Identity politics is a net positive force.
For by Dan Melo. Against by Matt Johnson. Please see end of debate for bios.
Opening: For
F.O.1 Despite being a persistent object of scorn, identity politics is not an all-powerful trump card. It has served and continues to serve a vital role in helping us shape our understanding of, and the solutions to, the problems faced by marginalized people. What’s more, it’s part of the inexorable trek toward advancing universal human rights. When stripped of the rhetoric, it’s a necessary, pragmatic first step. Identity politics, like any other human construct, is imperfect and subject to pitfalls, but ultimately provides both strength and a voice for marginalized groups to better advance their rights as people, thereby exerting a net positive force in society.
What Do We Mean by Identity?
F.O.2 A definition of identity politics seems to derive from any identity group positioning itself as unique regarding an issue or past grievance, e.g., LGBTQ+ and marriage equality, people of color and segregation, etc. We have had to make distinctions regarding identity for legal purposes — an immutable characteristic. But from an epistemological standpoint, identity could be categorized rather broadly, with anyone capable of being sorted into any number of identities based on a trait or set of traits. A group of people of color could also be cis-gendered, male, Marxists, Buddhists, etc. The key in any attempt at a concise definition (and thus, in part, the merits of the identity politics approach) is recognizing there is a level of universality to categorization, whether external or self-imposed, making some form of identity inescapable.
F.O.3 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of identity politics, while broad, serves as a useful standpoint from which to analyze the subject –“the term signifies a loose collection of political projects, each undertaken by representatives of a collective with a distinctively different social location that has hitherto been neglected, erased, or suppressed.” The alternative fine line-drawing that often happens at this stage of defining identity politics requires too much focus on a particular approach (e.g., the problems of social constructivist theory) and comes with a series of epistemological problems; versus having to defend the concept writ large. The more universal the definition, the better the explanation (and justification for it) needs to be.
F.O.4 Identity plays a significant role in shaping our knowledge and is necessary for identity-based empowerment (closing the gap between marginalized people and the rest of society). A momentary detour into the world of physics is illustrative. Carlos Rovelli argued in The Order of Time that our understanding of time is based exclusively on how we choose to organize information. He illustrates this using a deck of playing cards: if we shuffle the cards and then array them, how do we decide which one is first? Is it the first card in the deck? The smallest number? The first red card? Or maybe the first spade? Rovelli’s point is that “order,” (and therefore time) as we perceive it, is a relative thing; deciding what comes first requires one to set a second (or third) parameter to judge “first” by — in this instance numbers, colors, or whether a card is on top or bottom. It’s only in this relational aspect between two things that we arrive at any sense (albeit an illusory one) of order.
F.O.5 So too with identity. It is precisely by setting ourselves apart from one another based on certain categories that we can recognize where we stand in relation to things like equal access to certain rights. Based on how the slave-holding writers of the U.S. Constitution sorted human beings relative to rights, they did not appear to believe that the parameters set by words “all men are created equal” applied to their human property. Categorization determined treatment.
F.O.6 The relative nature of human interaction makes a focus on identity not just an important, but a required first step toward advancing universal liberalism; in part because the oppression is grounded on that same identity. The Civil Rights Movement was able to promote the cause of people of color because it identified where they stood relative to whites. Gay Pride advanced sexual freedom through the contrast of its identity to heterosexuals. They were not advocating for universal rights in a vacuum, free from the existence and promotion of a particular identity. Their success is as much about how each identity group related to another (white to black, gay to straight) as it was about how each group related to the rights at stake. There was and is no way to accomplish this end without some version of identity politics, because there’s no way to perceive and remedy problems without identifying them through comparison.
F.O.7 Attempting to cement universal human rights free from identity creates the problem of foundationalism. David Deutsch, physicist and author of The Beginning of Infinity, debunks this approach — there are no absolute foundations to anything because foundations only exist in response to a problem. In other words, no theory of physics exists independent of the universe it is trying to explain. Similarly, universal rights do not emerge separate and distinct from the problem of particular identities not having them. The Civil Rights Movement, Gay Pride, and New Wave Feminism could not pursue rights separate from their identities. It’s illogical for the remedies to focus on a group’s identity but claim that the problem cannot be defined by that identity.
F.O.8 We conceptualize the idea of universal human rights because of identity. People on a planet where no humans have experienced a deprivation of life, liberty, or property because of their skin color have no reason to identify themselves as black or white or anything else as it relates to those issues. Which is not to say they wouldn’t identify themselves at all, merely that skin color, etc., are of no consequence to their understanding of their rights. One cannot break with identity to address the problems that stem from it. Regardless of what drives the social theory and justifications for it, the core of identity politics (identity) serves the necessary function of expanding our understanding of the problems marginalized people face, and is in part what makes identity politics a positive force for change.
The Practical Reality of Experience
F.O.9 The other positive aspect of identity politics is its practical significance as it relates to experience and closing the rights gap. Identity groups have specific, rather intimate understanding of the issues they confront. There is nothing fanciful or overbearing about this conclusion. Tomorrow, if we discovered a population of Caucasians that had been enslaved for hundreds of years, then treated as a racially inferior people and incarcerated by the state in disproportionate numbers, they would have a lot to talk about with many other oppressed people around the globe, including people of color in the U.S. And they should be able to do so on equal footing, even under the most rigid social constructivist view (experience = authority). But I (and hopefully most others) have no interest in recreating institutionalized slavery for the sake of gaining experience.
F.O.10 The question (and the origins of some of the criticisms of identity politics) then becomes: where does an outsider to that experience fit? Can an outsider arrive at the same conclusions and remedies that any insider to an identity group can? The short, but practical, answer is: probably not. When it comes to unfolding and attempting to remedy the subjective aspects of human suffering, we are necessarily reliant on the experience of others when we have not experienced something ourselves. It’s the problem, as author, philosopher, and mathematician Nassim Taleb has described, of “lecturing birds how to fly.” Despite having developed intricate theories and math to explain birds’ flight, birds require none of it to actually fly; nor is theory a substitute for their own intimate understanding of flight. Taleb argues at length in Antifragile that knowledge does not travel equally between practical experience and theory and the latter is no substitute for the former. That’s not to say we are incapable of discovering flight ourselves, but that doesn’t do much for birds.
F.O.11 In the case of identity politics, amidst the constant ideological assault, we have conflated the practical reality of identity politics with the theoretical debate about it. Identity politics, unadorned, is an expression of experience and crucial to understanding the challenges faced by oppressed and historically marginalized people. The struggles of aboriginal Taiwanese to improve their lot does not require them to engage (or even contemplate) the whirling academic discussion of identity politics in order to pursue identity-based goals of equality. Theoretical understandings, standing alone, do not resolve problems; they must be tied with practical experience. Identity politics is the many voices of marginalized people demanding engagement with them rather than just about them.
The Limits of Identity
F.O.12 Of course, there are legitimate concerns about identity taken too far. To the extent that an identity group advocates for a set of moral rules different from other groups, there will be contradictions to contend with and bad ideas to cast out. No person, irrespective of their identity, is infallible, nor free from criticism. Despite these concerns, reality has yet to bear out such dire epistemological problems. Under former President Obama, immigrant families were being detained, and at the time of this writing, his administration deported more people than any other President’s. I have yet to see anyone even attempt to defend those policies across identity lines. Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote, long before Bill Cosby’s conviction, that he believed Cosby to be a rapist; even as he acknowledges Cosby as one the loudest black voices of our time. He remains highly critical of Kanye West and West’s support of Trump.
F.O.13 The monolithic view of identity politics lacks the nuance of the views actually expressed. One can advocate for a position such as “The system is rarely fair to a person of color” without holding that same person of color blameless. If there are indeed people who believe in different moral rules for different identities, the inherent contradiction in their view will run into trouble very quickly, and likely with another identity group. In order to vindicate Bill Cosby across identity lines, one would also have to marginalize women and their voice (something that, if recent history is any indication, women, even women of color, are not interested in).
F.O.14 Critics are also right to be concerned about the possibility of a growing empathy gap if identity serves as a separator. Research demonstrates we care less when observing pain in other races. A lack of empathy helped deliver prejudicial behavior over the centuries toward people of color, the LGBTQ+ community, and immigrants, among others–and still does. But the solution does not lie in demanding that we no longer congregate within identity groups. The research also demonstrates that people of color show greater empathy for other people of color than Caucasians do for other Caucasians. It shows the empathy we experience toward our ingroup vs. the rest of humankind is neurologically different.
F.O.15 Bridging the empathy gap is not as simple as seeking out shared humanity without regard for identity. Although identity politics has the potential to widen the divide between groups, it also can provide the beginnings of a solution. The problem (as this and the aforementioned studies show) is not the existence of the us/them dichotomy we tend to think of, but rather the implicit biases associated with each. Breaking down those biases doesn’t begin with pleas of shared humanity, but rather, with correcting the underlying misperceptions. Identity politics can serve as a spotlight, bringing those disparities into vivid contrast. Empathy is not born of a reductionist approach, stripping away identities to try to arrive at a common humanity, but of learning to acknowledge that those differences do not make us less human. The solution lies in expanding our understanding of what “human” means, in all of its many identities. Identity politics can help get us there.
Opening: Against
Defining Identity Politics
A.O.1 When you think of the term identity politics, what comes to mind? Protesters in Baltimore or Ferguson, Missouri demanding answers about a police shooting? Women sharing their stories of sexual harassment and assault? LGBTQ+ activists fighting for basic rights and equality? These images are ubiquitous in our culture, and they have convinced many people that identity is the axis around which social and political change must revolve.
A.O.2 Tactically speaking, they may have a point. Identity is among the most powerful engines of political mobilization, as movements like Black Lives Matter and #MeToo have demonstrated over the past several years. Francis Fukuyama explains why identity is such a potent political force in Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment: “Because human beings naturally crave recognition, the modern sense of identity evolves quickly into identity politics, in which individuals demand public recognition of their worth.”
A.O.3 This demand is understandable, and it’s clear that many identity-based grievances are legitimate. But we can’t simply redefine identity politics as an attempt to address various forms of prejudice, discrimination, and inequality — if the definition were that vague and anodyne, there would be nothing to argue about. Nor should we accept Ezra Klein’s assertion that “virtually all politics is identity politics” — a statement that robs the term of any meaning whatsoever.
A.O.4 Even if we grant the claim that all politics is ultimately based on identity, we’d still have to acknowledge that some political movements and ideologies are more identitarian than others. Consider the difference between, say, fascism and humanism — one is explicitly nationalistic and xenophobic while the other is cosmopolitan and inclusive. Fascists are obsessed with identity — when neo-Nazis shout “blood and soil” at their rallies, they’re broadcasting their contempt for supposedly inferior races and calling for the establishment of a hyper-chauvinistic ethno-state. Humanists, on the other hand, seek to improve the well-being of every person regardless of race, religion, or any other marker of identity. The difference between attending a humanist conference and screaming “Jews will not replace us!” on a street corner isn’t just a matter of degree.
A.O.5 Claims like “virtually all politics is identity politics” only add to the confusion about the term. They’re intended to obscure a real phenomenon in the West — the balkanization of our civic life as people organize themselves into narrower and narrower identity-based political factions. The term identity politics shouldn’t be diluted. We need a way to describe political movements that are inordinately concerned with identity — movements that use identity as an infinitely replenishable source of out-group hostility and that blindly castigate and stereotype people on the basis of gender, race, sexual orientation, or some other (often immutable) characteristic.
Restoring the Primacy of the Individual
A.O.6 Even in its most outwardly benign and justifiable form, identity politics undermines one of the most fundamental principles of liberal democracy: the protection and promotion of individual rights. In June 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered the commencement address at Howard University in Washington, D.C., in which he argued that injustices against some groups (such as black Americans) are so deep and enduring that these groups deserve special rights and protections: “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.”
A.O.7 While it’s easy to appreciate the force of this argument — especially coming as it did at the end of the Jim Crow era — Johnson’s attempt to envision a “completely fair” society was far less compelling: “We seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.”
A.O.8 The government can protect “equality as a right,” but given the wide variation among people — in aptitude, personality, and practically everything else we care about — the pursuit of “equality as a result” is a fantasy. What’s worse, any attempt to realize it would inevitably infringe upon the rights of others. Even the most legitimate effort to secure “equality as a result” (affirmative action) is, by necessity, discriminatory — if certain groups’ interests are consistently being promoted in a zero-sum contest like getting into college, other groups will suffer. Just ask Asian applicants to Harvard University.
A.O.9 Individual rights are universal rights. They’re granted to every citizen without reference to any characteristic other than his or her citizenship itself. While it’s true that history is replete with negations of these rights — negations that have disproportionately harmed certain groups of people — the remedy to these injustices has always been the refusal to wedge diverse individuals into fixed categories that determine their social and political status.
A.O.10 Identity politics ranks people according to rigid hierarchies of privilege and victimhood. But considering the vast, incalculable differences in individual circumstances among people, it’s extremely difficult to determine who has been more victimized or disadvantaged than whom.
A.O.11 For example, is a white, middle-aged, working class man from the Midwest — who has no high school diploma and finds himself at greater risk for “deaths of despair” like opioid overdoses and suicides than an average Hispanic or black American — more privileged than a well-educated, middle class black man? You could point out that the former has never experienced racial discrimination. But what if he has experienced poverty? Or unemployment? Or a mental illness? This complexity is why it makes more sense to treat people as individuals first and members of broad, diverse demographic groups second.
A.O.12 But that’s not what many identitarian academics, politicians, and social justice activists are doing. Instead, they’re making demographic categories more politically salient and downplaying the significance of individual circumstances. What is intersectionality, if not a sort of identity-based victimization shorthand? (While a black person is oppressed, a black woman is more oppressed, and a black gay woman is even more oppressed.) This way of thinking isn’t confined to the political fringe, either, as Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand demonstrated when she reminded her Twitter followers that “our future” is “female” and “intersectional.”
A.O.13 You could argue that, although a white man from the Midwest may have certain disadvantages, his ancestors weren’t subjected to centuries of slavery, oppression, and theft. Our society has a moral obligation to rectify these injustices because it inflicted them. Conversely, nobody is responsible for the man’s mental illness, and the moral responsibility for poverty and unemployment is more diffuse than the responsibility for racist subjugation.
A.O.14 But this would be a strange objection. When it comes to the formulation of public policy, the most important variable should be how much assistance each individual or group needs. It doesn’t matter if our society is less culpable for economic distress in the Midwest — the most relevant question is: “How much are people suffering and what can be done to help?”
A.O.15 Of course, black Americans must contend with disproportionate levels of poverty, incarceration rates, disenfranchisement, and a lot of other problems. But shouldn’t we focus on addressing the problems themselves instead of the identities of the people afflicted by them? Why do we place so much emphasis on demographic characteristics like race and gender when there are so many people — including white males — who fall outside this paradigm of victimhood and still suffer from poverty, substance abuse, mental illness, suicide, and many other social and economic disadvantages?
A.O.16 Identity politics even makes these problems difficult to discuss, as it elevates personal experience and subjective feelings over arguments that can be universally understood. While it’s true that I have no idea what it’s like to be a black woman or a gay man or a Muslim, nobody has any idea what it’s like to be anybody else. This is the reason why we need to embrace common national values and norms of discourse that allow us to solve problems that affect everyone.
How Identity Politics is Fracturing our Civil Society
A.O.17 While identity can be a catalyst for positive social change, it can also lead to tribalism and civic disintegration. Therefore, any definition of identity politics that encompasses historic campaigns for civil rights and equality but excludes the rise of nationalism and populism is far too narrow. For example, Trump promises to restore an idyllic, homogeneous, and largely fictional American past, and he cynically articulates conservative cultural grievances to provoke and activate his base. Trump’s brand of identity politics may be opportunistic, but it has been the impetus for many of his most toxic policies, such as his travel and immigration restrictions.
A.O.18 Trump knows he can manipulate our national conversation with a single tweet about NFL players kneeling during the national anthem or immigrants invading our southern border. During the election, he exploited tragedies like the terror attack in San Bernardino by announcing his intention to ban Muslims from the United States, create a registry to track them, and shut down mosques. Before he ran for president, he spent his time peddling an inane and paranoid conspiracy theory about President Obama’s identity, insisting that he was born outside the United States.
A.O.19 Identity politics fuels identity politics. When Trump’s white male supporters are constantly lambasted for their cultural and economic hegemony — when they’re told their beliefs and anxieties are somehow invalidated by the color of their skin or their gender — they become embittered and insular. This dynamic allows a demagogue like Trump to speak to these feelings and channel them into political action. Meanwhile, when Trump says there are “some very fine people on both sides” after a violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, the identitarian left takes the opportunity to remind its followers that the United States is the land of institutional racism and the home of crypto-fascism.
A.O.20 Should we really allow these voices, who profit from generating as much hatred and division as possible, to hijack our civic discourse? By prioritizing our membership in certain tribes over our identities as citizens and human beings, we have made ourselves vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous politicians, preachers, activists, and anyone else who wants to engender social and political conflict. Just look at the digital campaign to subvert the American electoral process in 2016 — Russian hackers and trolls created fake social media groups like “Blacktivist” (which had hundreds of thousands of followers) to inflame racial animosity among black Americans. Meanwhile, they exploited white identity politics by amplifying Trump’s attacks on immigrants, Muslims, and other minority groups.
A.O.21 There are also many ways in which identity politics intersects with and exacerbates other social and political tensions. As Fukuyama points out: “Economic grievances become much more acute when they are attached to feelings of indignity and disrespect.” From the election of Trump to Brexit, the interplay between economic grievances and feelings of indignity and disrespect may be the political story of our time — and it’s not a charming tale.
A.O.22 At a time when the United States is more fragmented by partisan conflict than it has been in decades, identity politics is a needlessly divisive force multiplier. It encourages people to view civic life as an arena of endless zero-sum competition in which their interests are perpetually at odds with the interests of other groups. It offers a bleak and ahistorical view of the remarkable social and political progress that has been made by marginalized groups over the past century. And it emphasizes superficial characteristics like race and gender instead of ideas and principles.
A.O.23 Take a look at this recent tweet from the writer and activist Amy Siskind: “I will not support white male candidates in the Dem primary … White male is not where our party is at, and is our LEAST safe option in 2020.” No mention of policy or character — just melanin and genitalia. This is identity politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and it’s as prejudiced, ugly, and counterproductive as ever.
Rebuttal: For
Definitions Shape Criticisms
F.R.1 Mr. Johnson acknowledges that identity is a “powerful [engine] of political mobilization” (A.O.2) but rejects a definition of “an attempt to address various forms of prejudice, discrimination, and inequality (A.O.3)” as “vague and anodyne” leaving “nothing to argue about” (id.). He also rejects Ezra Klein’s “all politics is identity politics” as robbing the term of meaning entirely. (id.). He instead posits that the term should refer only to “political movements that are inordinately concerned with identity” (A.O.5). However, Mr. Johnson does not offer up a justification or a factual basis for this approach.
F.R.2 Taking this definition on its face would almost certainly render identity politics an unnecessary evil; as would re-defining humanism as being “inordinately concerned with the advancement of the human race to the exclusion of all other species.” The fact that there is a particular behavior we seek to target, and address does not give us license to commandeer terminology for that purpose. Moreover, we do have terms to describe behaviors that “blindly castigate and stereotype people on the basis of gender, race, sexual orientation . . .” (A.O.5); see e.g., sexism, racism, homophobia, etc. If we should use identity politics as an exclusively pejorative term, Mr. Johnson has not provided a compelling reason, factual or epistemological, to do so. Rather, defining identity politics as representative of a collective, addressing a grievance specific to them (see F.O.2), still leaves open the ability to criticize movements (even nationalist ones) without erasing the meaning of the term and the good work it has done.
Individual Rights Don’t Exist in a Vacuum
F.R.3 Mr. Johnson posits that identity politics undermines the fundamental principle of liberal democracy, i.e. individual rights. (A.O.6). The notion that individual rights exist independently of the people seeking them falls into the same trap of foundationalism (see F.O.7). We cannot pursue rights on an individualized basis free from identity when the oppression targeted the individual because of identity. The Civil Rights Movement would have had no way of addressing the wrongs perpetrated on people of color’s identity free from that same identity.
F.R.4 Mr. Johnson also creates a straw man — that identity politics requires us to address the suffering of different groups in some hierarchical fashion — but provides no proof that such a view even exists. (see A.O.13 & 14). Of course, we should work to alleviate all forms of human suffering. Identity politics does not deny this reality; it simply is not the appropriate method of addressing suffering in all instances.
F.R.5 He also rejects Lyndon Johnson’s vision of a “completely fair” society that seeks “not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result” as “a fantasy.” (A.O.8). The equality in theory/in-fact dichotomy is far from fantasy and is not a zero-sum game. “Separate but equal,” as upheld in the Supreme Court decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, embodies the problem of equality in theory but not in fact. The majority reasoned one could theoretically segregate people while still giving them equal protection of the law, because separation did not imply legal inferiority.
F.R.6 In overturning Plessy, the Court in Brown v. Board (sensibly) decided that separate facilities are “inherently unequal” (emphasis mine). By their nature, they foster inferiority. True, whites lost priority seating on buses, at lunch counters, and exclusive admission to colleges, but the fact that there was some form of deprivation does not render equality-in-fact unreasonable. As this article points out, the problem with Harvard and Asian applicants (see A.O.8) is not that one identity is constantly given preference; it’s the potential that the reviewers still harbor unfair stereotypes about a group of people. The fact that an identity-based pursuit of equality does not move smoothly between theory and practice does not render it fantastical. Theory and practice are not two-way streets. (See F.O.11).
The Fractionalization of Society
F.R.7 Here, Mr. Johnson and I agree, in part. As I acknowledged, to the extent that identity politics has been used to create different moral rules for different identities, we should be ruthlessly skeptical (I have yet to see consistent concrete evidence). (See F.O.12). The same goes for misusing identity politics to widen the empathy gap. (See F.O.14). But the fact that a demagogue like Trump can abuse identity for political gain (see A.O.17 through 19) does not upend the positive legacy of identity politics in advancing universal human rights in the form of Civil Rights, LGBTQ+, and New Wave Feminism movements. We will not close the empathy gap by becoming color- or gender-blind (see F.O.9). Human rights are propelled forward by embracing our differences rather than pretending they don’t exist.
Rebuttal: Against
A.R.1 In his opening statement, Dan Melo points out that people can be classified according to a virtually unlimited range of identities, arguing that this is the “key in any attempt at a concise definition” (F.O.2) of identity politics.
A.R.2 Of course, we all have identities, but this observation gets us no closer to a concise definition of identity politics. It does the opposite. Not only are some identities far more politically salient than others, but there’s also a huge amount of variation within identity groups. For example, a citizen of the United States could be an ultra-nationalistic America-Firster or someone who regards national identity as morally and politically irrelevant. A woman could vote for a female candidate solely on the basis of her gender or she could assess the candidate’s experience, temperament, and policies without reference to the number of X chromosomes she has.
A.R.3 Although Melo begins by emphasizing the broadness of the concept of identity, he then accepts a definition from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a “a useful standpoint from which to analyze the subject.” (F.O.3) It reads: “The term signifies a loose collection of political projects, each undertaken by representatives of a collective with a distinctively different social location that has hitherto been neglected, erased, or suppressed.”
A.R.4 With its emphasis on marginalized and persecuted groups, this definition conveniently ignores the most harmful forms of identity politics that have existed throughout history. Didn’t the slaveholders who argued against the abolition of slavery believe their identity as whites gave them the right to oppress other human beings? Didn’t the Nazis condemn millions of people to death and wage the most destructive war in human history on the basis of their national identity and perceived status as members of a master race? Stanford’s definition would also leave out most of the populist and nationalist movements in the world today, which often appeal to members of traditionally dominant majorities.
A.R.5 If we’re unable to establish a more precise definition of identity politics, the debate can’t even begin. Melo can’t seem to decide if he agrees with Ezra Klein (who says “All politics is identity politics,” rendering the term meaningless) or if he wants his definition to exclude many of the clearest examples of identity politics. Neither view is helpful.
A.R.6 The importance of subjective experience is at the center of Melo’s argument. He asks, “Can an outsider arrive at the same conclusions and remedies that any insider to an identity group can? The short, but practical, answer is: probably not. When it comes to unfolding and attempting to remedy the subjective aspects of human suffering, we are necessarily reliant on the experience of others when we have not experienced something ourselves.” (F.O.10)
A.R.7 Although subjective testimonies and perspectives can give us powerful social and political insights, the claim that outsiders can’t “arrive at the same conclusions and remedies” as members of certain groups is deeply antithetical to the values, institutions, and conventions that underpin Western liberal democracies. As I observed in my opening statement, nobody understands what it’s like to be anybody else — every human being is a vast constellation of identities, accumulated experiences, and subjective frames of reference. But our ability to communicate and reason with one another allows us to overcome these differences and work toward public policies and social norms that prioritize the well-being of as many people as possible, regardless of their identities.
A.R.8 History contradicts Melo’s claim at every turn — there have been countless white abolitionists, men who fought for the Nineteenth Amendment, Christians who denounced the persecution of non-Christians, straight activists who campaigned for gay rights, and non-Jews who resisted the scourge of anti-Semitism. None of these people had to be part of a specific identity group to recognize that members of that group deserve the same rights and freedoms as everyone else.
A.R.9 We’re not “reliant on the experience of others” (F.O.10) to alleviate human suffering. In fact, subjective feelings and personal anecdotes are often terrible guides to the development of good public policy, as they’re liable to all sorts of bias and error. This is why elected representatives, writers, and others responsible for formulating or analyzing public policy use data and arguments that are accessible to everyone.
A.R.10 Melo believes identity politics is necessary to advance universal human rights, but he has it exactly backwards. The most successful campaigns to secure universal rights have appealed to shared values, such as equality under the law, the protection of the individual, and common citizenship. And in many cases, these campaigns have had to overcome the mindless tribalism of identity politics, which is so often a vehicle for racism, misogyny, homophobia, and other forms of out-group prejudice. Instead of continuing to obsess over what divides us — the source of intensifying identitarian conflict across the United States and Europe today — it’s time to abandon identity politics once and for all.
Closing: For
F.C.1 Mr. Johnson and I fundamentally disagree on what identity politics means and thereby what goods (or evils) it represents. We agree that identity groups are “powerful engines of political mobilization” (A.O.2). We may need a less fraught term to describe identity groups addressing social inequality. Throughout his rebuttal, Mr. Johnson relies on a foundationalist approach (contrast with F.O.7) where universal human rights exist somewhere independent of oppressed people and their oppressors, even as he acknowledges that “many identity-based grievances are legitimate.” (A.O.3). We can readily distinguish between identity movements, like indigenous rights, that self-advocate for equality, and those, like fascism, that self-promote at the expense of it. He has not addressed how one remediates wrongs done to an identity free of that identity. We cannot erase our human past, free from oppressors targeting race, sex, or religion. But we can use identity as a stepping stone toward a better understanding of universal rights (see F.O.4, 05). Call it by any term, but identity will play a role whenever identity is the target of oppression.
F.C.2 Contrary to Mr. Johnson’s assertion (A.R.8), I make no claim that people outside of identity groups cannot work to protect the rights of those groups. I am not advocating for a self-defeating, postmodern relativistic approach (another discussion entirely). Rather, I assert that in order to fully and better remediate the oppression experienced by an identity, we must involve the special perspective that the identity has on the issues it faces. (see F.O.10). That perspective is not the final word but an essential one. No human construct is infallible, but identity politics has performed a necessary function of expanding our understanding of universal rights. History evidences many liberal movements relying on identity politics to ensure equality, both theoretical and factual.
Closing: Against
A.C.1 Melo’s definition of identity politics encompasses every social and political movement in which “representatives of a collective” attempt to address “a grievance specific to them.” (F.O.3) It doesn’t matter if these representatives articulate their grievances with appeals to universal rights and values or tribal loyalties — as long as members of an identity group are engaged in political activity, they’re practicing identity politics.
A.C.2 To Melo, it was identity politics that led Martin Luther King Jr. to call upon his nation to “live out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.’” Just as it was identity politics that led Stokely Carmichael to chant “We want black power!” at a march in Greenwood, Mississippi three years later. Any definition that can’t distinguish between these political tactics and principles is far too vague.
A.C.3 Melo’s criticism of my point about the impossibility of securing “equality as a result” (F.R.5) conflates two completely different issues — equality under the law and equality of outcome. He cites the Brown v. Board Supreme Court decision to overturn the separate but equal ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (F.R.5). But I explicitly pointed out that the “government can protect ‘equality as a right’” in my opening statement (A.O.8), which is exactly what the Brown v. Board decision did.
A.C.4 Our core disagreement is this: Melo believes identity politics is necessary. As he puts it, “The Civil Rights Movement would have had no way of addressing the wrongs perpetrated on people of color’s identity free from that same identity.” (F.R.3)
A.C.5 But the treatment of black Americans was a horrific injustice that anyone can recognize and work to rectify. As King observed during the March on Washington in 1963: “Many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny.” Our destinies are all intertwined, and even though identity is “inescapable” (as Melo puts it, F.O.2), one identity supersedes all the others: We’re human beings.
Debaters
For
Dan Melo is a recovering lawyer, propelled by a fascination of social constructs and how they govern our interactions. He is currently working on a book about the current struggle of the progressive movement when reaching across the aisle. Dan writes on Medium and has a number of articles published in Areo Magazine.
Against
Matt Johnson has written for Stanford Social Innovation Review, The Bulwark, Quillette, Splice Today, Areo Magazine, Arc Digital, and many other outlets. He was formerly the opinion page editor at the Topeka Capital-Journal. In 2015, he received a Master’s in Journalism from the University of Kansas. Matt writes on Medium and can be found on Twitter.
