Omar Tarqhammen: The White House seeks to renew the Iran Deal
The U.S. has presented the representatives of the EU and Israel with a new potential framework for an agreement with Iran. Months in the making, the new document seeks to freeze Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme, in exchange for loosening the international sanctions currently imposed on the regime.
The old ‘Iran nuclear deal,’ the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), collapsed in 2018 following Trump’s promised U.S. withdrawal from its commitments. This disastrous decision destabilised the region’s fragile non-nuclear policy and reinstated devastating banking and oil sanctions, further damaging the prospects of any successive nuclear deal.
The JCPOA’s desired effect in this regard was that Iran would unwind its nuclear programme to a state where the development of a nuclear warhead would take in excess of a year, allowing the P5+1 the opportunity to respond. This represented a critical development in a situation where Iran’s nuclear programme threatened to revive the crisis in the Middle East, potentially triggering a domino effect of the nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia at the time explicitly stated its willingness and preparedness to obtain nuclear weapons, should Iran ever do so. The situation briefly stabilised in 1970, following the entry to force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in which Iran became a signatory.
However, following the overthrow of the government in 1979, U.S. intelligence again noted Iran pursued a uranium enrichment programme. In 2013, with the election of the reformist Hassan Rouhani, the P5+1 sought to establish a dialogue with Iran. Years-long negotiations sought to establish a system of incentives on both sides.
The agreement got off to a smooth start, as the IAEA certified in the spring of 2016 that Iran has met all its preliminary pledges. The JCPOA was in all regards a feat of diplomacy. Binding Iran and several world powers alongside the U.S., the agreement sought for Iran to dismantle the majority of its nuclear programme in a verifiable manner, in exchange for the abolition of the extensive sanction framework imposed on the regime. This amounted to billions of dollars worth of sanction relief each year so the international community could inspect the continued disassembly of the nuclear programme. The flow of investment was expected to bring about general prosperity to the people of Iran, as well as reduce the prospects of conflict between Iran and its ideologically opposed regional rivals, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Following the American presidential exchange, Biden offered to reinstate the deal, meeting, however, with a predictable distrust by Iran. Further, on the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, Washington remains dissatisfied with Tehran’s vague attitude towards the conflict, in several instances even siding with Moscow. In a situation where the U.S. seeks to rally universal and unwavering support for Ukraine, Raisolsadati’s friendliness towards Putin jeopardised the development of new genuine diplomatic relations with NATO.
In 2020, the U.S. sought to reimpose full-power sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA 2015. Under the JCPOA, any signatory who suspects that Iran is violating the deal can approach the UN Security Council for a vote on the continuation of the sanction relief. These so-called ‘snapback mechanisms’ remain in effect for ten years following the agreement’s entry to force in 2016, following which they will be permanently removed, should general compliance be ascertained. The P5 partners rejected the U.S. move, citing currently that the U.S. cannot unilaterally implement the snapback mechanisms as it left the JCPOA in 2018.
The fate of the JCPOA itself remains uncertain, as the tensions between Washington and Tehran remain high. The new, more conservative Iranian government under Ebrahim Raisi remains in stark disagreement about the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation and opts to align its loyalty with Russia rather than the U.S. International security experts continue to warn of the dangers of further delay in the negotiations, as Iran is expected to be in possession of enough enriched uranium to construct a nuclear bomb if it chooses to reinstate its programme.
The U.S. revealed that it had entered negotiations with Iran in January, and informed its European allies (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Israel in February 2023. It however remains unclear to which extent is the Iranian regime currently willing to negotiate its terms. The latest reports indicate that Iran has been familiarised with the proposal and rejects its current form. Nonetheless, given the revival of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme in the last two years, and the general instability of the country following the mass protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in the hands of the Iranian ‘morality police,’ anything short of an outright rejection of the very idea of a new nuclear deal remains a positive sign.
Composed by Omar Tarqhammen for Denuclearise.com
