Too many reforms, too little power: Local government in Bangladesh

Instead of a personal experience, I would like to focus on a broader issue which is closely connected to the bureaucracy and still remains as a matter of debate. The local government bodies had never been, in independent Bangladesh, ‘self-governing’ bodies in the true sense of the term. They could simply be labeled as an extension of the central government with guided and limited local participation. Consequently, local governments have always been institutionally and financially weak, poorly managed and lacked social and political credibility.
Change in Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh is something we have always seen in every govt. that formed parliament but never been able to reach in a suitable decision. Instead of building a devolved local govt. and strengthening it, the successive governments have taken a reformist role to continuously change their predecessor’s model. UZP is one of these rural local govt. institutions. And in this issue, the bureaucratic role of the country is never beyond doubt. In analyzing bureaucratic responses in this matter, I will mainly rely on the literature that has been developed in the context of developed countries and at the same times, have made some efforts to modify them in order to apply them in the developing countries. EVLN framework, given by Golden gives us four options: bargain, status quo, revolt, survive. I will try to connect these behavior in the local govt. issue.

Some historical facts can be elaborated in this regard. When general Ershad came into power as an autocratic govt., the first thing his govt. did to increase the connectedness to the local level as a tendency to gain control. During this period, an upazila had significant resource under its control. three types of funds: i) the central government block grant ii) local revenue comprising funds generated from local markets and fish pond leases; iii)the food for work resources . Another significant aspect of upazila was the strengthening of project implementation capacity. Most importantly, unlike the present time, upazilas were not subject to political control by the MPs. However, most of the studies were also critical about other problems including political instability, bureaucratic apathy, control and corruption could explain the reasons for failure of the upazila experiment in Bangladesh. It can be said that in this time, both the central and local level bureaucrats seemed to remain in status quo in UZP reforms.
The momentum the upazila system engendered seemed to fade when BNP, in 1991, came as an elected government dissolved the UZP on the plea of gross mismanagement and corruption. BNP govt. reintroduced the old Thana system. It would be reasonable to argue that BNP’s decision put an end to a quasi-democratic body of local govt. the bureaucrats captured back not only enormous power but also started controlling state resources that they could not even enjoy in their hey days of basic democracies days during the 1960s. Most MPs, irrespective of political affiliation, did not want any powerful rival in the constituency in the form of an elected UZP chairman, wielding substantial power over development resources to build school, colleges etc. However, the abolition of the Upazila is seen as a victory of the bureaucrats whose plan during this crucial period was to exploit the changed political situation to their own benefit. Ironically, the democratically elected government of Khaleda Zia indulged in anti-democratic practices with regard to decentralization. Here, we can say that the central bureaucracy remains in status quo. That means, they are satisfied with their current situation and maintain that, whereas the local level bureaucrats struggled for their power and remained loyal. Here, loyalists are employees who respond to dissatisfaction by patiently waiting for the problems to work itself out or solved by others.

Then when the AL govt. came into power in 1996, it carefully proceeded with its upazila reform plan even it has faced enormous political resistance both within and outside of the parliament. However, though there was not any upazila election held, The Upazila Parishad ACT was passed by parliament in 1998.
From 2001 to 2006, during this period, BNP with its new coalition partners including Jamat-e-Islam managed to get in power and showed greater reform rhetoric in local govt. compared to its previous in term in office. The initial zeal to strengthen local govt. gradually disappears as the party leadership was divided over the upazila issue. The govt. empowered MPs by allowing them to act as the advisor to Upazila Development Coordination Committee. here also, local bureaucrats simply remained loyal to their superior and govt.
Through the promulgation of local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance 2008, the Caretaker govt. revoked the power of MPs of upazila; created two elected vice chair positions and empowered the EC to hold polls to UZP. it can be said that here, the local level bureaucrats somehow restored their power (maybe through bargaining) .
In 2008, AL was back in power again. Upazila elections were held in 480 upazilas on January 2009 .Two important measures taken: the LGC and the freedom granted to the UZP from the control of MP were dropped by the new govt. ii) A law enacted in March 2009, provided for changes in the roles and functions of UZP. So the MP has been authorized to act as ‘advisor’ to UZP and the law defined that the Parishad should accept such advice. The controversy over the power of advisory role of MP in UZP generated serious debate in the political and civil arenas as meetings, seminars, symposia, rallies, press conferences and even litigations in the court of law took place. so, we can say, they revolt in this time. It seem that after the reform by sheikh Hasina govt. in 2009, the second generation upazilas were crippled as both the central bureaucracy and national democracy substantially took away their autonomy. The bureaucrats of in this matter, with a much controversial election, AL again came to power in 2014. The local govt. election at upazila level immediately ensued. It has observed that the first and second upazila election in the first and second phases ere relatively more peaceful than the third one, fourth and fifth. And more interestingly, after leading in the first and second phases of poll, BNP trailed behind AL in the third, fourth and fifth.
Now for the analysis part, with if not strong but better organized bureaucratic civil administration, the govt. ends up as a leviathan institution (totalitarian govt. having a vast bureaucracy). The size of civil service has doubled since independence. This means that the central govt. is being enlarged instead of local govt. and this bureaucratic growth at a time of declining local govt. power suggests implicit bureaucratic resistance to reform continues.
With regard to service delivery, the role of local govt. gradually decreased. Now if we look at the budget allocation for local govt. for the last few years, we can see that there is a steady declination happening. To be more specific, in 2014–15 fiscal year, the budget allocation was total GDP’s 7.1% where as in 2017–18 fiscal year, this allocation falls to 7.0%.
Then In the case of UP authority over the appointment and payment of salaries of the staff is held by central government bureaucracy. In the internal functioning of local govt., the national government functionaries also exercise control over them. For example, the Local Government Ordinance requires a UP to constitute a number of standing committees and for the formation of any additional committee it needs the formal approval of the DC. Another feature of financial control is that the UNO receives funds transferred from UP mobilized resources like share of land transfer tax, market lease money for retention in the accounts maintained by him for later distribution to UPs on basis of prescribed government guidelines. This shows that the UPs have no direct control even over resources generated from their jurisdictions. Such practice of regulating and controlling of the financial resources by the national government functionaries keeps the LG units ever resource poor and resource dependent on the national government. The local government institutions are entitled to Annual Development Plan (ADP) grants from the national government. The local government regulation holds strict instructions that the block grant must be used specifically in certain sectors determined by the central government. This pre-determined sector allocation seriously limits the scope of local level planning as well as the flexibility of local bodies to utilize the financial resources for satisfying the immediate needs of the community. This also runs contrary to the concept of functional autonomy of the LG units. Moreover, ADP allocation for LGD in fiscal year 17 as a share of total ADP (16.8%) has decreased compared to share of ADP allocation for LGD in RB fiscal year16 (18.4%) and fiscal year 16 (17.2%).
The website itself of local govt. BD states, ‘’Compared with Union, the process of decentralization and governance improvement at the Upazila level still has many challenges. At the same time, linkage between Union Parishad and UZP remains weak particularly in development coordination. Considering the above-mentioned situation of local governance at Union and Upazila levels, it is necessary to initiate a comprehensive and integrated project to strengthen local governance focusing particularly on Upazila as a pivotal institution to realize decentralized and effective service delivery to local communities throughout the country’’.

Now for the EVLN framework, it can be said that the local govt. bureaucrats were most of the times remained loyal to the decision taken by govt. or struggled or survived and revolt for a very short time to gain their autonomy in local levels where as bureaucrats of central govt. remained in status quo dominating over them. Except for the Ershad regime and the caretaker govt. phase, the local govt. bureaucrats were always bounded to their political bosses and their hierarchical superiors in the central one. So, to make a conclusion, I have now some certain questions. In spite of a changing tendency in Bangladeshi bureaucracy, as they recently are transitioning more towards instrumental bureaucrats from classical one, why there is still a dominance culture over local govt.? The rural development largely will depend on the local level officials, but the decisions are taken in the central office. Why central bureaucrats still don’t rely on the local levels and keep their power control even after 47 years of independence? Well, in my opinion, the political control over the bureaucracy is a matter of issue here because the MPs of Bangladesh never seems to give up their authority over the local level bureaucrats even if they are no big expert in rural development. The Hofstede score in power discrimination is really high which indicates power centralization in the country. If we sincerely opt for good governance, we have to carry out democratic decentralization. Incremental decision making can be something we can give a thought in this regard.. I don’t know where this is leading but we really need logical reform (another!) in this regard to make our rural govt. more effective.