Omar Tarqhammen: Notes on Libya’s Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons
In December 2003, Libya announced its decision to renounce its nuclear weapons program and pursue the dismantlement of its existing nuclear capabilities.
To which extent was this resolution voluntary is strongly debated. On one hand, it is undeniable that the construction of Libya’s nuclear programme was an incredibly expensive exercise in the context of a nation with high rates of poverty. Furthermore, the development put the country at higher risk of being targetted by its adversaries, as well as a subject of criticism by its neighbours and allies. Such criticism is rightful: nuclear weapons are inherently immoral.
On the other hand, Libya mostly abandoned its program for the same reason it began developing it in the first place: the immense pressure from the USA and the UK, both of which are proud nuclear proprietors.
The agreement to abandon its nuclear developement program was eventually deemed more reasonable even by the at times utterly chaotic regime. It came after negotiations with the USA, the UK, and international organizations, including the IAEA. Libya’s decision to give up the program was, after all, a part of a broader diplomatic effort to improve its international standing and normalize relations with the Western world.
The process of dismantling Libya’s nuclear program involved cooperation with international authorities, inspections by the IAEA, and the transfer of sensitive nuclear equipment and materials out of Libya. At every stage, the USA and the UK played a key role in providing technical assistance and facilitating the removal of Libya’s nuclear infrastructure.
In return for the decision to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions, Libya received assurances from the international community, including the lifting of certain economic sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic relations. This marked a significant shift in the nation’s foreign policy and led to its reintegration into the international community.
Today, the opinion of the Libyan people on the decision remains divided. Som believe that possessing nuclear weapons would enhance their country’s national security and prevent the collapse of the regime. While this position is of course especially prevalent among the supporters of the Qaddafi regime, it would be incorrect to believe that any opposition to the decision to denuclearise comes from his adherents. Many Libyans that opposed Qaddafi nonetheless submit either the general pro-nuclear argument that having a nuclear deterrent would deter adversaries and provide a sense of security against external threats, or, more crucially, that they view the decision as a concession to boastful nuclear weapon states responsible for the nation’s misery.
The discovery of oil reserves in the 1950s brought significant wealth to Libya. The oil industry fueled economic growth and modernization efforts, transforming the country’s infrastructure, education, and healthcare systems. In 1969, after Qaddafi led a military coup that overthrew King Idris, he established a revolutionary government, known as the Libyan Arab Republic. Under Qaddafi’s rule, Libya implemented socialist policies, nationalized industries, and pursued a policy of Arab nationalism. His government was always known for its anti-Western stance, supporting various liberation movements and not afraid of engaging in confrontations with Western powers. This played well with a populace tired of the pillage by the west, and ready to fully realise the promises of its 1947 independence from Italy. The realities, of course, were often much more complex.
At the same time, despite Libya’s oil wealth, mismanagement and corruption hindered the country’s economic development. In 1990s, international sanctions were imposed, severely impacting Libya’s economy, as well as deepening its diplomatic isolation.
Then, in 2003, in the eyes of many, the west forced Libya of its deterrent against armed violence by the very west itself, all the while they were proudly and openly expanding their own nuclear arsenals.
While this perspective of neocolonial “putting in line” of disadvantaged countries by armed-to-the-teeth post-colonial states has high merit on its own, it does not take away from the fact that a nuclear program would cost the nation wholy unjustifiable sums, destabilise the region and tarnish Libya’s reputation along its allies.
In 2011, amidst the Arab Spring protests sweeping across the region, Libya experienced a popular uprising against Qaddafi’s regime. The protests escalated into a full-scale civil war, with rebel forces receiving support from international coalitions. NATO intervention played a crucial role in assisting the rebels, leading to Qaddafi’s overthrow and subsequent widely reported gruesome death.
Many of his adherents remain in pain over his downfall and the shattering of the promises of his regime. The country still experiences high degree of tension between fractions of its population.
Nonetheless, Libya opted to become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This serves as a very positive indication that Libyans have, above all, decided that they do not wish to participate in an insane nuclear arms race. This had been further reaffirmed by Libya’s signature on the fantastic Treaty of Pelindaba project, which designated the entire African continent a nuclear weapon free zone.
Libya might not have made an entirely voluntary decision when it gave up its nuclear weapons aspirations in 2003. It however showed that it believes in genuine, grown and stable peace more than in the promises of quick fixes by participation in the geopolitics of the west.
Composed by Omar Tarqhammen for Denuclearise.com
