Is majority rule democratic?
or “in search of the Holy Grail”
“… And as she entered, on their tail,
And bearing in her hands the grail,
So great a brightness shone around…”
The following lines, written by de Troyes (2019, lines 3206–3208), allude to Perceval’s search for the Grail, a mystical object miraculously capable of providing unbounded felicity. Future generations began interpreting this Arthurian myth as a quest for an unachievable ideal, through which the sacred verity of its impossibility dawns along the horizon of enlightenment. Despite this fable’s literary domain, can its moral still be applied in the realm of politics?
The continuous debates around the best decision rule that should prevail in the democratic system incarnate the Holy Grail’s search. The main discussion appears to focus on either justifying or questioning the alignment of majority rule — or according to Dasgupta & Maskin (2008), a principle encapsulating the notion that the greater number entails the justified exercise of greater power — in accordance with the democratic principles. Despite the dense history of depicting majority rule as a vital limb of the democratic organism, originating in archaic Greece, where, according to Pitsoulis (2011), democracy involved rule by a majority vote of a popular assembly composed of male citizenry with completed military service, the critical vices of such a decision rule became subject of an ongoing discussion, with such thinkers as Mill (1869) and de Tocqueville (1889) spotlighting that the boundless political power inevitably leads to the so-called “tyranny of the majority”, where the permanent minorities are suppressed to reflect the bigotry of the majority. The question of whether majority rule is democratic still pulsates in academia’s veins, and hence, should be discussed.
Particularly, the essay initially highlights the side of the debate portraying majority rule as aligning with democratic ‘preliminaries’, before exploring the opposite side pointing out the flaws in such a decision rule. Finally, the essay explores the possible alternatives to majority rule and corresponding criticisms, thereby, spotlighting the need in the decision rules’ mixture. The essay’s main argument captures the notion that although majority rule comes close to the Grail of decision rules, it is still not ideal, and, therefore, cannot be fully classified as democratic.
“… The grail’s passage he observed,
In open view, and yet, reserved,
He knew not whom, with it, one served…”
(de Troyes, 2019, lines 3281–3283)
Contemporary advocates of democracy prescribe majority rule to such a system, with academics such as Jones (1988, p.7) suggesting that “there does seem something naturally compelling about” it. However, why exactly can majority rule be considered democratic?
Democratic
It is crucial to establish the ‘preliminaries’ of a democratic process justifying the need in a decision rule. From Dahl’s (1989, pp.136–138) perspective, if there is a “collection of people” within “well-defined boundaries”, all “committed to political equality”, and who have conflicting goals and interests, encompassing a plurality of values which are subject to dispute, there is a need for “collective decisions” which is brought about by a rule that is “decisive”, “acceptable”, and “feasible”. Arguably, majority rule appears to be the most suitable to reflect the preceding, particularly highlighted by the following justifications.
Majority rule maximises the number of participants who utilise the self-determination principle in collective decisions. Dahl (1989, p.138) argues that majority rule “ensures that the greatest possible number of citizens will live under laws they have chosen for themselves”. If any law is decided by a minority instead, the number of people who chose an alternative option will be inherently higher, thus opposing the intrinsic to democracy value of equality as the minority citizens’ votes are weighted disproportionately greater. Moreover, majority rule maximises the net benefit. As mentioned earlier, the people are not homogenous in their interests and preferred values, which requires the decisions to be made. However, as Jones (1988, pp.7–8) spotlights, “if people are at odds, you cannot satisfy everyone” and, therefore, “the next best thing is to satisfy as many as possible”. Here, majority rule applies best: if each citizen bears one unit of satisfaction, then, in any subject acclaimed by a majority, each citizen in the minority loses as much as each citizen in the majority gains. However, as Jones (1988, p.8) emphasises, “sometimes decision-making is not about ‘satisfying’ people but about trying to arrive at the ‘right’ decision”. In this case, majority rule embodies the most proficient tool, as it intertwines with the “wisdom of the crowd”. Originally established by Aristotle (2000) and further proved by Galton (1907), it is argued that many participants’ accumulative judgment is likely to be wiser upon the whole, as the median is centred near the correct value. This argument is further supported by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which prescribes that the probability of the majority arriving at the right decision is directly related to its size, as the larger it gets — the greater the chance of an accurate decision, thus levelling the effect of the outliers inherent to the minority judgement (Ladha, 1992). Yet, it is important to mention that de Condorcet (1785) pointed out himself that the majority principle stumbles across serious difficulties if there are more than two alternatives, thus hinting its imperfection.
Undemocratic
Despite the apparent alignment of majority rule with the democratic ‘preliminaries’, upon closer inspection, this decision rule’s flaws become evident. Notably, the critical issue arising from the majority principle is what Dahl (1989, pp.146–147) calls “boundary problems”, focusing mainly not on the collective decisions boundary, that is “matters decided collectively versus not”, but on the collective unit itself. Here, there is a possibility that ‘permanent majority/minority’ arise, stipulating the self-determination principle for majority and external determination for minority (policies specific to minorities’ identities might be neglected due to non-relevance to the majority). Moreover, de Condorcet’s worry about the non-practicability of the majority principle when faced with more than two alternatives is outlined by Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem”, which suggests that unless you allow one person to dictate to all the rest, no solution to cyclical majorities exists, as when faced with three or more options, there can be a case for “intransitive outcomes”, that is A>B>C>A (Maskin & Sen, 2014). Furthermore, as Dahl (1989, p.151) highlights, the majority government might tailor the agenda and even choose policies that “provide only modest benefits to its members and yet are so harmful to a minority”. Therefore, the argument about majority rule maximising the net benefit is flawed, as the less average net benefit acquired by the majority denotes the greater net loss for the minority, especially if the discrepancy between the two is minimal. The presented difficulties blossom from the ‘tyranny of the majority’, debunking the idealisation of majority rule. Under such criticisms’ gravity, what are the alternatives?
Alternatives
The decision rules of supermajority and limited democracy can be rejected momentarily due to the apparent non-plausibility of their materialisation on a large scale. However, Lijphart’s (1977) consociationalism represents the most suitable approach in dealing with the questions based on sensitive topics which cannot be decided by majority rule (especially within deeply divided societies). Consociational democracy indoctrinates four principal characteristics contrasting majoritarian principles: i) joint consensual rule within a coalition consisting of minorities; ii) corresponding proportionality guarantees each strata’s fair and equal treatment; iii) availability of mutual veto in the decisions; iv) segmental autonomy interpreted as minority rule over minority itself (ibid.). However, such a decision rule cannot be viewed as an end in itself, as it suffers from the categorical flaws:
1) mutual veto implies the unlikeliness of arriving at any particular decision, with the inherent endless voting cycles mainly perpetuating the status quo; 2) minority rule over minority itself infers the presence of majority within the ruling minority, indicating the infinite regress of trying to establish the uniquely determined decision.
“… I grieve no less that you did fail
To seek to learn about the grail…”
(de Troyes, 2019, lines 3588–3589)
Ultimately, majority rule appears to align with democracratic ‘preliminaries’, supported by the justifications discussed earlier. Contrastingly, its difficulties stemming from the “tyranny of the majority” highlight its limitations, supplementing oil to the cauldron already blazing in the flames of heated debates. However, the implied dichotomy of classifying majority rule as either democratic or undemocratic (with a related search for the best alternative) resembles Perceval’s naive thinking, craving to obtain the Holy Grail. Conversely, there is no ideal decision rule, as every available contender has its intrinsic flaws. However, there is a clear possibility of utilising both majoritarianism and consociationalism simultaneously, employing the latter in the situations involving a permanent majority or a decision encapsulating sensitive topics directly embracing minority members, sewing-up the ragged societal fissures. Thereby, further research on their mixture’s plausibility appears of interest, with the specific voting systems’ analysis (which was not outlined in this essay, signifying its limitations). Instead of seeking the best decision rule, academia’s focus should be forwarded to acknowledging the morality of its ‘journey’, with the advantages and disadvantages of the existing decision rules. Only when disillusionment prevails over idealism, the possibility of combining the theories will materialise.
