A ‘Crypto UBI’ ecosystem

Crypto-currency governance may be the hardest part.

So I’m trying to use digital money creation to pay people an Universal Basic Income (UBI). There are three main problems that need to be solved before that can happen:

  1. Who exists? People need to be identified so they can get paid. That problem is solved by identity providers, which are just organizations that have a website and that sign human identities in and out of existence. That problem is on track to being solved.
  2. How to scale? To create money individually to millions (or billions?) of people, the technology must scale. Things like EOS.io are going to solve that problem. That problem is also on track to being solved.
  3. How to survive? The corporate-state doesn’t like competition. Creating money and paying people with it? That sounds like “communism,” and if we can’t shut down “the blockchain,” surely we can take a look at these people who are feeding it with people’s identity certificates?

Bitcoin is “real money” because it is very hard to be cheated (e.g. infinite money printing by any random player) and very hard to shut down (i.e. need to track down and destroy every Bitcoin full node). However, digital money that is not “mined” by anonymous random people on the Internet but rather originates from people identifying each other… that’s got to have “identification centers,” and those can definitely be harassed.

I have already tackled (1) and (2) in previous writings on this “channel.” I consider those problems solved.

Problem (1) is solved because a single person (any person) can run an Identity Provider. They can pay $5/month to host an instance of the “centralized” web application server on Linode, and they can themselves process individual identification requests from users. In fact, that’s what I’m going to personally do, when it is time.

There will be many identity providers, all over the place, run by all sorts of individuals and organizations. These will in time replace the “national” registries of the corporate states. And you can’t do anything to shut them down. There is no law that can be designed to attack identification centers. If someone can find a way to FUD voluntary identification into “aiding terrorism” or some such shit, then humanity’s run on this planet is already over. We will have much bigger problems than a lack of UBI, and frankly, the time for being civil about it would be long gone.

Problem (2) is solved. We can do digital money systems that process tens of thousands of transactions using things like Delegated Proof-of-Stake. These networks are not as hard to shut down as the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks for example, but they are already very hard to shut down. E.g. if you censor one of EOS.io’s block producers, then another one, eagerly waiting in line, is simply going to take their place. The network completely adapts in a few minutes. The difference is that in Bitcoin and Ethereum, there is no “line” of people to pick up the block producer role and instead every able block producer on the entire planet is participating simultaneously.

So we arrive at (3). We have seen that Identity Providers can’t be at all persecuted if they have absolutely nothing to do with the digital money systems. Instead, they just passively provide a registry that anyone can consult and use. Likewise, “The Blockchain” cannot be persecuted because there’s no actual people to attack. That’s why every “Blockchain” is still online, despite “ICOs” being persecuted — because ICOs have names and faces to them.

However, someone or something has to take the stuff produced by Identity Providers and feed it to The Blockchain. And that entity is the “governance mechanism” of the blockchain. This will work like most other proposed blockchain governance mechanisms: holders of tokens (“funds”) vote proportionally into the blockchain record itself, and a proposition with sufficient votes passes.

For instance, the blockchain can vote to accept identity certificates and updates (for example, identity revocations) from certain Identity Providers. Then anonymous, intermediary and voluntary organizations (which operate websites hosted on “freedom of speech” web or cloud hosts) work as “pumps” that bridge the information of “which people exist right now, and what are the public keys that they actually control right now,” produced by Identity Providers and their users, into the blockchain. The blockchain will recognize the signatures in the identity updates to be from one of the identity providers that are authorized, and update itself accordingly (e.g. start or stop UBI payments to certain wallet addresses).

These intermediary “coin organizations” or “coin foundations” may also be “voted in” by the governance process of the blockchain if required. For example, it may be necessary for the blockchain to lower or waiver fees for the intermediaries, since they are volunteers which already pocket the costs of keeping their web servers up, accepting requests from users, and from pumping information from the identity providers into the blockchain.

There’s a lot of details to flesh out, but I think that covers the overall technical and social strategy to implementing “crypto UBIs.”