A Soldier’s Perspective on Ukraine
And what the future of the conflict holds
I have fought the Russians on a few occasions. Once was in the forests of southern Germany and later in the deserts of California. Or at least that is how the US Army wanted me to think of it.
In a nod to subtly, a fake country was made up to stand in for Russia: Donovia. But the name is where the differences end. The Donovians — played by American Opposition Forces (OPFOR) — fight as the Russians do. They move in Brigade Tactical Groups and in smaller units typically based around the number three. Three tanks to a platoon, three platoons to a company, and so on. Their vehicles are modified to replicate BMPs, BRDMs, T-90s, and many of the other vehicles used by the Russian Army.
United States Army units regularly travel to places like the National Training Center (NTC) in California and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Bavaria to collectively fail. It is the job of the OPFOR to ensure that your worst day is in the confines of a simulated battlefield so if, and when, real bullets start flying, you know what to do. And for this purpose, the opponent was based on Russia.
There is a good reason for this selection that goes deeper than its Cold War roots: the US Military respects the potential of the Russian Military and its adversarial role in geopolitics.
And that is why Russia’s bungled invasion of Ukraine has been particularly shocking. Russia may be relatively poor, but it is supposed to be capable. For a moment let’s put aside Ukraine’s heroic defense and the illegal and misbegotten nature of the Russian venture and focus on how Russia has failed as a professional army- and why that is so concerning.
A lack of foresight
By uniting Europe against it, Russia has displayed a lack of foresight at the strategic level. But it has also been missing at the operational and tactical levels. Their logistical failures are key indicators of Russia’s poor prep.
Mechanized forces are notoriously thirsty. For every few tanks, a fueler is needed. And that fueler requires further trucks to bring fuel to the forward distribution sites. The same goes for ammunition, food, water, and all the other items armored units require. Running out of items such as grease, coolant, hydraulic fluid, and oil will stop a mechanized platoon just as effectively as a lack of fuel.
For an army that has been building up to this invasion for months and shares a border with the invaded country, this logistical oversight is astonishing. Notoriously, Ukrainian farmers have been taking advantage of this by towing away vehicles that appear undamaged. Granted, some may have suffered mechanical failures, but the Russian Army’s failure to recover and repair these vehicles further evidences logistical issues.
Discipline
Ukrainian civilians joy riding on tanks also points to a lack of discipline. As a former tanker and scout, I can comfortably tell you that a tank is difficult to take by civilians if the crew is unwilling to give it up. The tanker's creed is not “death before dismount” without reason. Furthermore, commanders are loath to abandon vehicles except in extreme circumstances. Open-source information coming out of Ukraine shows an army appearing to lack the discipline necessary to maintain its fleet.
Leadership
This all goes back to a failure of leadership. It is clear from interviews with Russian POWs that many are as surprised to be in Ukraine as the Ukrainians are to have them. Either intentionally or through neglect, Russian officers have failed to inform their soldiers and are pushing them along in a style reminiscent of early-to-mid twentieth-century military thinking. Modern soldiers should have a clear task and purpose. Even a limited understanding of the conflict around them and their part in it will make soldiers more effective than being told to “shut up and take the hill.”
There are a few potential causes for this. One is that Russian officers do not trust their soldiers, which circles back around to discipline. Another possibility is that they do not know any better. This would indicate a systemic issue within the Russian Military. Finally, there may be a sense that if the soldiers knew too much they would not want to participate. A cynic could argue this too relates to discipline, but it really suggests a much deeper rot. Whatever the cause, leadership has failed.
And that failure is apparent in smaller ways too. Their inability to obtain air superiority with a huge numeric advantage is one. The Ukrainians have done their part in that realm, but no Ukrainian action can account for Russia’s failure to encrypt their radio transmissions. Oversights such as that are difficult to justify.
Russia fights like the West
Finally, the biggest shock of the war is how Russia did not fight. Russia tried a Western-style lightning strike. Armored spearheads dashed in behind a powerful but targeted bombing campaign. And through it all, they made an effort to avoid civilian casualties.
This is not the typical Russian style of war. In previous conflicts and doctrine Russia has typically relied on massive artillery bombardments to level areas before armor and infantry move in to sort through the rubble. With Russia’s lightning war failing and Putin being backed into a corner, it seems likely that Russia will default to this style of fighting. And it will come at great cost to Ukrainian lives.
Conclusion
Russia has failed in the conflict but must not be confused with a paper tiger. All of the issues above exist in the Russian Army. But they still have a large, formidable army and will likely find more success as they change their tactics. Furthermore, for now, the Kremlin appears to have the will to fight a battle of artillery shells and attrition.
It is my dearest hope that Ukraine will continue to show the same perseverance and courage that has already earned them a chapter in future Military History textbooks. It is a conflict they can win, and one Russia will surely lose, but the worst may well be yet to come.
Please note that the thoughts and comments here are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense.
