THM OWASP TOP 10 — 2021
THM OWASP TOP 10 Module Notes
Broken Access Control
Websites have pages that are protected from regular visitors. For example, only the site’s admin user should be able to access a page to manage other users. If a website visitor can access protected pages they are not meant to see, then the access controls are broken.
Simply put, broken access control allows attackers to bypass authorisation, allowing them to view sensitive data or perform tasks they aren’t supposed to.
IDOR or Insecure Direct Object Reference refers to an access control vulnerability where you can access resources you wouldn’t ordinarily be able to see. This occurs when the programmer exposes a Direct Object Reference, which is just an identifier that refers to specific objects within the server. By object, we could mean a file, a user, a bank account in a banking application, or anything really.
For example, let’s say we’re logging into our bank account, and after correctly authenticating ourselves, we get taken to a URL like this https://bank.thm/account?id=111111
. On that page, we can see all our important bank details, and a user would do whatever they need to do and move along their way, thinking nothing is wrong.
There is, however, a potentially huge problem here, anyone may be able to change the id
parameter to something else like 222222
, and if the site is incorrectly configured, then he would have access to someone else's bank information.
The application exposes a direct object reference through the id
parameter in the URL, which points to specific accounts. Since the application isn't checking if the logged-in user owns the referenced account, an attacker can get sensitive information from other users because of the IDOR vulnerability. Notice that direct object references aren't the problem, but rather that the application doesn't validate if the logged-in user should have access to the requested account.
Cryptographic Failures
A cryptographic failure refers to any vulnerability arising from the misuse (or lack of use) of cryptographic algorithms for protecting sensitive information. Web applications require cryptography to provide confidentiality for their users at many levels.
Take, for example, a secure email application:
- When you are accessing your email account using your browser, you want to be sure that the communications between you and the server are encrypted. That way, any eavesdropper trying to capture your network packets won’t be able to recover the content of your email addresses. When we encrypt the network traffic between the client and server, we usually refer to this as encrypting data in transit.
- Since your emails are stored in some server managed by your provider, it is also desirable that the email provider can’t read their client’s emails. To this end, your emails might also be encrypted when stored on the servers. This is referred to as encrypting data at rest.
Cryptographic failures often end up in web apps accidentally divulging sensitive data. This is often data directly linked to customers (e.g. names, dates of birth, financial information), but it could also be more technical information, such as usernames and passwords.
At more complex levels, taking advantage of some cryptographic failures often involves techniques such as “Man in The Middle Attacks”, whereby the attacker would force user connections through a device they control. Then, they would take advantage of weak encryption on any transmitted data to access the intercepted information (if the data is even encrypted in the first place). Of course, many examples are much simpler, and vulnerabilities can be found in web apps that can be exploited without advanced networking knowledge. Indeed, in some cases, the sensitive data can be found directly on the web server itself.
Injection
Injection flaws are very common in applications today. These flaws occur because the application interprets user-controlled input as commands or parameters. Injection attacks depend on what technologies are used and how these technologies interpret the input. Some common examples include:
- SQL Injection: This occurs when user-controlled input is passed to SQL queries. As a result, an attacker can pass in SQL queries to manipulate the outcome of such queries. This could potentially allow the attacker to access, modify and delete information in a database when this input is passed into database queries. This would mean an attacker could steal sensitive information such as personal details and credentials.
- Command Injection: This occurs when user input is passed to system commands. As a result, an attacker can execute arbitrary system commands on application servers, potentially allowing them to access users’ systems.
The main defence for preventing injection attacks is ensuring that user-controlled input is not interpreted as queries or commands. There are different ways of doing this:
- Using an allow list: when input is sent to the server, this input is compared to a list of safe inputs or characters. If the input is marked as safe, then it is processed. Otherwise, it is rejected, and the application throws an error.
- Stripping input: If the input contains dangerous characters, these are removed before processing.
Command Injection
Command Injection occurs when server-side code (like PHP) in a web application makes a call to a function that interacts with the server’s console directly. An injection web vulnerability allows an attacker to take advantage of that call to execute operating system commands arbitrarily on the server. The possibilities for the attacker from here are endless: they could list files, read their contents, run some basic commands to do some recon on the server or whatever they wanted, just as if they were sitting in front of the server and issuing commands directly into the command line.
Once the attacker has a foothold on the web server, they can start the usual enumeration of your systems and look for ways to pivot around.
Insecure Design
Insecure design refers to vulnerabilities which are inherent to the application’s architecture. They are not vulnerabilities regarding bad implementations or configurations, but the idea behind the whole application (or a part of it) is flawed from the start. Most of the time, these vulnerabilities occur when an improper threat modelling is made during the planning phases of the application and propagate all the way up to your final app. Some other times, insecure design vulnerabilities may also be introduced by developers while adding some “shortcuts” around the code to make their testing easier. A developer could, for example, disable the OTP validation in the development phases to quickly test the rest of the app without manually inputting a code at each login but forget to re-enable it when sending the application to production.
Security Misconfiguration
Security Misconfigurations are distinct from the other Top 10 vulnerabilities because they occur when security could have been appropriately configured but was not. Even if you download the latest up-to-date software, poor configurations could make your installation vulnerable.
Security misconfigurations include:
- Poorly configured permissions on cloud services, like S3 buckets.
- Having unnecessary features enabled, like services, pages, accounts or privileges.
- Default accounts with unchanged passwords.
- Error messages that are overly detailed and allow attackers to find out more about the system.
- Not using HTTP security headers.
This vulnerability can often lead to more vulnerabilities, such as default credentials giving you access to sensitive data, XML External Entities (XXE) or command injection on admin pages.
Vulnerable and Outdated Components
Occasionally, you may find that the company/entity you’re pen-testing is using a program with a well-known vulnerability.
For example, let’s say that a company hasn’t updated their version of WordPress for a few years, and using a tool such as WPScan, you find that it’s version 4.6. Some quick research will reveal that WordPress 4.6 is vulnerable to an unauthenticated remote code execution(RCE) exploit, and even better, you can find an exploit already made on Exploit-DB.
As you can see, this would be quite devastating because it requires very little work on the attacker’s part. Since the vulnerability is already well known, someone else has likely made an exploit for the vulnerability already
Identification and Authentication Failures
If an attacker is able to find flaws in an authentication mechanism, they might successfully gain access to other users’ accounts. This would allow the attacker to access sensitive data (depending on the purpose of the application). Some common flaws in authentication mechanisms include the following:
- Brute force attacks: If a web application uses usernames and passwords, an attacker can try to launch brute force attacks that allow them to guess the username and passwords using multiple authentication attempts.
- Use of weak credentials: Web applications should set strong password policies. If applications allow users to set passwords such as “password1” or common passwords, an attacker can easily guess them and access user accounts.
- Weak Session Cookies: Session cookies are how the server keeps track of users. If session cookies contain predictable values, attackers can set their own session cookies and access users’ accounts.
There can be various mitigation for broken authentication mechanisms depending on the exact flaw:
- To avoid password-guessing attacks, ensure the application enforces a strong password policy.
- To avoid brute force attacks, ensure that the application enforces an automatic lockout after a certain number of attempts. This would prevent an attacker from launching more brute-force attacks.
- Implement Multi-Factor Authentication. If a user has multiple authentication methods, for example, using a username and password and receiving a code on their mobile device, it would be difficult for an attacker to get both the password and the code to access the account.
Software and Data Integrity Failures
When talking about integrity, we refer to the capacity we have to ascertain that a piece of data remains unmodified. Integrity is essential in cybersecurity as we care about maintaining important data free from unwanted or malicious modifications.
For example, say you are downloading the latest installer for an application. How can you be sure that while downloading it, it wasn’t modified in transit or somehow got damaged by a transmission error?
To overcome this problem, you will often see a hash sent alongside the file so that you can prove that the file you downloaded kept its integrity and wasn’t modified in transit. A hash or digest is simply a number that results from applying a specific algorithm over a piece of data. When reading about hashing algorithms, you will often read about MD5, SHA1, SHA256 or many others available.
This vulnerability arises from code or infrastructure that uses software or data without using any kind of integrity checks. Since no integrity verification is being done, an attacker might modify the software or data passed to the application, resulting in unexpected consequences. There are mainly two types of vulnerabilities in this category:
- Software Integrity Failures
- Data Integrity Failures
Software Integrity Failures
Suppose you have a website that uses third-party libraries that are stored in some external servers that are out of your control. While this may sound a bit strange, this is actually a somewhat common practice. Take as an example jQuery, a commonly used javascript library. If you want, you can include jQuery in your website directly from their servers without actually downloading it by including the following line in the HTML code of your website.
When a user navigates to your website, its browser will read its HTML code and download jQuery from the specified external source.
The problem is that if an attacker somehow hacks into the jQuery official repository, they could change the contents of https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.1.min.js
to inject malicious code. As a result, anyone visiting your website would now pull the malicious code and execute it into their browsers unknowingly. This is a software integrity failure as your website makes no checks against the third-party library to see if it has changed.
The correct way to insert the library in your HTML code would be to use SRI and include an integrity hash so that if somehow an attacker is able to modify the library, any client navigating through your website won’t execute the modified version.
Data Integrity Failures
Let’s think of how web applications maintain sessions. Usually, when a user logs into an application, they will be assigned some sort of session token that will need to be saved on the browser for as long as the session lasts. This token will be repeated on each subsequent request so that the web application knows who we are. These session tokens can come in many forms but are usually assigned via cookies. Cookies are key-value pairs that a web application will store on the user’s browser and that will be automatically repeated on each request to the website that issued them.
For example, if you were creating a webmail application, you could assign a cookie to each user after logging in that contains their username. In subsequent requests, your browser would always send your username in the cookie so that your web application knows what user is connecting. This would be a terrible idea security-wise because, as we mentioned, cookies are stored on the user’s browser, so if the user tampers with the cookie and changes the username, they could potentially impersonate someone else and read their emails! This application would suffer from a data integrity failure, as it trusts data that an attacker can tamper with.
One solution to this is to use some integrity mechanism to guarantee that the cookie hasn’t been altered by the user. To avoid re-inventing the wheel, we could use some token implementations that allow you to do this and deal with all of the cryptography to provide proof of integrity without you having to bother with it. One such implementation is JSON Web Tokens (JWT).
JWTs are very simple tokens that allow you to store key-value pairs on a token that provides integrity as part of the token. The idea is that you can generate tokens that you can give your users with the certainty that they won’t be able to alter the key-value pairs and pass the integrity check. The structure of a JWT token is formed of 3 parts:
The header contains metadata indicating this is a JWT, and the signing algorithm in use is HS256. The payload contains the key-value pairs with the data that the web application wants the client to store. The signature is similar to a hash, taken to verify the payload’s integrity. If you change the payload, the web application can verify that the signature won’t match the payload and know that you tampered with the JWT. Unlike a simple hash, this signature involves the use of a secret key held by the server only, which means that if you change the payload, you won’t be able to generate the matching signature unless you know the secret key.
JWT and the None Algorithm
A data integrity failure vulnerability was present on some libraries implementing JWTs a while ago. As we have seen, JWT implements a signature to validate the integrity of the payload data. The vulnerable libraries allowed attackers to bypass the signature validation by changing the two following things in a JWT:
- Modify the header section of the token so that the
alg
header would contain the valuenone
. - Remove the signature part.
Taking the JWT from before as an example, if we wanted to change the payload so that the username becomes “admin” and no signature check is done, we would have to decode the header and payload, modify them as needed, and encode them back. Notice how we removed the signature part but kept the dot at the end.
Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
When web applications are set up, every action performed by the user should be logged. Logging is important because, in the event of an incident, the attackers’ activities can be traced. Once their actions are traced, their risk and impact can be determined. Without logging, there would be no way to tell what actions were performed by an attacker if they gain access to particular web applications. The more significant impacts of these include:
- Regulatory damage: if an attacker has gained access to personally identifiable user information and there is no record of this, final users are affected, and the application owners may be subject to fines or more severe actions depending on regulations.
- Risk of further attacks: an attacker’s presence may be undetected without logging. This could allow an attacker to launch further attacks against web application owners by stealing credentials, attacking infrastructure and more.
The information stored in logs should include the following:
- HTTP status codes
- Time Stamps
- Usernames
- API endpoints/page locations
- IP addresses
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
This type of vulnerability occurs when an attacker can coerce a web application into sending requests on their behalf to arbitrary destinations while having control of the contents of the request itself. SSRF vulnerabilities often arise from implementations where our web application needs to use third-party services.
Think, for example, of a web application that uses an external API to send SMS notifications to its clients. For each email, the website needs to make a web request to the SMS provider’s server to send the content of the message to be sent. Since the SMS provider charges per message, they require you to add a secret key, which they pre-assign to you, to each request you make to their API. The API key serves as an authentication token and allows the provider to know to whom to bill each message. The application would work like this:
By looking at the diagram above, it is easy to see where the vulnerability lies. The application exposes the server
parameter to the users, which defines the server name of the SMS service provider. If the attacker wanted, they could simply change the value of the server
to point to a machine they control, and your web application would happily forward the SMS request to the attacker instead of the SMS provider. As part of the forwarded message, the attacker would obtain the API key, allowing them to use the SMS service to send messages at your expense.