“ Boeing needs to restore confidence”
The 737 MAX is under fire and so is Boeing. The reintroduction of the MAX is stalled because regulators lack confidence in the new software of the maligned MCAS system. Boeing in the meantime launched a charm offensive, inviting different pilot unions to Seattle, but the pilots don’t seem fully convinced yet. The following is an exclusive interview with Dennis Tajer, spokesman of Allied Pilots (APA), who represent the pilots of American Airlines.
Have the pilots of American Airlines (Allied Pilots) tried out the new software on the simulator?
DT: Yes, we had a session on the simulator but something wasn’t programmed right. Then they showed us how the new software works and that looked OK: The MCAS system, for instance, is now connected to two AoA sensors and the MCAS has other limitations. But the message seemed to be “this is not about the old system, it’s gone.”
So there was not a lot of explanation about the “old” MCAS software.
DT: No, and we think that with the new software, the old one should be the baseline. We think Boeing needs to restore confidence. Explaining the flaws of the old software would bolster confidence. Saying: the MCAS before it used to do this, and now it does this …
Now it seems that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is taking more time than expected to approve the software changes and “unground” the MAX.
DT: In the process of reviewing the safety procedures some new issues have surged, going beyond the Boeing MAX and touching upon older models like the Boeing 737 NG. Last April, FAA officials told our airline and pilots union that the agency was re-examining what is called the runaway stabilizer trim procedure, a series of steps to counteract erroneous nose-up or nose-down commands. In some Boeing manuals it says that the trim wheel “could be difficult to turn,” but in other supplemental pieces it says “it might take two pilots to turn the trim wheel” and “a pilot should alleviate the elevator load (accelerate or decelerate) before trimming.” All these procedures should be up for review. For us it is not a condition to “unground” the MAX, but we hope that while reviewing the safety procedures, the FAA clarifies these things.
When you mention the runaway trim stabilizer procedure, it sounds like a clear reference to the Ethiopian Airlines accident, where the pilots were trying in vain to handle the trim wheel after the misfiring MCAS.
DT: Boeing says the stab runaway is unrelated to MCAS but it is related. It’s a tool I want to use when MCAS misfires. After Lion Air and Ethiopian Air the FAA is thinking that maybe more time is needed — not 5 seconds, but 20 seconds — for pilots to react when this happens. You don’t want to be modeling for the ace of base, like Sully or Chuck Yeager, but for your average pilot out there.
It’s something that should be trained in a simulator?
DT: Fortunately, we now know that the MCAS can’t be triggered that easily anymore. There are lot of fences now. But we want the worst-case scenario. When layers of cheese (safety boundaries) are falling to the wayside and pilots are getting overloaded, you want to do the obvious. There can be 9 things going on at the same time: AP disconnect, stick shaker, distractions … so we should know how difficult it would be to trim manually. You need a flotation line over the metaphorical water.
So much for the review of the runaway stabilizer trim procedure. But now the FAA is reviewing the MAX again. The question remains, does the MAX really need the MCAS? Wasn’t it inserted in the first place for certification reasons? In other words: Why not take the MCAS out?
DT: That’s a good question. Would the plane be unwieldy, hard to handle without it? Is the MCAS needed to handle the aircraft safely? Some feel it’s a commercial decision; we don’t know if it’s a safety design or a so-called cloaking design.
Can you explain this?
DT: A cloaking design is something that gives you the impression of being on another plane. Another — not problematic — cloaking design on the MAX for instance is the Landing Attitude Modifier (LAM), which makes the spoilers deploy automatically during landing and gives the pilot the same visual as being on the NG, although the MAX is higher due to the landing gear. It’s all part of the idea that flying the MAX would feel exactly the same as flying a Boeing 737 NG. A cloaking device in itself is OK, it’s a control law that assists you. If it helps to get certified, good! As long as it’s safe!
This cannot be said about the MCAS feature.
DT: We’re saying: If you do something, do something safer and stronger, so why did you design a single point of failure (referring to the single AoA the MCAS was linked to)? They had a monster in a cage and then they opened the cage so they should stop defending their design. They said you as pilots don’t need to know the intricacies of how this system works, but on the other hand they were counting on us to be the back stop, the last line of defense. So keep walking not running, you’re fixing it. But don’t blame the pilots.
So there should be no question of blaming foreign pilots or their lack of training as happened after the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents?
DT: We continue to resist that they blame foreign pilots or malign foreign airlines. The only airline that had a simulator for the MAX was Ethiopian Airlines! We at American Airlines didn’t even have one. This should be a global topic, where we share information with pilots all over the world. Today’s communications make it possible to be on a call with somebody on the other side of the globe or to send documents … like the interview we are doing now. That’s a great tool, so let’s use this to get stronger and safer for all of us.
Tom Dieusaert is the author of “Computer Crashes, when airplane systems fail” (2017), a best-selling book which has been translated to four languages. The updated verson in Spanish (System Error) was published on July 12th 2019 and includes the Boeing 737-MAX saga.
