DEF UK: Oxford agora on increasing cultural and linguistic skills in the military

First published 28 Dec 2016

Disclaimer. The views expressed in this blog are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom or indeed any other Government. Further, publication of those views should not be considered as constituting an official endorsement of factual accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation by the UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom, or that of any other Government.

Participants

• Several active duty military officers: two mid-grade RAF Intelligence Officers, a senior enlisted military linguist, and two Junior Officers from the US Navy
• Two participants from industry, one representing a major defence contractor and the second a senior executive with a prominent global advertising firm
• Graduate students and professors of international relations and Middle Eastern studies

Opening remarks, Neill Hunt

Neill Hunt briefed the participants on the history and general structure of the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF) in the United Kingdom. DEF has been active in the UK since February of 2013. The purpose of DEF is to Inspire, Connect, and Empower young leaders in order to positively impact the national security enterprise. DEF members are proactive, innovative, and forward-looking. They represent a “virtuous insurgency” against the retarding effects of bureaucratic and organizational inertia.

Proposal

Keith Dear briefed the proposal earlier circulated by Lt James Haw of the Australian Army. Lt Haw proposes a model for cultural training in the Australian Army modeled after the United States Marine Corps’ Regional, Culture and Language Familiarization Program (RCLF). That proposal is available here.

The RCLF model aims to create a breadth of cultural expertise covering all possible operating areas. It provides general cultural awareness and language familiarization training and assigns regional ‘specialties’ for both officers and enlisted. The purpose of this program is not to create cultural experts fluent in foreign languages, but to develop a reasonable level of cultural competence in the Marine fighting force.

Lt Haw’s proposal concludes with the following questions, which formed the basis for the subsequent two-hour discussion:

1. Is there popular support amongst military leaders for this type of training?

2. Would an RCLF add value to soldier career development?

3. How could such a course be implemented, staffed and managed?

Presentation

One of the RAF intelligence officers present initiated the discussion with a short presentation on his experience with language and cultural training in the UK military. This officer had undergone a 15-month training course in Dari language, supplemented with one month of language training in Tajikistan at the Tajik Military Academy. He went on to employ those language and cultural skills on deployment to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in 2013 and 2014. By developing personal relationships with Afghan partners and insight into the social dynamics at play in the partner force, the intelligence officer was able to bridge and mediate cultural divides. This officer proposed that language and cultural knowledge can yield significant returns if three criteria are met: we need the right people appropriately trained and in the right place, working alongside the right partners.

Challenges

With that thought-provoking introduction, the agora began by outlining some of the obstacles that we face in developing and maintaining language and cultural expertise in the US, UK, and Australian armed forces. Obstacles to progress include:

• Lack of language and cultural knowledge in senior ranks causes systematic devaluing of the skillset; this situation is self-perpetuating
• Box-ticking approach to cultural training across most branches of the armed forces
• Rapid operational turnover in the UK Armed Forces leads to a draining of acquired regional knowledge; units sent in to relieve are left with a ‘blank slate’
• Real cultural expertise cannot be mass-produced; we will never have brigades of Middle East experts
• Providing the level of language and cultural training required to generate an expert is a time-intensive process and requires people with an affinity for language learning
• Overt military affiliation can be a complicating factor in establishing meaningful contact with the right local partners
• Brits are historically bad language-learners

Brainstorming

The group attempted to address some of the challenges highlighted above. Specific points and proposals are given below, generally in the order that they arose in conversation:

● The idea of cultural experts within the military is not entirely novel

○ One RAF intelligence officer in attendance recounted the story of an RAF Int Officer operating in Aden in the early 1950

● Sometimes a familiarization is all you need in order to appreciate the gravity of an issue

○ Having achieved a moderate appreciation for regional expertise, our officers may be more likely to refer to experts when necessary

● How industry does regional knowledge

○ By having resident specialists, corporations are able to sidestep the challenges associated with operational turnover

○ Military should look to those industries where national interests are at stake; corporations have built up understanding over time

● Lessons from Yemen

○ Embassy officials spent more time in Dubai than in Sana’a

○ Wrong interlocutors, who were overstating and misrepresenting their importance/position within the tribe for financial gain

○ To be received as genuine, you can’t go out with the explicit objective of obtaining information.

○ Confidence follows relationships, which themselves take time

● Working through interpreters

○ The critical relationship is that between the ‘terp’ and the foreign national

○ Best case can be working through an interpreter, even when you don’t need an interpreter. Taking an intelligence-gathering approach.

● Recruiting cultural experts

○ Achieving both breadth and depth

○ Constructing an ‘ideal soldier’ that is not only physically hard, team-oriented, and innovative, but culturally competent; capable of understanding the human terrain to the same extent that they can navigate physical terrain

Conclusions

This agora did not achieve consensus on the majority of the questions posed. It did, however, make several important observations, identifying key issues and formulating questions for further consideration. Those takeaways are listed here:

• Broadly speaking, it was recognised that a greater training for languages and cultural expertise would be of value to the Armed Forces. Achieving consensus on what this would look like remains particularly challenging and complex.
• Lessons from industry and other military Armed Forces may offer useful insights into how a programme of language/cultural training might be implemented in the UK military.
• Real language and cultural competence is not unheard of in the UK Armed Forces. Nor does it represent an unattainable standard. This competence has been present in the UK Armed Forces historically and still exists (to some extent) today.
• Tactical bias and operational turnover constitute major challenges to developing lasting regional expertise. Junior and midgrade officers who participate in intercultural operations tend to be less valued than their peers who complete tactical/operational tours. A rapid, comprehensive operational turnover drains forces in theatre of hard-earned regional knowledge developed over periods of months.
• Interpreters play an important role in transactional exchanges of information. They are, however, a poor substitute for organically-sourced, language and culture experts in our militaries. By using interpreters even when they are not needed, we might understand the intercultural dynamics at play more completely.
• As it stands, the social construction of the ‘ideal soldier’ in our Armed Forces does not involve cultural competence. This might be amended over time to socially incentivize the development of a skillset with real operational benefits.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors concerned, not necessarily the MOD. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without prior permission in writing from the editor.