Crouching Tiger, Hidden Shark

Derya Ünal
Nov 5 · 5 min read

As China seeks to extend its influence across the South Pacific, its micro nations are trading sovereignty

Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare reviews the honour guard during a welcome ceremony with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, 9th October, 2019

Merely two weeks after it became public knowledge that the Solomon Island’s Province of Tulagi had struck a deal with the Chinese Sam Enterprise Group, having signed a “strategic cooperation agreement” on 22nd September, the nation’s Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has now issued a statement seeking to overturn the decision as invalid, describing the act by the Central Government as “unlawful, unenforceable and (to) be terminated with immediate effect”. The deal between the island of 1700 inhabitants and a Chinese company close to the Communist Party had attempted to effectuate a 75-year lease, promising the islanders the exploration of oil and gas and increased fishing activities while also gaining permanent foothold following the newly established diplomatic ties between the Solomon Islands and Beijing.

The Solomon Islands are but one example of a deeper diplomatic effort on the side of China in the South Pacific. Ever since Japan’s and America’s diplomatic retreat from the Pacific, the spheres of influence around the Pacific Rim have shifted and Beijing has readily stepped into the void using the promises of cooperation in the forms of investments and aid money. China’s “soft” strategy in the South Pacific is twofold; Firstly, it has successfully strengthened diplomatic ties and rallied tiny nations, such as Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, to “switch” and reverse their recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, increasing Taiwan’s isolation on the world map. Secondly, it has sought an active role in developing Pacific infrastructure ranging from maritime projects to government buildings and road development.

The 14 tiny nations of the Pacific, however, are not helplessly fledging under the tiger’s approach. China, in its issuing of loans rather than development grants, has provided the governments of Oceania with a new tool to achieve economic development in places other foreign parties refuse to help. In this way, the Pacific “sharks” (a symbol from in the Solomon Islands coat of arms) have cleverly played the diplomatic game with foreign interest to steer economic development into their territories. Whereas other foreign governments, such as Australia, invest in healthcare, education and public governance, Chinese investments have complemented other foreign aid in much needed infrastructure projects, such as the new wharf on the second biggest island in Vanuatu, or a new bridge project in Fiji. At the same time, China has demonstrated no sign that it would like those debts returned. Rather, Beijing is appearing to trade off debt for political favours. There is one direct advantage for Beijing to winning over the “sharks” of the Pacific; these micro nations possess the same voting power in the UN General Assembly as China.

However, China’s twofold reach into the South Pacific sphere, which contains fewer than 10m inhabitants and a combined GDP of less than $33bn, raises the question over its long-term benefits from offering these investments. For now, Australia is China’s main rival in terms of aid and development in a vast geographical area that suffers from weak economic growth, the effects of climate change and frequent natural catastrophes. One reason to invest is certainly the access to economic resources; China has invested most heavily in Papua New Guinea, which has the largest resources of minerals, natural gas and timber among the Pacific islands.

The real question is, though, how far China is willing to go in the pursuit of economic, military and political influence in the South Pacific, and which of these goals it holds closest to its heart. It is certainly true that these islands are placed in valuable maritime economic zones and hold natural resources, and last June Papua New Guinea became the first Pacific nation to join China`s Belt and Road Initiative. However, this is likely a side effect of Beijing’s push to become the dominant power in Asia; if investment is followed by establishing land bases to strengthen Beijing’s commercial efforts in the Pacific region, military usage of these bases is not far off, mirroring Beijing’s proceedings in the South China Sea. In recent years, Beijing has not only established bases in the South China Sea but has increased naval presence across Asia by creating bases of strategic interest along the shores of Cambodia and Myanmar, with planned additions in Pakistan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka.

In order to understand which goals Beijing is pursuing in its diplomatic game in the South Pacific, one has to consider the local conditions that characterise this region. Here, Beijing has found an easy target of small island nations with comparatively large maritime zones that require only smaller budget investments as promises in return for switching allegiance away from Taiwan, economic dependency and possibly the lease of land that could be turned into a military base in the future. This subtle strategy seems to pay off for China, since it is not seen to act as an aggressor nation on the geopolitical chessboard; in this way, Beijing can continually move its secret front in the Pacific, ultimately outplaying its main rivals in Asia. The possibility of a military base in the South Pacific puts the US and its Australian ally into the vicinity of the Chinese, as the majority of these islands are centrally located in between them. This would create a major security threat in the region, potentially forcing a military response by the ANZUS+J (Australia, New Zealand, USA, Japan) treaty members.

Prediction: In the short term, Beijing will stick to exploratory efforts to strengthen its political and commercial ties to the South Pacific. Its long-term goals will become evident when Beijing makes moves in the South China Sea base, its most militarised effort beyond the mainland in Asia. The base, however, has not been developed since 2018. This signals that a military expansion into the South Pacific area, at least for the next few years, is not a Chinese priority. Rather, Beijing is aiming to covertly gain regional traction over the next 5–10 years. After this time, it is likely for Beijing to enter a new phase of regional dominance, which will be supported by the continued establishment of land bases with possible military enforcement across the Pacific region.

defined & underlined

a concise take on current affairs and how they fit into the bigger picture

Derya Ünal

Written by

defined & underlined

a concise take on current affairs and how they fit into the bigger picture

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