Free Will and Determinism
One of the long-standing debates in the tradition of philosophy is the Free Will Paradox. It states that if God is omniscient, then there exists a point of view the world is deterministic, and thus Free Will doesn’t exist. However, a more secular version can also be made: the laws of nature are deterministic. In general, there exists a contradiction between a man’s free choice and the backdrop of some determinism. Throughout the western tradition, several different views attempt to reconcile the paradox:
Incompatibilism argues that the world is deterministic, and thus Free Will simply does not exist. That means that the choice you made for breakfast this morning was not your free choice, but instead, pre-determined since the beginning of the universe.
Compatibalism argues that despite the world being deterministic, free will still exists. At first, this view seems contradictory (i.e. how are we both deterministic and free choosing?), however, many thinkers have reconciled the issue by reinterpreting Free Will. For example, David Hume argues that Free Will exists insofar as it is not governed by Causation. However, Causation itself cannot be proven to be true in the world (see the previous blog post). Instead, human experience creates the abstraction of causation in order to make sense of the world. If this is the case, then human experience precedes our idea of causation, and therefore our faculty for making choices is not restricted by causation.
Libertarianism argues that determinism simply doesn’t exist. With that stated, nothing impedes the existence of Free Will, and therefore we can easily state that it exists.
One of the most important consequences of the Free Will Paradox has to due with moral responsibility. If Free Will doesn’t exist, then being morally responsible for one’s actions simply doesn’t make sense. For example, if I steal a box of cereal from the grocery store and then get caught, I could make the claim that the event was predetermined due to determinism and therefore I shouldn’t be punished. Even more so, I shouldn’t feel morally guilty for having committed the crime because, if I really did not believe in Free Will, then I should have known intuitively that I could not have acted otherwise.
Possibly then one of the best arguments for why Free Will exists is because we do feel guilty at times in our lives for actions we make. It might be possible to derive a rationally consistent argument for the non-existence of Free Will, however, (unless you are a psychopath), we all feel morally bound on making morally responsible decisions. And if we don’t, we feel guilty, and no amount of reasons will rid that feeling. The determinist could counter this argument, saying that the feeling of guilt is also predetermined. That, your view on Free Will and how it impacts your life is also deterministic, and simply the state you find yourself opens up the opportunity for guilt. To the determinist that makes this argument I’d ask: and does this apply to you? For, if it does, then this person would be living in his own contradiction. He might say he believes in the non-existence of Free Will, yet he lives a life in which his free choices matter in a morally responsible way.
