NATO, BALTICS AND SCANDINAVIA — TO DEFEND OR NOT
NATO, four letters that invoke strong emotions that vary from gratitude to fear. The variance of the emotions can be explained with nationality and political inclination. For a Russian NATO is something to afraid of, something that sneaks its tentacles ever closer to the motherland. On the other hand for an Estonian NATO is a knight in shining armor that uses its powers to protect freedom and civil liberties against the tyranny spreading from the old KGB lairs in Moscow.
Fears are often based on the lack of knowledge and that is the case with NATO too. NATO has its foundations in the western alliance that, together with the Soviet Union, liberated the Europe from the 3rd Reich. By binding the western European democracies together with the military and industrial powerhouse of the 20th century, NATO offered its members security guarantees in the form of Article 5.
While the article 5 was never truly tested during the cold war years, the combination of a common enemy, mutual and fair contributions to a common strategy under a unified theater command and realistic training gave each member nation enough confidence on the mutual defense. All of this started to decline during the 1990's as the threat of the Soviet armor punching its way through the Fulda gap faded and new threats started to loom in the horizon.
Terrorism and expeditionary operations in Africa and Middle East shaped the European armies up until 2014. All nations downsized their manpower, some like Netherlands traded their heavy armor for mobile peacekeeping forces. Training to retain the perishable skill of fighting a stand up ground war against equal technology level enemy was neglected in most European countries. Sole exception was Finland, perhaps not because of a brilliant insight but because of the glacially slow doctrine changes, who retained conscripted army geared for fighting mechanized spearheads in an all-out war situation.
Modern day NATO has lost 2.2 million soldiers since the end of the cold war. While the area it has committed to defend has grown considerably. Out of the remaining 450 000 soldiers most are not equipped to fight a defensive battle against armored formations, let alone to attempt to take on offensive duties against such forces. Where NATO forces are far superior to all potential adversaries are naval and air power. But NATO: s current air-power has not been tested against peer level adversary since the 1950's.
While the political commitments are in place to defend every inch of the alliances area, serious doubts have been voiced on the real depth of the commitment. Popular opinion in many member states is not very favorable towards military support of the other members and tolerance towards casualties may be low.
The Adversary
Naturally NATO is not alone with its declining capability. Russia, who is the only realistic aggressor in the European theater of operations, has lost both manpower and technological assets. While Russia may not have the Soviet ambition, or power, to push to the Atlantic, it still possesses enough formations trained and equipped for all-out war to challenge NATO. It also has increasing numbers of well trained professional units that are not only capable for all-out war, but they can also be used in complex and rapid operations against other nations. This capability was demonstrated in the invasion of the Crimean peninsula.
Russian capabilities combined with their cohesive and centralized command structure that doesn’t have political delays between the executive decisions and the deployment of military force, be it overt or covert, allows them to challenge and probably take control of a limited areas within the NATO:s perimeter.
Scenarios and narratives
There are multitude of reasons why Russia might seek to engage NATO in a limited, non-nuclear, conflict. Most the reasons stem from the internal turmoil that is boiling beneath the oiled surface of the abyss also known as Kremlin. Russia as a country is not doing well. Without going deeper it can be said that there is a very real possibility of an economic collapse because of the low oil price, sanctions and un-diversified economic structure.
The only way that the current Russian establishment, the securocratia and president Putin, can survive even on the short perspective, is to convince the Russian general population that the declining standard of living and national prestige are caused by the actions of an external enemy. If Russians can be convinced that the survival of the motherland requires sacrifices, they will endure hardships far better than most nations. This offers the ruling class a possibility of a long term survival, instead of the Ceausescu-like ending.
This narrative requires conflict, controllable conflict that is. Ukraine was effectively used as a basis for a similar narrative, but its effectiveness is starting to vane, as Ukraine is not an existential threat to Russia. So where would Russia confront the western world? List is short. The most probable targets are the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Finland and Sweden. While Finland and Sweden are not NATO members and Swedish defense minister Peter Hultqvist has just stated that Sweden will not seek the membership at least before 2018, any military action would cause full scale political and economic responses from the European nations as EU couldn’t stay idle.
On the other hand NATO would have to respond against an invasion on Baltic soil. But the region is very hard to defend and the short distances and open terrain would offer rapid attack routes for mechanized and motorized troops. Any NATO operation would have to be a reactionary one. And that would mean a counter offensive against dug in in heavy forces, that operate beneath an effective air defense umbrella. When the available forces are taken into account NATO would be outnumbered in the Baltic-region by 2:1. Counter offensive against and twice the numbers and equal technology levels would be hard sale in any parliament. And the parliamentary decision making process would allow Russian forces to prepare their defenses.
Additional limitations to NATO defensive and counter offensive operations within the Baltic theater of operations are the neutral governments of Finland and Sweden. By maintaining strict neutrality, these countries would severely limit the usability of both air and naval power against Russian forces in the Baltics.
Many experts conclude that NATO cannot defend the Baltic countries and it most certainly cannot retake them if they are lost to Russia.
Balancing factors
If Finland and Sweden would join the NATO, would that ease the pressure towards the Baltic? Russia would no undoubtedly increase its activity and pressure against the countries. But Finland would bring significant land assets to the military simulations. It can field 300 000 men ground forces in short notice and if properly supported by the few effective and fast ground units that NATO has, it will always pose a threat against the economic and social heart of Russia — the city of Sankt Petersburg. Sweden on the other hand has practically nonexistent ground forces, but their strong air and naval power would allow NATO a free roam against Russian targets in the Baltic.
How could NATO convince the Finnish and Swedish politicians to join the alliance? That would require NATO to regain its cohesion and the creation of suitable formations to support the new front line in the north. Some of this transformation has already started, like the creation of the German and Dutch armored division, but the new capabilities must be built with strong coordination and a sense of purpose that Finns and Swedes can relate to. NATO must be able to sell itself as an asset, not as an additional cost to already burdened defense budgets.
Sources:
http://www.iltasanomat.fi/kotimaa/art-1441851851392.html
http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/2015092420408293_uu.shtml
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists maaliskuu 1989)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279983/2013.pdf
http://www.janes.com/article/46904/germany-receives-first-leopard-2a7-mbt
http://www.popsci.com/russian-invasion-ukraine-spurs-new-german-tank-design-0
http://rt.com/news/217823-putin-russian-military-doctrine/
http://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/sweden-and-stability-baltic-sea-region-0#axzz3OV9K605f
