of the dangers of popularism and brought forward Nietzsche in explaining his thesis: of the need for strong institutions in functioning societies.” Resolving the Szabo and Fukuyama Divergence.
Revisiting Nietzsche
Fukuyama used Nietzsche because of the need to feel something in the existential condition. Fukuyama has been attributed in predicting the rise of a politician like Trump whose short, catchy, direct, and polarising messages have proved appealing to a disenfranchised electorate.
This type of politics has not been confined to America: in Britain, the Brexit decision to leave the EU has proved equally contentious. And for the first time it seems; legal actions, threats, and court rulings are becoming an acceptable way of challenging what appears to be the democratic and free expression of civil culture.
The Litigation of Modern Life
In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche traces origins of guilt and conscience to primitive relationships between counterparties: with the more sophisticated and evolved a society becomes, the less it needs to punish offenders (they pose less of a threat to the whole).
The concept of justice to Nietzsche only exists where laws have been transgressed, so while justice and institutions [of law] take revenge out of the hands of the offended party, there is no such thing as justice in itself — only the laws which make justice possible.
Nietzsche also suggests why we punish is fluid — that it is the act of punishing which endures.
To such regard, we can observe within modern litigation the award of money as punitive damages, restoration or compensation as common place. And to such ends, benchmarks or rationale for such [awards] are used by courts.
Formal Declaration of Comparable Value
Change can happen either more or less gradually or [more or less] suddenly. It can be seen as a response to a crisis or where some see great change as a crisis, depending on how they are situated in relation to it.
In context of the Bitcoin price, there has been relative stability for some time. It’s been observed this is more a consolidation and fight between those that want it to find purpose and those who believe it an aberration which will eventually atrophy.
To this regard, it has previously been noted Satoshi created Bitcoin without any express or obvious purpose: to the extent he said any random spark could trigger a digital like gold rush (he appeared unsure as to any actual use).
It has also been noted that in macro-economic terms, Bitcoin does have latent rationale, which may not necessarily be causative of such [a spark].
In considering court precedent in declaring restorative damages in relation to a Bitcoin standard, we can again return to Nietzsche: the meaning of punishment has changed many times over the years, so much so that origins and utility become worlds apart.
That something has a purpose or utility is only a sign that a will to power is acting upon it. A litigation standard in relation to Bitcoin is no different: it may be the random spark [to a digital gold rush], created and given purpose by a plaintiff will and legal precedent [to act upon it].
In such a scenario, a new trust standard is created beyond theoretical context.
