Why States Who Use Torture Sign Human Rights Treaties
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Signing human rights treaties isn’t as innocent as it may appear.
International human rights treaties are a puzzle. They fundamentally change how we understand international law.
Treaties in international law usually monitor the relationship between at least 2 states. But human rights treaties are quite unique in only monitoring the responsibility of the state towards its own citizens. This internal relationship is usually one that international law doesn’t interfere in. Domestic matters that don’t affect the international order usually aren’t considered within international law. States voluntarily choosing to give up their domestic sovereignty to international law is surprising.
But that’s not why they’re such a puzzle.
Human rights treaties are puzzling because of the trend that has been found with signing them. Namely, autocratic states that practice more torture, are more likely to sign human rights treaties than autocratic states that practice less torture.
This is an important issue. If signing human rights treaties is related to worse human rights records, then policymakers need to sit down and consider how to make them more effective. At least, they urgently need to consider whether human rights treaties may be doing more harm than good.
Human rights treaties can’t be enforced
It’s important to understand this before we delve into the puzzling trend of human rights treaties.
The core human rights treaties are considered to be these 3:
- 1987 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment (CAT)
- 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
- 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
The CAT allows states and individuals to declare violations, but it doesn’t outline any means of enforcement when they do.
A review of CAT reports from recent years reveals — not surprisingly — that states that do violate the treaty don’t report their violations.
The ICCPR and the CEDAW both require annual reports from signatory states. However, there is no enforcement of the submissions of the reports, and no repercussions for human rights violations.
The lack of enforcement doesn’t explain why states with worse human rights practices are more likely to sign human rights treaties, but it goes a long way toward reducing the presumed link between signing the treaties and any improvement in human rights practices. That given, there are different explanations for why states sign human rights treaties.
The realist argument: compulsion by great powers
The realist argument stresses the importance of the balance of power in the international system and, in short, claims that autocratic states sign human rights treaties because they’re compelled to do so by stronger powers. Lack of compliance, they say, could result in military and economic sanctions by the most powerful states in the world, and that’s why autocratic states sign human rights treaties.
But this argument simply fails to hold under empirical testing. Less powerful states with poor human rights records signed the CAT before any of the great powers did. Afghanistan and Bolivia joined the CAT on 4 February 1985. While they were official ‘democracies’ at the time, there were both notorious for sweeping human rights violations.
The great powers were yet to join. The UK joined in March 1985, Russian in December of that year, and China in December 1986. The US didn’t join until April 1988.
While the balance of power may explain a lot of trends in international law, it just doesn’t hold with explaining why autocratic states sign human rights treaties, and why they’re more likely to do so when their human rights records are worse.
The liberal argument: ideological appeal
The liberal argument focuses on the “ideological appeal of human rights” (Donnelly, 1986). In short, it argues that autocratic states sign human rights treaties because they’re genuinely convinced that it’s the right thing to do.
While this seems optimistic, and might be true for some states, it doesn’t explain why states with poorer human rights records are more likely to sign these treaties.
So if not the realist argument, and not the liberal argument, what does explain the trend we’re seeing with human rights treaties?
The logic of torture
Dictatorships with power-sharing have higher rates of torture than dictatorships without. So, for example, dictatorships that allow the existence of other political parties have higher rates of torture than those that don’t.
Here’s why:
- Power is shared, so opposing points of view are endorsed to a higher level
- Thus, there are higher levels of defection against the ruling regime
- Thus, there are higher levels of torture
By contrast, states that don’t allow power sharing have less of a need to use torture, instead relying on fear and intimidation to rule.
Following the logic of torture: because power is shared, opposing actors pressure the ruling regime to make concessions such as signing the CAT. But, because there’s no enforcement mechanism, they continue to violate the treaty anyway. When Pinochet legalised political parties in 1987, they pressured him to sign the CAT during that same year, and he subsequently ratified it in 1988.
However, though this is a much better explanation of why autocratic states might sign human rights treaties and continue to violate them, it still doesn’t explain why they’re more likely to sign when their torture records are worse.
Signing as a ploy
All the other explanations have presumed that states sign human rights treaties for various reasons, then don’t comply with them because they don’t need to.
Instead, this explanation suggests that states wilfully violate human rights treaties after signing them as a signal of their strength.
In this narrative, it’s important to the signing state that observers understand that they hold no intention of compliance. But, why does signing human rights treaties show strength?
Here’s why:
When autocratic regimes are removed from power, they are often punished for violations of human rights treaties. If they’re worried they may be removed from power, they’re unlikely to sign these treaties, to avoid subsequent penalties. Signing human rights treaties is a signal that they intend to stay in power, and that they have a lack of regard for international opprobrium.
Hollyer and Rosendorff suggest that, when the opposition receives this signal, they reduce their insurgent activities. This leads to a lower level of torture because there are fewer defectors, and this explains the reduced levels of torture following the signing of the CAT by autocratic regimes.
In 1996, Deby’s Chad had a very high rating of 4 on Hathaway’s 5-point torture scale and a rating of 3 on the CIRI 3-point scale. The regime faced armed opposition which it repressed with extensive torture. Deby signed the CAT in 1996 and adopted a new constitution that gave increased powers to the presidency. In 1997, several armed opposition groups ended their insurgency. The Economist published an analysis in 2010 showing that this explanation also holds true for the cases of China and Vietnam.
It’s important to take these trends with caution. While there are numerous cases that support this theory, we all know very well that correlation doesn’t equal causation. A more detailed analysis would account for concomitant policy decisions as well, which may affect the ratification of the CAT, the reduced levels of insurgency, and the reduced levels of torture.
Empirical trends show that human rights treaties aren’t necessarily associated with improvements in human rights and may, by contrast, be associated with worse human rights.
If they are indeed used as a tool to repress opposition, then it’s the responsibility of human rights treaty bodies to consider how to minimise the negative repercussions incurred on individuals and societies through signing these treaties.
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