Aaron Harding: Did Ukraine Make a Mistake in Giving Up Its Nuclear Weapons
Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, a litany of variously credible threats of the use of nuclear weapons was uttered behind closed doors as well as screamed from the rooftops. While the actual employment of nuclear weapons remains unlikely, the impact of these threats to regional stability as well as the strain it puts on international governance and liaison are extremely clear. There is no certainty that Putin’s desperate command will not utterly malfunction and set the world on a path of absolute destruction.
This is especially the case given that a notable number of Russian nuclear weapons have reportedly been placed on high alert, prepared for near immediate deployment should the command arrive. Such tense environment risks tragic mistakes caused by miscommunication, overly active staff, or even a mere accident.
By their very nature, nuclear weapons can never be completely safe. This, indeed, was well understood by Ukraine itself: when it gave up the nuclear weapons that it “inherited” from the collapsing Soviet Union.
In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and was replaced by 15 independent countries: together with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were formed. Ukraine’s incorporation into the Soviet Union forms an important part of Russia’s currently endorsed historical narrative: it has a rich cultural and intellectual heritage and represents a crucial political and administrative centre.
Critically, Ukraine holds an incredible strategic value as well. Ukraine was one of the most industrialized and agriculturally productive regions in the USSR: like other Soviet republics, it underwent a process of agricultural collectivisation which negatively impacted productivity, however, its diverse economy nonetheless yielded profit. Its industrial output supplied the Union with essential resources and helped subsidise some of its inherently agriculturally barren regions.
Almost more importantly for such a paranoid Moscow regime, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea is integral to USSR’s regional security ambitions, and throughout the existence of the Soviet Union, the country operated with a high degree of Moscow’s military presence. It housed several crucial military bases, training facilities, and defence-related industries. Additionally, Ukraine’s territory was contributing significantly to the production of coal, iron, steel, machinery and chemicals used for the broader Soviet economy as well as its army and its military-related infrastructure.
In connection with such a position, Ukraine also formed an important component of the Soviet Union’s nuclear program. It hosted a significant portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, including missile silos, research facilities, and production sites. Moscow relied on Ukraine’s resources and expertise for the development and maintenance of its nuclear weapons program. Following the USSR’s dissolution, the new nation of Ukraine inherited a substantial nuclear arsenal, a large part of its specifications classified. The full scope soon became apparent.
Overnight, the newly formed nation of Ukraine found itself to be the third-largest nuclear power in the world.
Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons is a significant event in the country’s history. Marking a clear separation from the “nuclear and proud” Moscow regime, Kyiv rejected the legitimacy of weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine became a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994, joining the vast majority of the world with the aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and encouraging disarmament.
In the same year, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The memorandum provided Ukraine with assurances of its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Subsequent negotiations took place between Ukraine, Russia, and other countries regarding the fate of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. These negotiations involved discussions on issues such as compensation, security guarantees, and the safe removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.
In 1996, Ukraine completed the process of transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia. This included the removal of all strategic nuclear warheads, which were transported to Russia for dismantlement. By 1996, Ukraine was declared a non-nuclear-weapon state. The denuclearization of Ukraine was supported by the international community, including the United States, Russia, and other countries. Financial and technical assistance was provided to Ukraine to support the dismantlement process and address security concerns.
The decision to give up nuclear weapons was significant for Ukraine, as it demonstrated its commitment to non-proliferation and international security. However, it also raised concerns about the country’s security, especially given the subsequent conflict with Russia over Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum and the events surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament continue to be topics of discussion and debate in international relations.
With all the fear gripping Ukraine now, it is crucial to remember why it gave up the nuclear weapons that fell into its lap following the 1991 dissolution. Nuclear weapons are inherently immoral, and any talk of their use or development exponentially escalates the crisis at hand.
Ukraine did not make a mistake by giving away its nuclear weapons: on the contrary, Ukraine showed early on that its people wish to be better than Moscow’s regime expects of its subjects.
Composed by Aaron Harding for Denuclearise.com on 13 June 2023
