Janus of Modernity: Populism as the Primary Response to Globalisation
Introduction
“Two-faced Janus, god of Time!
Be my Phoebus while I rhyme”
(Swift, 1726)
The following lines incorporate the allusion to the God of Janus, who in Rome mythology represented a gatekeeper between life and death. Throughout time, the notion of Janus became embedded within linguistics as a metaphor of duality — the incessant struggle between antonymous concepts amongst different institutions. Particularly, if the aperture of politics is widened by applying the Janus myth, the duality between globalisation and populism can be observed, with the ‘populist face’ of contemporaneity condemning the fallacies of the globalizationist past.
According to Kyle & Mayer (2020, p.3), “there are nearly five times as many populist leaders and parties in power today that at the end of the Cold War, and three times more since the turn of the century”, with the sharpest augmentation of populism occurring “between the mid-2000s and early 2010s”. Therefore, despite the multiple waves of globalisation, with the fourth installation appearing at the turn of the twenty-first century, and the implied sense of the democratisation of the socio-political and liberalization of the economic environments, the face of populism not only appeared on the head of the world but became embellished by the powder of radicalisation. Hence, it is essential to establish why the perceived good of globalisation spawned the antagonistic antipode of populism. Thereby, this essay’s narrative initially encompasses the analysis of the existing literature suggesting the nature of populism as a response to globalisation, before presenting the argument highlighting the two ideologically different hemispheres of populist left versus right reactions depending on the shocks induced by globalisation. It is argued that right-wing populism should be interpreted as a reaction to ‘cultural globalisation’, whereas left-wing populism as a rebound to ‘economic globalisation’. The concluding remark of the narrative embodies forecasting the future of globalisation and populism under the pandemic monolith’s gravity.
Literature Review
“God of Time, if you be wise,
Look not with your future eyes”
(Swift, 1726)
To adequately understand the duality represented by the Janus of Modernity, both of its faces should be highlighted. Stiglitz (2002, p.9) outlines the definition of globalisation as “closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world” materialized by “the enormous reduction of costs” and “breaking down of artificial barriers”. Therefore, the concept embodies the process through which the world is becoming increasingly interconnected within the various pillars upon which society stands. Specifically, Mudde (2007) delineates three forms of globalization: economic, which primary objective is to create a capitalist global market; cultural, through which national cultures have become progressively bonded and open to foreign investment; and political, which represents the interdependent worldwide system, supported by the rise of supra-national organizations, which impose and oversee the new order established by the first two forms. Through the continuous and unequivocal transformation of the socio-political and economic environments, globalisation has incarnated the various advantages, such as increased trade, efficiency, investment, dissemination of liberal democratic values, and augmented cultural diversity, cementing the new dogma of livelihood. Nonetheless, the perceived benefits of such a categorical process simultaneously produced the negative effects, uncovering the eyelids on the populist face.
Particularly, Rodrik (2010) accentuates that globalisation in its different manifestations produces ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ exposed to the fluctuations within the previously mentioned environments. These negative fluctuations, further producing the shocks including capital flight, immigrant crisis, increased unemployment with the corresponding in-country inequality, accumulate in the demand-side factors which incentivise the supply of populism to the ‘left-over’ sections of the given population. According to the minimal definition proposed by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p.1), the notion of populism in its nature epitomizes a “thin-centered ideology, which is based not only on the Manichean distinction between the ‘pure people’ and ‘corrupt elite’, but also on the defence of popular sovereignty at any cost”. The ‘thin-centered’ infers that characteristics that compose the physiognomy of populism may adhere to the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, thus, creating a differentiation of left — focusing on the income/class issues — and right — accentuating the entho-cultural cleavages — populism. Despite the mentioned dissection of populism into two ideologically different camps of Right and Left, most of the literature tends to apply the intersectional lens when intertwining the linking threads with the globalisation, frequently adhering to the particular type. Such a shortcoming can be observed based on the approaches to immigration attitudes which can be expressed through the prisms of culture and economy. Academics such as Scheve & Slaughter (2001) and Hanson et al. (2007) claim that the populist backlash against immigration was caused solely by the deficiencies of economic globalisation in the form of labour market competition and fiscal burden. Conversely, the works of Margalit (2019) and Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014) suggest that the negative attitudes to immigration are supplemented by the sense of the rising cultural homogeneity, with the implied loss in the traditional values, and other cultural impacts instilled through the process of cultural globalisation. Therefore, there is a distinctive aberration of not only interpreting populism as a response to a particular type of globalisation but, additionally, generalizing the concept, thus not analyzing contradistinction between Right and Left. Suchwise, the next section of the essay fills the missing mortises by projecting a spotlight on the dubious face of populism. Particularly, the preceding is conducted by illuminating such a concept as a response to cultural globalisation within the right-wing and economic globalisation within the left-wing correspondingly, elaborating on the argument of Rodrik (2018, p.12), emphasising that the different reactions of populism “are related to the relative salience of different types of globalization shocks”.
Argument and Evidence
“Can you take delight in viewing
This poor Isle’s approaching ruin,
When thy retrospection vast
Sees the glorious ages past?
(Swift, 1726)
Firstly, the trends associated with the cultural globalisation provoking the populist right response should be addressed. Waters (1995, p.5) highlights that cultural globalisation embodies a “social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding”. Through such a process, society alternates the agenda encapsulating the most resonating issues of the day, moving from money-oriented to self-expressionist dimension. Here, cultural globalisation, personified by the categorical propagation of the liberal democratic values, accompanied by the augmented cultural diversity, shifts the previously established dogma of a nation-state through cultural homogenisation. Subsequently, this begets the adverse effects, mainly represented through what Inglehart & Norris (2017) highlight as ‘cultural backlash’. During the 1970s, the Silent Revolution began with the proliferation of liberal values and the ensuing diminishment in the traditional foundations (ibid., p.433). This idealistic cosmopolitan avalanche covered the less educated and the older citizens, thus developing the sense of “declining existential security” further “stimulating an Authoritarian Reflex” in the form of the cultural backlash (ibid.). The prevailing feeling of dissatisfaction with the modernized displacement from class-based to values politics gradually begins to stimulate the emergence of populism from hibernation. The estrangement to the recency of modernization eventually flourishes into the virulent buds of the nativist plant, further consumed by the populist face of Janus. Consequently, the populist platform starts exploiting the cleavages within society, painting the picture of the imaginable crisis on the canvas of the favourable past. Here, as Gest et al. (2017) argue, “Nostalgic Deprivation” emerges in the vicinity of the perceived crisis, as the native citizenry commences the collation between the prosperous past and the disastrous current status. Under the gravity of the grievances, the populist right instils the ‘cultural threat’ image, representing the subversion of the dominant societal group’s status. The further support of the populist right movements rooted in the exclusionary populism’s foundation enables their elected leaders to propose their new agenda tackling cultural globalisation’s trends. The preceding can be observed based on the multitude of examples, including Viktor Orban and his populist right party Fidesz in Hungary using the parliamentary majority to end the legal recognition of transgender people (Wareham, 2020); or the Law and Justice party with the president of Andrzej Duda in Poland affecting the court ruling on outlawing almost all abortion (Easton, 2020). Thereby, the emergence and augmentation in the support base of populist right movements, accentuating the ethno-cultural cleavages, are strongly tied to the trends induced by the cultural globalisation planting the seed of fear towards the new and, therefore, unknown.
Secondly, the impact of the economic globalisation inducing the populist left response should be underlined. Gaburro & O’Boyle (2003, p.97) frame economic globalisation as “the practice of economic agents working in different countries and serving the world market without a prevailing national base”. Therefore, through the implied mobility of both capital and manufacture accompanied by the increased market competition, the cultural globalisation demolishes the nation-state with the inherent welfare system meanwhile boosting the rates of host country’s unemployment, thus destabilizing the weights of equality within a country. Moreover, the greater interconnectivity in the economic sphere means the greater interdependence. Broner & Ventura (2016) argue that the possibility of the ‘capital flight’ rises through the increased direct and portfolio foreign investments. In this recessionary situation, the investors are likely to withdraw their funds, sustaining the crisis and further establishing the lasting inequality gap. Therefore, the benefits of economic globalisation backfire into an accumulative cost of economic inequality. Nolan & Valenzuela (2019, p.397) claim that inequality has been rising in many rich countries, arguably undermining economic growth, thus ‘squeezing’ middle and lower-income households, and exacerbating social ‘bads’ in the form of health inequalities, social solidarity, and trust in the institutions. Here, the predominantly populist-left actors emerge by increasing the inequality issue’s salience, revolting against the corrupt government and co-opted elites. The most notable actors exploited The Great Recession’s crisis to generate support for their movements. This can be highlighted based on the rise of the radical left SYRIZA in Greece which initially tripled its electoral share from 4.6 to 16.8 percent in 2009 (Kalyvas, 2015, p.189), and further had the party chairman, Alexis Tsipras, serving as Prime Minister twice. Hence, the populist left response’s birth and development, focusing on the income-class, correlates with the fallacies emerging due to economic globalisation.
Conclusions and Implications
“Drown your morals, madam cries,
I’ll have none but forward eyes;”
(Swift, 1726)
Ultimately, globalisation and populism resemble the opponent faces on the same body of the modern world. The abundance of benefits produced through the different forms of globalization comes at the cost of generating the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, subsequently creating and perpetuating the disbalance within particular countries. Here, the appealing but at the same time deceitful face of populism blossoms under the fallacies of globalization to inspire the ‘left-over’ sections of the population to fight against the plutocratic system. However, the factors that generate demand for populism differ amongst the ideological camps of Right and Left. The cultural globalization with the shocks of the dispersion of new liberal values and diminished dominance of the native majority generates the backlash further picked up and reinforced by right-wing populists. In contrast, the economic globalization with the inherent shocks of capital flights and increased unemployment transgresses and worsens the in-country inequality, thus creating a platform for left-wing populists to thrive upon. Thereby, to reduce the possibility of the future emergence and prolongation of populism, the current issues should be addressed through the new set of policies and greater cohesion among the countries.
Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the deceitful nature of populism, notably with the right-wing leaders such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro failing to protect their nations, thus potentially accelerating the withering of its dreadful face. Hence, during the inevitable fifth wave of globalization taking place during the agonizing flames of the post-pandemic crisis, the categorical emphasis must be directed on mutual support. If the countries and its leaders will worship unity and transparency, while renouncing division and secrecy — the Janus of Modernity will abstract duality and incarnate into transition with a globalizationist face forwarded into the hopeful future,
“Yet I find a new-year’s lace
Burnishes an old-year’s face.”
(Swift, 1726)
