Network Effects and Privacy in Addressing COVID Spread

In my last post, I asked how big tech companies are going to help us fight the coronavirus, and suggested that data sharing would allow us to identify those who are at high and low risk of developing a severe case. Only a timely basis, Apple and Google are collaborating to develop contact tracing — tracking the network of phone locations to identify potential transmissions.

It is mass surveillance and it might be the best technology we have to fight the spread of this and future viruses. This is a complex topic with many pros and cons and will inevitably stand as precedent for future surveillance and health data sharing. How much liberty does safety cost?

The technology uses Bluetooth to make a log of everyone you have been in contact with and if any of those people come down with the virus you are notified. Privacy is ensured through using a “rolling proximity identifier” and no personal information is required. Leveraging network effects and Metcalfe’s Law each additional user brings increasing value. Caretakers can intervene sooner within a population and a patient keeping the network of each network healthy.

Some states like Massachusetts are opting for a low-tech, tried and true method for contract tracing: employing people to individually call the sick and warn the possibly infected. This method is time-intensive and relies on perfect recall. One benefit is providing short-term employment for the millions without jobs. These calls are also a form of care allowing the quarantine to directly share their hardship with public health workers.

Bluetooth is also susceptible to hacking. While Apple employs “geniuses”, there is a risk that the encryption could be broken and records re-identified. Competitors working together could also prolog roll out. But even if the technology does work, there are risks to false confidence and false fear.

Because the virus can live on surfaces for days, some could become infected without being in the presence of the contagious. This is an opt-in service, meaning participation is likely lower than an opt-out policy. An individual opting out could be a silent spreader.

While this technology could give us a false sense of safety, it could also provide a false sense of fear. Depending on existing health conditions, individuals are at vastly different levels of case severity risk. “The percentage of COVID-19 patients with at least one underlying health condition or risk factor was higher among those requiring intensive care unit (ICU) admission (358 of 457, 78%) and those requiring hospitalization without ICU admission (732 of 1,037, 71%) than that among those who were not hospitalized (1,388 of 5,143, 27%).”

Many will not have a bad case. As the economic toll rises, so does the need for the cured and low-risk to safely return to work. The low-risk could spread it to the high-risk, but a phased approach can get the low-risk back to work and keep the high-risk safe.

Assuming we need a way to aggregate a list of the contagious, should it be private or public and on an indefinite or finite timeline? We have traditionally trusted the government with technology that is too powerful for profits, but the pendulum of public trust might be with companies.

We already share some of our most personal data on who we are (likes, dislikes, fears, aspirations, spending, location, friend groups, etc.) for free with companies in exchange for the convenience of connecting with people, getting places and buying things. This could be a precedent for freely sharing health information in exchange for safety. If we are comfortable with sharing the “why” data on our motivations that make us “me” with companies, are we also comfortable with sharing the “what” data on medical information in exchange for personal and societal health?

Once we are comfortable sharing our health information with Apple and Google, they could become the go-to for other personal health data thereby having health, location, wearable, diagnostics, spending (Google is also launching their own credit card) and internet data.

Fighting this virus is not a national issue — it is a human problem. South Korea and Israel have a similar contact tracing app and the EU has recently called for member states to develop something akin. France and Germany are planning to use centralized servers to track phone contact and will be getting more information from the phones to help epidemiologists than the Apple — Google technology.

Contract tracing is a complex privacy vs. safety question that will likely have longstanding precedents. We have debated these questions and continue to amend our views as a nation since our inception with The Bill of Rights to modern-day and the Patriot Act. Whether high or low-tech contact tracing, I think the U.S. is ideally positioned to make our next step, the right step.

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