The Analysis of Xi Jinping’s UN 75th General Assembly Speech
or “The Titanomachy of Paradigms”
“So they, with bitter wrath, were fighting continually with one another… for ten full years.”
The following lines, introduced by Hesiod (700 BC, line 617) in his epic “Theogony”, allude to the Titanomachy, in other words, ‘Titan War’ between old and new gods. The future generations started interpreting this myth as a subset of metaphorical doctrines utilised to depict human nature’s metaphysical laws, with the Titanomachy incarnating the inevitability of evolution. Nonetheless, can such a moral be applied in the political sphere, and particularly in the realm of international relations?
One of the prevalent features of the international relations theory (IRT), or as Cox (1981, p.126) defines, “an area of study concerned with the interrelationships among states”, is that its essence gravitates around the process of constant changes, making it challenging to create a practical scientific approach to its study and inferential possibilities. It is no coincidence that dissimilar research paradigms compete in this area, the most salient being political liberalism, realism and Marxism. Concurrently, the growing influence of world politics, with accompanying international relations and global processes, on the kismet of humanity stimulates the desire of political scientists to recognise that each of the approaches has the right to exist, such that the ‘Titanomachy of Paradigms’ can be brought to its longed-for Exodus, where the established approaches combine to analyse the field of study from different perspectives, thus contributing to the accumulative evolution of IRT itself.
Overall, this essay analyses Xi Jinping’s 75th UN speech from the perspectives of competing paradigms encapsulating distinct IRT views. The narrative initially highlights the apparent adherence of the CCP leader’s recital to liberalism, before portraying its conflicting nature with realism, and finally interprets it from the Marxist perspective. The essay’s concluding remark represents its inference about finding unification of the mentioned approaches to create the new IRT edifice.
Liberalism
“… the former of them roams peacefully over the earth.”
(Hesiod, 700 BC, line 761)
The period of formation and the first twenty years of IRT development as a relatively autonomous discipline are marked by the complete domination of liberalism. Such a paradigm is based on “two definitive articles of perpetual peace”, originally formulated by Kant (2004, pp.20–24) — the necessity of establishing a civil constitution of every nation and the idea of the “League of Nations” where its participants would “enter into a contract resembling the civil one… guaranteeing the rights of each”. Jinping (2020) highlights the latter by claiming that China reaffirms its “commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” and further declaring that it “will continue to work as a builder of global peace”. Furthermore, liberalists do not deny that the international relations system is inherently anarchic, that is, according to Axelrod (1984, p.3), a state in which “nations interact without central authority”. However, from their perspective, this anarchy is temporary and is continually diminishing, as international relations are becoming increasingly manageable under the purposeful activity of an expanding web of participants.
In this vein, neoliberalism includes a trend based on the concept of “complex interdependence”. Nye & Keohane (1971), highlight even though the states’ policy is specified by internal economic interests aimed at economic welfare maximisation, the growth of interdependence creates the shared economic interests amongst all states, where the oneness of stakes stimulates the augmentation of cooperation. States interact with one another to simultaneously minimise the potential losses and increase economic benefits, thus engaging in the positive-sum game, or as Jinping (2020) outlines, “win-win cooperation”. This growth of economic interdependence changes states’ behaviour in the international arena, leading to a decreased role of military power. As Jinping (2020) emphasises, “we are living in an interconnected global village with a common stake”, and thus, China has “no intention to fight… with any country”.
Moreover, the post-classical version of the liberal paradigm accentuates the radical change in the essence of political power under the influence of globalisation, including the erosion of national-state sovereignty, which occurs due to the increasing ‘permeability’ of inter-state borders and the weakening of state functions. As a social institution, the state is turning progressively antiquated and is gradually leaving the historical arena, giving space to joint international associations, based on the single free-market foundation, simultaneously overseeing the dissemination of norms. Proponents of the post-classical version of liberalism, such as Oneal & Russett (1999), emphasise the growing role and interaction of international organisations (IOs), NGOs, and transnational business corporations, forming cross-border networks both at local and global levels. Hence, politics is increasingly carried out in structures infiltrated with such solid vertical and horizontal networks, the importance of which is rising, while national-state sovereignty is being corroded. Jinping (2020) projects a favourable spotlight on the IOs suggesting that the only way to defeat the virus is to “enhance solidarity” by giving “full play to the leading role of the World Health Organisation”, staying “true to multilateralism… with the UN at its core”, and finally upholding a multifaceted trading regime “with the World Trade Organisation as the cornerstone”.
Suchwise, Xi Jinping’s speech aligns with the theoretical paradigm of liberalism, where the main processes dominating in international relations are integration and cooperation, based on the growing interdependence of the world. However, the world does not become better and safer immediately, which demands cohesive actions from the international relations’ participants to adjust them through the prisms of the IOs.
Realism
“Zeus… the most excellent among the gods and supreme in power.”
(Hesiod, 700 BC, line 48)
The traditional political realism, associated with such thinkers such as Thucydides, Hobbes, and von Clausewitz, has a long history in studying the sphere of international relations. Realists claim that the very conflictual nature of man pulverises the possibility of liberalist utopism encompassing a delusional belief of creating a new cooperative world order through the universal intergovernmental organisation. In this instance, Jinping’s (2020) accent on the idea that “no country can gain from others’ difficulties” would be rebutted by the traditional realists, claiming that in the moment of others’ downfall any individual would crave to benefit from their vulnerability.
Furthermore, Morgenthau (2004) points out that realism, likewise liberalism, proceeds from the position according to which international relations’ nature is anarchic. However, unlike the liberalist cooperation, the implication of such an anarchic system for realists constitutes that states, acting as the main participants in international relations, are forced to rely solely on personal capabilities in interaction with each other (ibid.), which conflicts with Jinping’s (2020) “bound together” narrative. The behaviour of states is formulated by their leaders based on their inherent understanding of national interests, which are grasped in terms of the state’s strength compared with other states, where success is achieved by those leaders who are employing strategies that support or expand their power in terms of the material capabilities relative to the other states. Thereby, as Morgenthau (2004, p.51) suggests, “international politics… is a struggle for power”, unlike Jinping’s (2020) proposed “extensive consultation, joint cooperation and shared benefits”. In the end, morality either serves the interests of the strongest or does not play a significant role in international relations, with Morgenthau (2004, p.51) considering prudence “to be the supreme virtue”, thus opposing Jinping’s (2020) stress on “moral standard” and unequivocal compliance “with international norms”.
Building upon Morgenthau’s vision, the proponents of neorealism claim that, in international politics, the possibility of war is acute at any time. According to Waltz (1979, pp. 110–113), “states facing global problems are like individual consumers trapped by the ‘tyranny of small decisions” and, therefore, “prevalence of anarchy in the state system requires individual states to be ruthlessly self-seeking” in their attempt to provide for their security. In turn, such a condition leads to power-maximising behaviour, where each state tailors the textile of the political seam to fit its interests best. Therefore, unlike Jinping’s (2020) liberalist “no to unilateralism and protectionism” and dismissal of “development behind closed doors”, realists would seek to exploit a pandemic crisis as the basis for engaging in a zero-sum game.
The central conflict between realism and Xi Jinping’s statement is encapsulated in Mearshaimer’s (2004, p.65) notion regarding the unlikeliness of agreement between states “on a general formula for bolstering peace” due to the inherent lack of trust. The world is not an idle utopia, in which considerations about security and power can be covered by the avalanche of pacifism induced by mutually-beneficial cooperation.
Marxism
“… no helpmeets in hateful poverty, but only in wealth.”
(Hesiod, 700 BC, line 592)
The paradigm of Marxism in IRT dates back to the “The Communist Manifesto” of Marx & Engels (2008, p.33), distinguishing capitalism to be the defining feature of the international system, where “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”, unlike Jinping’s (2020) conception of humanity’s “collective struggle”. Devotees of this paradigm consider that the international relations’ nature is not so anarchic as imperialist and exploitative, with thinkers such as Lenin (1925, p. 265), claiming that imperialism should be seen as “a special stage of capitalism”. Here, the main actors are primarily not states or transnational associations but, instead, social classes. These are represented by the owners of productive capital, who monopolistically own and manage the means of production in the global economy, thus entering into an acute competitive struggle, and proletarians, forming the economic base, exploited by world imperialism supplementing bricks to the superstructure monument of socio-cultural institutions maintaining capitalism’s evil engine.
Neo-Marxism particularly projects such a struggle onto the global scale of inter-state relations. Frank’s (2004) emphasis on the ‘metropolis-satellite structure’ and Wallerstein’s (1974) ‘world-systems theory’ with the trichotomy of categorising states into ‘core, semi-periphery, periphery’ foreground the notion that the well-being of economically developed countries (metropolis/core) is based on the exploitation of the other countries’ resources and the unequal exchange between rich and poor states. Thus, despite the attractiveness of Jinping’s (2020) urge to “face up to major issues such as wealth gap and the development divide”, China’s “commitment in providing US$2 billion of international assistance” would be interpreted by neo-Marxists as an attempt of further cementing China as a core country spreading the nets of dependency in the sea of countries-in-need.
Lastly, Jinping (2020) underlines that “economic globalization is an indisputable reality”, which benefits should be delivered “in an equitable way”. However, Marxists would interpret such a statement as contradicting to itself, as from their perspective, globalisation perpetuates the current disbalance of social forces, which are coercing the countries worldwide to open their national economies and societies, inevitably creating winners and losers depending on the country’s initial economic weight on the global scales. Therefore, Marxists would critically assess Jingping’s speech, classifying the speaker’s intentions as bourgeois desiring to perpetuate the inequality under a pretentious pacifier mask.
Exodus
“At the first Chaos came to be, but next wide-bosomed Earth”
(Hesiod, 700 BC, line 116)
It is essential to pay attention to the fact that the theoretical paradigm is not necessarily the correct model for interpreting reality, as Xi Jinping’s speech may only appear liberal on paper. However, even if it is correct, one should bear in mind its relativity. The new turns in the evolution of the research object and scientific practice development can shatter and even demolish all its basic principles. This circumstance fuels the ongoing dispute between IRT paradigms, as the supporters of each believe that their opponents’ views do not correspond to the rapidly changing international reality. Nevertheless, there is also a desire to avoid the opposition of paradigms, which manifests itself in attempts to classify these disagreements according to one consolidated principle of extrapolating the several provisions from each.
Ultimately, there is a clear possibility for modernising IRT to liberate it from the extremes limiting its evolution due to the tedious war of paradigms unfolding on the field of its theoretical framework. The three classical theories engage in continuous development, possessing the capacity of becoming intertwined into the wholesome conceptual framework. Only when the chaos from the ‘Titanomachy of Paradigms’ is over, will the harmony reign upon the Olympus of IRT.
