U.K. army soldiers carry ammunition to their tactical vehicle during a weapons training event with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Battle Group Poland (BGPol), at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, May 17, 2018. BGPol is a multinational coalition of U.S., U.K., Croatian and Romanian forces. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Hubert Delany III)

Brex-agon: Brexit Risks that Could Shape U.S. Defense

Orlandon Howard
7 min readApr 5, 2019

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Governments, companies, and even individual stakeholders all over the world are frantically assessing how, and to what extent they’re exposed to risks from the potential impact of the U.K.’s split from the European Union. They all want to prepare themselves for the uncertain fallout.

If the U.S. Department of Defense performed their own objective risk assessment of the U.K. as a defense coalition partner, post-Brexit, there’s a good possibility the U.K. would be considered a moderate risk for abating support on the nations’ shared defense commitments, given the potential weakening of its national power.

A Longtime Anglo-mance — A Tradition of Comradeship

The U.S. and the U.K. have at least a century-long history of strategic partnership. The two nations have expressed their friendship through extensive trade and financial partnerships, and most prominently through security and defense cooperation.

Over the last century, they have combined efforts in every major war led by the U.S., with the exception of Vietnam.

Today, the two countries’ security interests are still tightly braided. They share membership in the world’s most important multilateral alliances such as NATO, the United Nations (specifically the security council), and security alliances such as Five Eyes.

The U.S. has been fortunate to have the collegial fellowship of its elder kinsman, to share common mind and mutual burden for achieving shared international security goals.

Then Entered the Exit — The Vote to Disrupt the Status Quo

But those happy days were before Brexit — the name given to the U.K.’s (Britain) decision to exit the European Union after nearly 45 years of membership.

Brexit, was an unexpected outcome of a referendum, voted by 51.9 percent of U.K. citizens in 2016. Ironically, the referendum was initiated by former Prime Minister, David Cameron, who was a ‘Remainer’. He hoped to secure a decisive public consensus that the U.K. should remain in the EU.

Cameron’s aims were upset with an epic, yet ever so slight, majority vote to leave the EU. His political standing was so severely weakened by the Brexit vote that he was compelled to resign. His saga was a story ripe for a tragedy poem in Homer’s Iliad.

Now the question is whether the U.K. as a nation will be in the same position David Cameron was — critically weakened — possibly lacking sufficient capital to fulfill the role of a preeminent global leader.

There are reasons for the U.S. to be worried about the answer.

Standing Outside the Circle— Soft Power Weakens

Brexit threatens to reduce the U.K.’s soft power both with the international community and within its own commonwealth.

The prospect of the U.K.’s diminished soft power presents risks to U.S. defense because the U.K. has historically been an important partner for the U.S. to wield influence over EU countries in security matters. Since 21 of the 29 countries in NATO countries are EU members, the U.K.’s divorce from the EU stands to weaken its political power not only over the EU, but likely NATO.

The EU who has reasonable incentive to prefer the recommendations of members who share membership in both alliances, may be predisposed to scrutinize or even reject U.K. recommendations because of the divorce, as they enter a more competitive relationship. It’s even conceivable they may do so deliberately to underscore the detriment of losing membership in the EU and the benefit of remaining.

A Divided Kingdom — Internal Unity Weakens

The U.K. also stands to be internally divided, literally, over Brexit. The U.K. is a federation of countries, somewhat like the EU, comprising England, Scotland, Wales and the province, Northern Ireland. Although none of the countries are recognized internationally as standalone countries, each of them has some power or leverage to secede from the union — without the threat of a civil war, except possibly in the case of Northern Ireland.

The fragile nature of the union between the four nations is cause for concern, post-Brexit. Although England and Wales are a low risk of a UKexit, the relationship with Scotland and Northern Ireland are less secure. Unlike England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland had majorities vote against Brexit.

If both countries seceded, the U.K. would relinquish half its contiguous territory, 10 percent of its population and about 10 percent of its total gross added value (gross domestic product (GDP) excluding taxes and subsidies on products).

And the threat of disunion is real.

Scotland and Northern Ireland, seeking to protect their interests, have reconsidered their union with the U.K., out of concern for the ensuing impact of leaving the EU, particularly regarding trade relations with the EU.

Scotland held a referendum to leave the U.K. two years before Brexit. Scots decisively voted to remain, 55.25 percent to 44.65 percent. However, after Brexit, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, and other supporters have called for a second referendum to revisit the decision as a result of the referendum vote.

A post-Brexit referendum could reverse the decision to remain, since most Scots voted against Brexit, and because of the unfavorable forecasts of its impact to Scotland’s economy.

Possibly More ‘Troubles’ — Internal Security Weakens

The handling of Northern Ireland and its border with Ireland also carries security risks, given its history of violent intra-state conflict over control of the region.

“Northern Ireland’s transformation from a region plagued by incessant violence into one characterized by peaceful co-existence has been made possible by Ireland’s and Britain’s joint membership of the EU,” said a report on Brexit by the Institute of International and European.

Brexit now threatens that peace and the U.S. will be impacted if conflict erupts.

The U.S. has a demonstrable stake in sustaining peace in Northern Ireland. U.S. diplomats brokered the Belfast agreement, which ended the civil war that led to the death of more than 3,000 people. The U.S. has also allocated more than $540 million dollars to the International Fund for Ireland that supports cross-community and economic engagement in Northern Ireland.

Renewed conflict in Northern Ireland risks embroiling the U.K.’s defense elements internally, and could again demand the U.S. to lend resources to help promote peace in the region.

Cut to NATO Tithes — Defense Spending Weakens

Then there’s the tangible risk for the U.S. in the threat to the U.K.’s defense spending. The most salient risk lies in a possible a shortfall in the U.K.’s defense spending below the two percent threshold established by the NATO agreement.

Even before Brexit, the U.K.’s defense spending, relative to the percentage of its GDP, was in steady declined since 2009.

The U.K. committed to allocating two percent of its GDP to defense spending in its 2015 national security and defense strategy until 2020. However, although NATO has given them credit for exceeding the threshold, the World Bank reports that their spending has fallen below the two percent mark since 2014.

Even if given the benefit of the doubt, the U.K. still faces the risk of economic aftershocks that could threaten their defense commitments and lead to further reductions, well below the two percent threshold before the end of 2020.

A Battle for Attrition — Defense Force Weakens

There is also risk of a practical deficit in the U.K.’s ability to resource its defense force for a substantial engagement.

The U.K.’s decline in defense spending was already a concern for U.S. defense officials even before President Donald Trump. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, expressed concern about the U.K.’s defense spending, pointing to a potentiality where the U.K. would no longer have the capacity to deliver a capable division of troops and equipment, but would have to be integrated into U.S. divisions.

The U.K.’s budget constraints, even before Brexit, led it to reduce its ground forces by over 20,000 troops from 2010, its Air Force Squadrons by eight since 2000, and its Navy ships by 14 since 2000.

A post-Brexit U.K. risks more drastic reductions in its military personnel force. Aside from the economic pressures, if Scotland and Northern Ireland secure independence, the U.K. will incur a near eight percent reduction in military end strength.

The Sum of All Fears — Defense Capacity Weakens

Decisions like Brexit and other relevant policy decisions affect the U.S. significantly because of the nations’ shared equity in defense.

The U.K., like most of the developed world, depends on the strength of the U.S.’ defense to help maintain global security. But the reciprocal is also true. The U.S. depends on the strength of coalition partners like the U.K.

Seeking to gain greater autonomy and sovereignty, the U.K. may have reduced its power and stature in the global community, particularly in matters of defense.

Yet, in the ongoing effort to make the world more secure, the U.S. will continue to need capable coalition partners that have the willingness and the defense capacity to address the increasingly complex security concerns faced by the international community. Any degradation of that willingness or capacity imposes risks that the U.S will inevitably absorb and have to fill in the gaps.

Shoring up those risks carry significant costs that will be ultimately paid by American tax payers, and most importantly, by the blood, sweat and tears of members and supporters of the Department of Defense.

Hopefully, leaders and their constituents in the U.K can be convinced to consider all the major stakeholders in the outcome of Brexit and the relevant impact to their own defense and security and that of the global community.

The views expressed here are my own and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army, nor any other members of these organizations.

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