Counterterrorism and Peacekeeping Don’t Mix — and Mali’s Coup Proved It.
Malian people surged to the streets in celebration as coup leaders announced the overthrow of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s (IBK) regime early last Wednesday. After weeks of protests, the consequence of a failing economy and rampant corruption, Malian soldiers mutinied against the central government claiming to have put Mali first: “There is no more room for mistakes.” The Islamist insurgency has grown out of control, molting into a terrorist safe-haven in Africa. Col. Assimi Goita, the now de facto leader of Mali, had received counterterrorism training from U.S. forces for years. Goita, who claims to lead a new group called the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), has promised to build a civilian-led government and hold a new election in the near future. But Mali has not recovered from its last coup, in 2012, which left an Islamist separatists movement and terrorism destroying the North.
A Brief History
The recent conflict in Mali took form in early 2012. A separatists insurgency in the north, comprised of ethnic Tuareg people, had seized the region by April declaring it the independent state of Azawad. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine began to seize control of towns taken by Tuareg rebels, starting with Gao.
Then-president Amadou Touré was dethroned in March over his handling of the northern conflict. Having completely lost control, the government invited foreign intervention to retake the region. The French government responded, sending thousands of troops to Mali in a counterterrorism (CT) capacity, reasserting the central government’s sovereignty. By February of 2013, French forces had almost completely expelled Islamic extremist groups and a peace deal between Tuareg separatists and the Malian government had been signed.
That April, the United Nations (UN) approved a multidimensional peacekeeping force. Initially thought to be a short, keep-the-peace mission, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) became the deadliest ongoing peace operation, with over 200 personnel deaths. The French established a long-term counterterrorism operation, Operation Barkhane, to combat the growing terrorist threat in the region. And suddenly, Mali was one of the most heavily occupied regions of the world.
Initially thought to be a short, keep-the-peace mission, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali became the deadliest ongoing peace operation, with over 200 personnel deaths.
You Can’t Have Both
The two powers in Mali, the UN forces and French forces, lead to questions about the dichotomies between peace and war, sovereignty and intervention, and their convergence into a ‘new normal’ in peacekeeping. The dynamics of peacekeeping operations have become increasingly militant rather than a source of peace enforcement. UN peacekeepers more frequently find themselves in hostile situations that have not reached peace agreements. As such, long term military intervention is beginning to dominate the space of peacekeeping more than it has in the past.
Concurrently, research has produced a repetitive theme showing that multidimensional intervention is the most successful at producing physical and structural peace. Doyle and Sambanis define multidimensional peacekeeping as, “consent based” programs designed to “implement a comprehensive peace agreement.” In contrast, they define peace enforcement as, “a military intervention authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.” Fortna defines multidimensional missions as both military and civilian populations to “implement a comprehensive peace settlement.” To her, peace enforcement is defined as, “substantial military forces to provide security.”
Counterterrorism stands on a much grander scale than that of local peacekeeping. Similar to the modes of ‘containment’ seen in the late 1970’s during the Red Scare, many nations are operating for ‘containment’, trying to minimize the spread and reach of terrorism. Such is the case in northern Mali, with terrorism in the Sahelian region named the ‘War on Terror’ in Africa. In nations as small as Mali, counterterrorism forces are a threat to the sovereignty of the host nation. In many ways, it can actually perpetuate the conflict. It reduces faith in the government, which justifies rebel groups, and exposes the intervening nature of the ‘other’ that terror groups seek to harm.
The topic is difficult because extremism is conceived in areas of conflict and instability, thus counterterrorism operations will likely move towards those regions. But at the same time, the solutions to the conflict and instability of the host nation will not be answered because the focus has shifted towards the fight against terror. When the focus is no longer on the individual factions that have created the instability, the instability that breeds terror, then there will be no way to create a new environment that is no longer conducive to extremism.
The Case of Mali
The French and UN forces in Mali operate perpendicular to each other, while simultaneously creating a space for political reconstruction. While the counterterrorism forces have a clear, political objective, the UN peacekeepers operate as an independent body to mediate dialogue between the warring factions. Resolution 2100 (2013), called for French troops to use every mean necessary to defend MINUSMA if under “imminent and serious threat.” The Resolution continues on to state that MINUSMA can use all necessary means to deter violence and avoid the resumption of armed groups in the area. While these two forces have distinct, separate objectives, is it really possible to separate their authority on the ground?
Peacekeeping forces have been the targets of continual attack by a myriad of scattered groups in northern Mali. Belligerents are more likely to disarm if they understand the intention and purpose of the peacekeepers who are there. Peacekeepers, intentionally meant to project neutrality, eased fighters’ fears while increasing trust in the process. If belligerents cannot distinguish between the French and the UN, then the generic scene of ‘intervention’ will not allow peacekeepers to foster local trust. As Charbonneau argued, the distinction to be made between these two groups are conflict resolution versus conflict management. While both are sufficient conditions for peacebuilding, they both cannot necessarily exist together to create sustainable stability. While the French forces are creating a space for MINUSMA to operate in a peacemaking capacity, they are simultaneously undermining the pressure to come to the table.
Yet, according to data collected on the violence against MINUSMA, only 25% of attacks against peacekeepers are claimed by terrorists’ groups.
In Mali, the French forces are not there in tandem with MINUSMA, but rather to fight off ‘terror’ groups. French forces are on a long-term counterterrorism operation, focusing not on the state stability of Mali, but on the fear that Al-Qaeda is planting roots in Africa. Because terrorism is seen as intolerable violence, it immediately authorizes states use of force, rarely distinguishing between the local groups involved. Charbonneau argues that counterterrorism assumes too much about terrorists and non-terrorists, therefore refusing to see the connections between the different actors and the intricacies of their relationships. In Mali, the Tuareg rebels and actual jihadists are not distinguished by the government, arguing that they are “more or less the same people.” Yet, according to data collected on the violence against MINUSMA, only 25% of attacks against peacekeepers are claimed by terrorists’ groups.
While terrorism is indeed, a growing conflict that requires an increasing amount of attention, its scope needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. In Mali, the counterterrorism operation overshadows the local issues, therefore impeding the ability to create solutions. Even once international actors transcend the issue of terrorism, there will still be disagreements on what the biggest issues are in the conflict and how to solve them. Sustainable peace requires trust –- and there is no trust in Mali.
