The special pleading fallacy of Christian miracle claims.
Christians usually claim that Christianity is the only religion based on a verifiable historical miracle (the resurrection of Jesus) claim. Naturally, many sceptics raise the question that there are countless miracle claims from other faiths, then why make an exclusive claim about the resurrection of Jesus?
Christians seem eager to accept any miracle claims that align with their particular faith but suddenly become Richard Dawkins when it’s from any other faith. This is a textbook example of a special pleading fallacy. With so many miracles claims in many other faiths, how can anyone use miracles as evidence for a particular religion?
Christian apologists will reply to this by saying the fact that there are other miracle claims and some of them are false doesn’t mean we can discard all miracle claims. But the question is, why do you think those other miracle claims are false and yours valid?
One possible answer an apologist can give is that they have looked into other miracle claims from an unbiased perspective but didn’t find them convincing. They have not found a single counter-example that passes the epistemological standard as the resurrection of Jesus does.
I highly doubt that. It didn’t take me even a day to find a counter-example. First, let’s run through the epistemological standard a Christian apologist might have, which THEY THINK the resurrection of Jesus passes, and then I will provide my counter-example.
An important point to note here is that epistemological standard is not necessarily about the claim being true. A claim can pass the given epistemological standard and still be false. Conversely, a claim can fail the given epistemological standard and still be true.
So, on what grounds do Christians justify the resurrection of Jesus? When asked why it is justified to believe in the resurrection of Jesus, A Christian might provide the following points:
- Accounts of the resurrection are very early. Possibly just a couple of days after the crucifixion of Jesus. The accounts are closer to the events in terms of time.
- The accounts are closer to the event in terms of geographical location.
- There are reliable firsthand accounts available.
- There are public appearances among multiple witnesses.
- The event causes some outward action. Disciples changed their minds. Many people converted to Christianity, including Paul etc.
If you have not guessed already, I am trying to steelman the resurrection argument. Many or all points mentioned above are disputed among scholars in some way. So, is there not a single counter-example from a different faith that can pass the above epistemological standard? Let me provide my counter-example.
It was on 20 September 1995. A worshipper at a temple in southern New Delhi offered milk to a statue of Ganesha. When a spoonful of milk from the bowl was held up to the trunk of the statue, the liquid appeared to disappear, apparently taken in by the idol.
Word of the event spread quickly, and by mid-morning, it was found that statues of the entire Hindu pantheon in temples all over India were taking in milk. By the next day, the phenomenon was observed all over the world.
Many international media houses covered the story. The whole nation of India stood standstill for a day. There was a massive jump in sales of milk. People in large numbers flocked to temples to witness the miracle. Even the stock markets were closed on the day. Most importantly, you can find many people even today who can testify that the miracle did happen.
If justifiable belief in miracles is really the goal of Christian apologists, then they should accept this miracle claim. Christians can find some obscure symmetry breaker between these miracle claims, but that would prove my point of special pleading. For example, one can say that the miracle of milk drinking is trivial and not at the level of resurrection.
What if stories of figures like Jesus were also trivial at that time? That’s why some sceptics may compare Jesus with figures like Apollonius of Tyana. Just because one of these traditions persisted throughout time, is it enough to consider it literally true?
How can we say what is trivial or not trivial? Let’s grant that there are supernatural beings, but why assume that one category of miracles is trivial and the other is not? Who are we to say that a supernatural being should perform this specific category of miracle to be believable?
Once pushed back on the exclusivity of Jesus’s miracle claims, a Christian can give another response: so what? Even Pharaoh’s magicians could copy the miracles of Moses. If theism is true, then miracles are possible. So, what’s the problem here?
Let me get this straight. Assuming theism is true, then there are the following possibilities with regard to miracles:
1. It could still be a trick, fraud, myth, or a misunderstood natural phenomenon.
2. It may actually have some supernatural origins but not from God. Maybe demonic.
3. It is actually from God but misunderstood in some form.
4. It is literally true.
The thing is that the question still remains. In the case of Jesus, why say it is point 4 and not any of the points above? How can we say that WITHOUT PRESUPPOSING Christian theology?
My last point is important. Apologists often say that arguments against resurrection are circular while missing the circularity in their argument. Resurrection is possible because theism is most likely true. Theism is evident because of resurrection. Moreover, A person can be a theist, but the proposal that God needs to come down as his own son and die and resurrect for the salvation of humans would still be absurd unless one presupposes Christian theology.
The point here is that theism may or may not be true but using a miracle claim as support for an exclusive religious tradition looks to me as special pleading. After exploring various religious traditions, I don’t think miracle claims support one tradition over another.
And no, I am not saying all religious traditions are equal. They vary in their philosophy and core ideas and are often incompatible. We can still attempt to make all religious traditions compatible with each other, but I think that would be the most metaphysically complex solution.
This is also an additional problem for Christianity or any other exclusive monotheistic tradition. The existence of religious diversity is not a problem for some religious traditions, but it is a huge problem for exclusive monotheistic traditions. We can call this an Explanatory Challenge of religious diversity, but that’s may be a topic for some other article.
