2022 Taiwan Election: Foreign Influence Observation Report
Doublethink Lab
This report was written by Doublethink Lab analysts Jerry Yu and Agnus Lin, Chairperson Puma Shen, and Digital Investigation Team Director Kevin Zeng. We would like to thank the interns, cooperating groups, experts and scholars of the Foreign Influence Monitoring Hub (MHub), a joint initiative between Doublethink Lab, Taiwan-based fact-checking organizations, research units, and civil society groups, for participating in daily information collection, analysis and discussion.
Key takeaways
- We recorded 2,900 items of suspicious information across a range of social platforms in a roughly three-month election period, and monitored Weibo hot searches to track fluctuations in the impact of disinformation narratives on the PRC’s primary microblog.
- The information manipulation tactics of PRC-aligned inauthentic actors targeting Taiwan have evolved considerably, amid a decline in the content farm model we identified in 2020 due to efforts to stamp out coordinated inauthentic behavior on social platforms.
- Disinformation attacks are now more decentralized, originating across a network of social media fan pages and accounts, which makes them harder to identify and track.
- Rather than focusing on familiar tropes, like Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, PRC-aligned actors have had marked success in identifying divisive issues in Taiwanese society, and amplifying their impacts.
- PRC-aligned actors capitalized on disinformation and conspiracy theories distributed in the pre-election period, reinvigorating narratives at key points during the election campaign, then dropping them post-election.
- Aside from content creators, amplification efforts extend across disinformation and propaganda “Operators,” which have a direct or indirect relationship with the CCP, and “Resonators” (which do not appear to have a relationship with the CCP) — existing elements in Taiwanese society, particularly traditional media, whose values align with PRC propaganda and who do not need to be incentivized to share related content.
- While it is hard to put a measure on the “success” of PRC-aligned information manipulation targeting Taiwan during the election period, disinformation relating to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world’s most advanced maker of semiconductor chips, being “hollowed out” by the United States, and items linked to the breaking of antique porcelain in Taipei’s National Palace Museum, both originated from PRC-aligned inauthentic actors and observably impacted the election. These items featured in election campaigning, and were referred to in parliamentary questions raised by Taiwanese legislators.
Executive Summary
During the election period Doublethink Lab did not observe the effective spread of popular PRC official media reporting and topics to Taiwan. Instead, PRC media, Weibo influencers, and overseas anonymous fan pages, cited content produced by Taiwanese media with narratives that divide Taiwanese people’s perceptions of the US and Japan, and suggest that public security has deteriorated under the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. The most successful divisive issues were those that were already current within Taiwan: such as TSMC’s establishment of a factory in the US, Taiwan’s domestic security problems, and the breaking of porcelain in the National Palace Museum in Taipei. In addition, modes and methods of operation are evolving. While the content farm mode has declined, the decentralized production of content, coupled with the role of ‘Operators’ in amplifying existing conflicts, and ‘Resonators’ like Taiwan’s traditional media, anonymous fan pages, internet opinion leaders and politicians, has increased Taiwanese people’s exposure to CCP-aligned propaganda.
In recent years, Taiwan has frequently observed traces of information manipulation from abroad in local and national elections for presidents and legislators. The objectives of these information manipulations are not only to influence the outcomes of the elections, but also to exacerbate societal divisions and shape mutual distrust between different groups in Taiwanese society. Specific social media accounts have created or shared content to attack the diplomatic and domestic governance failures of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). PRC officials and state media shape public opinion through the dissemination of manipulative information on diplomatic, cross-Strait, security, and livelihood issues in Taiwan. They shape public opinion into a narrative that conforms to the consistent internal and external propaganda of the PRC, such as mistrust of the DPP and anti-American sentiments, attempting to influence Taiwanese voters’ behaviors and values.
In the future, the PRC may scale back resources devoted to “creating” disinformation. Instead, greater focus may be trained on selecting existing divisive issues and citing reliable sources, before amplifying their influence and impact. Resonators whose views are aligned with specific propaganda or disinformation issues will naturally expand the reach of such narratives without external incentives. Notably, the decline of the content farm mode is accompanied by the decentralization of suspicious and controversial sources of information. The source of malicious information is thus more deeply hidden in the expression of personal opinions in civil society. The fact that it has become more difficult to discern inauthentic accounts, and therefore mass actions by a large number of fake accounts, is a trend that warrants further attention.
Introduction
During Taiwan’s 9-in-1 election in November 2022, so-called because voters cast ballots for up to nine different government posts, Doublethink Lab cooperated with domestic fact-checking organizations, scholars, and civil society groups to observe and monitor foreign influence operations targeting the election. Due to the large amount of manpower required, we also put 30 trainees through a four-day analyst training course in August. We then conducted daily observations on major social media platforms and other information environments in Taiwan for the following three months. In summary, we were looking for content that:
- Related to elections or current affairs in Taiwan and contained disinformation or misinformation;
- Fit common (previously observed) narratives of the PRC’s information warfare against Taiwan;
- Involved PRC-linked actors in its dissemination.
As of Nov. 25, 2022, we had recorded nearly 2,900 items of suspicious information. Based on this data, we derived various operating methods, roles, and narrative axes, which are discussed below:
In addition to logging suspicious information, we reviewed Weibo “hot searches” — trending hashtags and search terms on the PRC’s foremost microblog. Hot searches are an important PRC government tool for manipulating public opinion in the online environment. In short, relevant trending topics on Weibo can be said to map closely to the PRC government’s Taiwan influence strategy. As this election coincided with the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (the 20th National Congress), we also analyzed Taiwan issues on Weibo before and after this important political event. (Please see the appendix below for details).
Prior to the election, relevant Weibo hot searches mainly related to anti-Taiwan independence, (re)unification, Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, and other United Front Work Department (UFWD) mainstays. Key phrases included: #Unity is beneficial; Taiwan independence is a dead end#, #China lodges representations on behalf of a Taiwanese scientific research ship blocked by Japan# (where the PRC acted on behalf of Taiwan without jurisdiction), #Japan must not intervene on the Taiwan issue#, and so on, in keeping with consistent lines the PRC has taken towards Taiwan in the past.
Other items did not directly attack Taiwan, but set the tone for future Taiwan-facing information operations. For example, in early November, the topic #台灣教授呼籲台灣人要覺醒# (Taiwanese professor calls on Taiwanese to wake up), initiated by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CCCYL), reignited a familiar trope — that the US uses Taiwan as an anti-China “tool.” Subsequently, heated discussion about “TSMC being ‘hollowed out’ by the US” mapped a similar narrative, with the two combining to ignite heated debate about whether the US, and ruling DPP, can be trusted.
Responding to debate raised around the hot searches #台北故宮3件文物破損照曝光# (Photos of 3 damaged cultural relics in Taipei’s National Palace Museum exposed) and #台北故宮歷年共計359件陶瓷器傷損破裂# (Taipei’s National Palace Museum sends 359 ceramics for repair), Kuomintang (KMT) legislator Chen I-hsin questioned the reported destruction of cultural relics in the National Palace Museum. This topic showed how the PRC’s efforts to echo existing public debates in Taiwan can have a considerable impact.
I. CCP information operations during the 9 in 1 election
Having observed the extent and timing of PRC accounts or actors involved in disseminating suspicious information, as well as the degree of discussion of related issues in Taiwan, we can roughly divide the observed information operations into four types, namely:
- PRC actors create content and disseminate it in Taiwan’s public environment.
- PRC actors do not create content, but instead amplify existing conflicts within Taiwan.
- PRC actors produce Weibo-trending content, but fail to trigger widespread public discussion in Taiwan.
- PRC actors potentially miss opportunities to amplify issues and narratives within Taiwan.
We noticed that whether an issue makes a significant impact in Taiwanese society does not only depend on which actor introduces the topic or comments online, but also on whether it “resonates” with Taiwan’s traditional media. Media participation multiplies online impact, resulting in far more heated discussions. The following is a preliminary description of the cases we observed in the 2022 nine-in-one election.
A. PRC actors create and disseminate content in Taiwan’s public environment
On Aug. 2, Nancy Pelosi, who was at the time Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan for two days. Immediately after her departure, the CCP announced that it would hold military exercises in waters surrounding Taiwan from Aug. 4 to 7.
On Aug. 5, PRC state media Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily both released a series of pictures and texts suggesting that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were operating on Taiwan’s coastline. The next day, fan pages on Facebook such as Today’s Strait , Taiwanheadlines and Watch Taiwan Strait, and reposted People’s Daily pictures, claiming that the PLA had reached the Taiwan coast and were observing the old Taiwanese Navy frigate “Lanyang”.
These three fan pages all have managers in the PRC, and their posts were shared with Taiwan’s public communities via suspicious accounts. According to a report from the Taiwan FactCheck Center (TFC), the images in the post were artificially modified and processed. Moreover, the Ministry of National Defense clarified that no warships entered Taiwan’s territorial waters during the PLA exercise. This is an example of disinformation made in the PRC and introduced to Taiwan to influence public opinion.
B. PRC actors do not create content, but instead amplify existing conflicts within Taiwan
TSMC is ‘hollowed’ out by the US
As early as December 2021, a discussion around the idea that “the US would blow up TSMC” rather than let it fall into the PRC’s hands gathered momentum in Taiwan. Both Taiwanese and PRC actors participated as information widely circulated on platforms such as Facebook and Weibo. The theory ran that in the event of a PRC invasion, the US would blow up TSMC. Implicit in the theory is a familiar and pessimistic narrative in the PRC’s information operations, namely that “the US always prioritizes its own interests and has no intention of defending Taiwan.”
From April 2022 onwards, items carrying the “TSMC is being hollowed out by the US” narrative appeared sporadically, focusing on the idea that “when geopolitical risks in the Taiwan Strait rise, the US government will move TSMC to the US.” By October, this issue had become the primary information operations topic in the run-up to election day.
Former DPP legislator Julian Kuo and media veteran Hsieh Hanbing, amongst others, were the first to advance this point of view, but discussion heated up when actors in the PRC and Taiwan picked up and expanded a related Bloomberg commentary in October 2022. PRC state media (Huanqiu.com, Haixiadaobao, Guancha.com) participated, alongside Weibo Big V (very influential user) Wuxin Jianying, anonymous Facebook fan pages based overseas, and Taiwanese media (United Daily News, ETtoday, TVBS). KMT legislator Wen Yu-hsia also questioned the Minister of National Defense and the Director of National Security in the Legislative Yuan, asking whether the US has arrangements to evacuate and blow up TSMC. Analyzing the narrative tone of the “TSMC is being hollowed out by the US” discussion during this period offers interesting insights into PRC information operations tactics.
In November, two incidents catalyzed the discussion. On Nov. 1, the item “TSMC embarked on a chartered flight to the US” appeared, followed by “[TSMC Chairman] Morris Chang confirms that the (ultra-advanced) 3 nanometer (semiconductor chips) will be produced in the US” on Nov. 21. An intensive propaganda war began, with the push and pull centered on two primary narratives:
- The US only cares about its own interests and regards Taiwan as a tool. Its sole focus is on relocating Taiwan’s semiconductor talent and hollowing out TSMC. It has no intention of helping Taiwan in the event of war in the Taiwan Strait.
- The DPP is well aware that TSMC’s relocation to the US will cause a crisis, but still caters to the US and is selling off the world’s foremost chipmaker to satisfy its own interests.
Multiple PRC central and local state media, Weibo Big V influencers, and anonymous overseas fan pages on Facebook were the first to widely disseminate these narratives. Actors in Taiwan, including politicians, political commentators, and political fan pages, then responded, producing commentaries that were later leveraged in congressional questioning and election campaigning.
TSMC’s charter flight to the US came to prominence on Nov. 1, and was first forwarded by Weibo Big V Taiwan’s Foolish Things. Nov. 1 to 3 saw the successive release of China News videos curated by the UFWD and the CCCYL, which framed the “US only uses Taiwan as a tool” narrative, based on content extracted from a speech by Taiwanese professor Chang Lin-chen at a seminar entitled “How to Avoid War: A Crisis Moment in US-China-Taiwan Relations.” The videos also mentioned the key phrase “#Taiwanese professor calls for Taiwanese to wake up#,” which became a trending topic on Weibo.
China Media Group’s Watch Taiwan Strait WeChat account, CCTV’s website, and (local state media) Shanghai Media Group’s Kankan News, all inflamed “the US will move TSMC” narrative, implying that Chang’s chartering of a flight to the US “confirmed speculation that the US intends to ‘hollow out’ TSMC.” While TSMC has committed to building a 3nm chip fabrication plant in Arizona, its founder Morris Chang has previously urged Taiwan to hold on to its leadership position in the crucial semiconductor chip industry.
After Nov. 3, TSMC narratives were amplified by multiple actors, including Weibo Big Vs and PRC state media such as Shenzhen Xiaotian, Sina Military, Charge Bugle, Junwu Ji, , Wanwanshashi [Taiwan’s Foolish Things], Xiaofan Haoshe, Taiwan.cn (under the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council), CCTV.com, fjsen.com and Southeast Media (local state media in Fujian), Fujian Media Group’s Straits TV, as well as Straitplus. And also Hong Kong-based Facebook account Red Gene and Facebook anonymous foreign fan pages networks like Netizen Tea Room, Eight Fighters and Five Cars (Badou Wuche), as well as other actors on Weibo and Facebook.
One week before the election, on Nov. 21, when the news that “TSMC founder Morris Chang confirms that 3nm chips will be produced in the US” appeared, Weibo Big Vs Wanwanshashi (Taiwan’s Foolish Things), Wuxin Jianying, Diba Official Weibo, Shenmashi, Shenzhen Xiaotian) PRC state media (CCTV News, Taiwan.cn, Taihainet, Global Times, Haixiadaobao, Straitsplus, Shenzhen Satellite TV, Kankan News, etc.) and foreign fan pages (Taiwan’s most beautiful scenery is people, miserable green boy 2.0) all followed up with commentary. The content aimed to “reconfirm” that TSMC will be “hollowed out” and moved to the US, with the DPP complicit in the transfer.
Some influencers in Taiwan accepted these narratives, or were at least willing to share them on. Public discussions ensued, including among legislators Wen Yu-hsia and Alex Tsai, media personality Joyce Huang, as well as via Facebook networks such as Kaohsiung Miss Lin, engineer looks at politics, and The Reacher. Legislator Cheng Li-wen also leveraged TSMC-related disinformation during an election speech in Kaohsiung, claiming that the US and the DPP should not be trusted.
However, these individuals and page managers are not necessarily pro-PRC. They are picking up on specific issues — acting as “resonators” through their sharing activities rather than “operators” incentivized by China. It is also worth noting that the high-profile impact of the TSMC tropes garnered a response: several Taiwan scholars jointly issued a statement calling on voters to condemn malicious information operations, and Business Today published an article reminding investors to be wary of disinformation and misinformation.
Data from (messaging app) LINE collected by MyGoPen, a service that helps people clarify the veracity of online rumors, shows changes in the volume of TSMC-related discussions over time. Based on the keyword “TSMC,” content in September concentrated almost exclusively on “TSMC donating vaccines.” October content focused on the reappearance of old news, such as “TSMC goes to Nanjing to set up a factory” from 2019, and “TSMC provided confidential information to the US” in 2021. About the same time, the first signs of the “TSMC is being relocated by the US” narrative began to emerge.
Data from November show a spike in TSMC narratives, revolving around the “TSMC is being hollowed out by the US,” and “the DPP is selling TSMC to the US” themes, showing the impact of the PRC’s information operations in this area:
National Palace Museum breaks Ming & Qing porcelain
On Oct. 28, KMT legislator Chen I-hsin said he had received a report that the National Palace Museum in Taipei had broken Ming and Qing porcelain, and that the management was trying to cover it up. The incident immediately sparked heated discussions among Taiwanese media and the public, and there were many claims on (bulletin board) PTT that “cultural relics have been sold abroad.” At much the same time, Weibo Big Vs stoked the flames, citing screenshots and news from Taiwanese media reports. Related discussion topics included “[Taiwan] is being hollowed out by the US and Japan” and “smuggling [artefacts] out of the country”. The next day, the topic #台北故宮3件文物破損照曝光# (photos of 3 damaged cultural relics in Taipei’s National Palace Museum exposed) topped the Weibo hot search ranking.
The narrative builds on a previous conspiracy theory — “90,000 cultural relics were sent to the US and Japan” — which emerged when the Legislative Yuan discussed the “National Palace Museum Cultural Relics Wartime Evacuation Plan” in August 2022. The theory runs that the DPP gave away cultural relics in exchange for money or political benefits.
On Oct. 30, another related message that has since been proven by TFC to be false, spread widely on Facebook, suggesting that porcelain broken in the Palace Museum was fake. Several suspicious fan pages, which use identical, inauthentic profile photos of young women, posted the content within a very short timeframe. Weibo Big Vs. immediately popularized these posts, with Taiwan’s Foolish Things and Diba Weibo forwarding screenshots carrying the message that “Taiwanese themselves think that the Palace Museum broke fakes.” We suspect this operation to be an instance of coordinated inauthentic behavior.
On Nov. 3, influential Weibo accounts such as Guancha.com and the CCCYL again posted on #台北故宮歷年共計359間陶瓷器傷損破裂# (A total of 359 ceramics in the National Palace Museum were damaged and cracked over the years), propelling the topic up the Weibo hot search ranking.
Hokkien and Hakka name rectification and the return of elementary school textbooks for re-edits
On Nov. 10, Taiwanese media reported on two issues: “Hokkien and Hakka may be renamed Taiwanese and Taiwan Hakka” and “Elementary school textbooks are submitted for review and re-editing in suspected case of de-Sinicization.” Global Times, local PRC state media Southeast Media, and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council quoted the reports, saying that “the two sides of the Strait have the same root and their origin cannot be separated.” Other angles included that the education “syllabus was withdrawn because it did not conform to Taiwan independence” and “Taiwan independence tentacles extend to elementary school classrooms.”
The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China issued a major response on Nov. 16, stating that the DPP is deliberately promoting “de-Sinicization,” but cannot alter Chinese cultural identity and Chinese national identity, which are deeply rooted in Taiwanese society. At the same time, the CCYL systematically released a large number of videos on Weibo, along with statements such as “Even Taiwanese do not agree with Taiwan’s de-Sinicization stance.”
National Day firework drones made in the PRC
On Nov. 8, KMT legislator Lu Ming-che raised a parliamentary question suggesting that the use of PRC-made drones in the National Day fireworks display had compromised Taiwan’s national dignity. On Nov. 9, Weibo accounts such as Shenzhen Xiaotian and Sina Military successively published articles titled “Mainland-made drones performed in Taiwan, angering the Green (DPP/independence) camp.” The next day, the Communist Youth League Central Weibo account quoted articles and videos from the Global Times, launching the meme #台灣之光只有電池裡的電視台灣製造的# (Only the electricity in the battery is Made in Taiwan), which made it onto the Weibo hot search list. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council also condemned the DPP on Nov. 16, saying that measures to ban PRC drones “harbor ulterior motives and are not right in the head.”
Related discussions continued to question the Taiwan government’s “de-Sinicization” policy, and ridiculed the DPP government’s hypocrisy and double standards around its “anti-China, protection of Taiwan” values stance.
Kaohsiung floating corpses and Tsai Ing-wen fails to mention the Taoyuan kidnapping case
This year’s 9-in-1 election also encompassed Taiwanese public security issues, as foreign actors followed up on reports by Taiwanese media. For example, from Sept. 16 onwards, various accounts jumped on the issue of corpses found floating in Kaohsiung’s waterways. Three Facebook fan pages primarily administered in Macau (InitialDPP Hairpin Turn Event Book, DPP is cheating, and weloveKSLin) made or shared “City of Floating Corpses” pictures or memes to mock Taiwan’s public security. Taiwanheadlines, a fan page with managers in the PRC and Hong Kong, also released a timeline (the green form in the images below) entitled “Kaohsiung Floating Corpse Record,” detailing several corpses found from Sept. 16 onwards. The timeline and ironic phrases such as “Happy Floating City,” emphasizing poor law and order in counties and cities governed by the DPP, also appeared on the page of Weibo Big V Wuxin Jianying on the same day.
Moreover, we observed that the Global Times and similarly high-level state-run media quoted Taiwanese politicians or media to produce sensational headlines relating to domestic fraud and kidnapping news. From Nov. 7, several politicians and media in Taiwan published content around the idea that “Tsai Ing-wen’s Facebook shows she only cares about elections and not law and order.” For example, on Nov. 10, the Global Times reported on “A bloody kidnapping that shocked Taiwan,” criticizing Tsai for ‘ignoring’ a major violent crime case in Taoyuan. Articles with the same title were also published elsewhere and forwarded to major content farms and news websites in China.
C. PRC actors produce Weibo-trending content, but fail to trigger widespread public discussion in Taiwan
In this case, although disinformation topics trend on Weibo and PRC officials held related press conferences, they did not provoke discussion on Taiwanese social media or in the wider information environment in Taiwan. One example is the topic #A united Taiwan can implement a social system different from that of the mainland# and other information related to cross-Strait unification. Meanwhile, #中方就台大科考船遭日方干擾提出交涉# (China lodges a protest against Japan’s interference in Taiwan’s scientific research vessel) and #寧波漁船救起48名台灣漁船船員# (Ningbo fishing boat rescues 48 Taiwanese fishermen) emphasized the PRC’s maritime assistance to Taiwan. These Weibo topics were shared by fan pages such as Straitplus, Taiwan.cn, Huaxiajingwei, Taiwanheadlines, and Chinavtv, etc., but did not gain traction in Taiwan. These fan pages all have administrators who are geographically located in the PRC, and published articles with the same title, indicating a collaborative operation.
It is worth noting that on Nov. 18, the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice prosecuted two Taiwan-based Facebook fan pages: “Chinavtv” and “Taiwanheadlines.” The bureau alleged that the pages disseminated false information, and that the person in charge of managing the Taiwan operation violated various regulations governing Taiwan-mainland relationships, including accepting payments from the PRC without permission from investment review authorities.
The takeaway is that though the PRC government took the initiative to stir up debate around “cross-Strait (re)unification” and “Taiwan’s diplomatic relations,” their efforts failed to impact public discussion in Taiwan. It may be that this was never the intention, and that the content served to boost the CCP’s internal propaganda, or it could speak to a failure to coordinate adequate follow up from traditional Taiwanese media.
D. PRC actors potentially miss opportunities to amplify issues and narratives within Taiwan
We also collected suspicious information related to the credibility of the election, such as allegations that the Central Election Committee rigged the voting, refused to accept the result of a referendum, and would not reinstate video monitoring of polling booths (when this has never in fact been in place). These topics have continued to resonate post-election. However, despite the allegations stemming from a pro-PRC Facebook group (全民監票行動聯盟, which has since been taken down), PRC actors, accounts, and suspicious fan pages we observed did not carry out related large-scale information operations. This potentially suggests the CCP missed an opportunity or that our observations missed related activities.
On Oct. 14, multiple Taiwan-based Facebook personal accounts intensively shared a report insinuating that Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s son being confirmed as a deputy director of the DPP office in the US was a case of nepotism. The same topic was previously shared on March 7, but we did not observe PRC actors manipulating this topic during the election period.
II. Classification of actors’ roles
Based on the above cases, we can divide disinformation and election interference actors into three categories: Attacker, Operator, and Resonator. Attackers deepen confrontations among the Taiwanese people by creating or amplifying controversial messages to the PRC’s benefit. Operators manipulate the information and receive instructions from the PRC directly or indirectly, via bodies including:
- The PRC’s central state media: Xinhua News Agency, China News Service, CCTV, People’s Daily, and Global Times, etc., and fan pages created for Taiwan issues, such as Watch Taiwan Strait under the Central Guangdian Headquarters, and Taiwan Net of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.
- PRC local state media: Kankan News (Shanghai Media Group), Straitsplus, Strait Herald Press and Southeast Media, and Hong Kong state media such as Hong Kong China News Agency, and its fan page Tongshuo 2.0.
- Accounts of official organizations directly under the command of the Chinese Communist Party, such as the Communist Youth League.
- PRC commercial media: Guancha.com, Sina Military, Huaxiajingwei, Taiwanheadlines, Chinavtv.
- Weibo Big Vs: Wanwanshashi (Taiwan’s Foolish Things), Shenzhen Xiaotian, Wuxin Jianying, Unification of Forces, Charge Bugle, Junwu Ji, Guyan Muchan, Xiao Fan Hao She, Diba Official Weibo.
- Overseas anonymous fan pages: Attack on Pink Pineapple, The most beautiful scenery in Taiwan is people, Red Gene, InitialDPP hairpin bend event book, DPP is cheating, and weloveKSLin.
Finally, while Resonators do not participate directly in promulgating information operations in the same way as Operators, they spread related narratives because they hold similar values — their actions and operations are synchronic. Our research shows that the creation and expansion of topics and arguments within Taiwan’s public debate still relies on Taiwan’s traditional media. Taiwan’s media will naturally amplify the PRC’s information manipulation narratives if they match their values. Resonators include:
- Traditional media, such as: United Daily News, China Times, ETtoday, TVBS, CTITV.
- Anonymous fan pages/accounts, such as: Kaohsiung.NewTide, The Reacher, and fake accounts regularly sharing content in LINE groups.
- Online opinion leaders, such as: Lucifer Chu, Julian Kuo, Joyce Huang.
- Taiwanese politicians, such as: Wen Yu-hsia, Alex Tsai, Cheng Li-wun.
III. Analysis of the nature and importance of the PRC’s Primary Taiwan-facing Narratives
The suspicious information we recorded and the key issues analyzed here allow us to summarize five themes that the PRC tends to act on and amplify, namely: diplomatic declarations, issues of unification and independence, culture and cross-Strait ties, anti-US sentiment, and Taiwan local public security and epidemic issues. We now evaluate each of these in terms of their importance, with three points being the highest score and one point being the lowest.
Diplomatic declarations (Importance: 2)
These comprise efforts by the PRC government to divide Taiwanese public opinion and stoke anti-US and anti-Japanese sentiment. Examples include publicizing the military exercise after Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the fake pictures of “the PLA reaching Taiwan’s coastline” created by PRC state media, and the Weibo topic “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) strongly retaliated against Pelosi’s treachery in Taiwan and other perverse action.” China MOFA’s decision to hold a press conference protesting against Japan’s interference with a National Taiwan University scientific research ship is another example. We note that these issues arose after Pelosi’s visit and were part of a rapidly executed emergency response.
Unification and independence issues (Importance: 1)
We observed multiple hot topics on Weibo on this theme, such as “A unified Taiwan can implement a social system different from that of the mainland,” “Unification is beneficial and Taiwan independence is a dead end,” “Resolving the Taiwan issue is China’s own business,” “Ministry of Defense says Taiwan independence is a dead end, and “Reunification is the right way.”. Discussion of “one China” and “anti-Taiwan independence” have greater significance for internal propaganda in the PRC — Taiwan’s local elections are more focused on economic unification rather than political unification; voters are more concerned about people’s livelihoods and municipal issues, so these topics struggled to gain traction.
Culture and cross-Strait connections (Importance: 1)
When de-Sinicization issues arise in Taiwan, PRC state media quote Taiwanese media to bring home the idea that even Taiwanese people do not agree with the government’s de-Sinicization policies. Examples include: “The National Palace Museum breaks Ming and Qing porcelain,” “Hokkien and Hakka name rectification,” and “Returning primary school textbooks for re-editing.” These articles were accompanied by condemnations from PRC central government units like the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. The above three incidents were leveraged to push a narrative that the DPP is implementing a policy of de-Sinicization. Moreover, Taiwan’s ban on PRC-made drones was also amplified: the use of PRC-made drones in performances was used to highlight hypocrisy in the DPP’s core value of “resisting China and protecting Taiwan.”
Anti-Americanism (Importance: 3)
The “TSMC was ‘hollowed out’ by the US” theory, based on the “Americans use Taiwan as a tool” narrative, and the related topic “Taiwanese professor calls on Taiwanese to wake up,” all trended on Weibo hot search. The “Taiwan is a US tool” narrative is often deployed in opposition to Taipei improving bilateral relations with Washington DC or amidst US arms sales to Taiwan, or to suggest that US politicians visiting Taiwan is a waste of government funds. The PRC has proved effective at leveraging such issues, and the election period was no exception.
Public security in Taiwan (Importance: 3)
PRC accounts amplified narratives involving local public security issues, weaponizing them as a means of attacking DPP-ruled counties and cities. The discovery of floating corpses in Kaohsiung, and describing the kidnapping case in Taoyuan as a Taiwanese version of a famous Cambodian trafficking case, are key examples. When the target of the attack is the head of the county and city, such as in the “Kaohsiung Floating Corpse Case,” a Weibo Big V or an anonymous foreign fan page ridicules Kaohsiung’s poor security. When the target of the attack is the DPP Central Committee, such as Tsai Ing-wen avoiding mention of the kidnapping case, a different pattern emerged: the Global Times, a PRC state-run media outlet, extracted content from Taiwanese media, disseminated it to major platforms, and finally instigated rumors on Taiwan’s LINE social messaging ecosystem. How the work is divided up differently among Operators in each case is a topic for further observation and study.
Epidemic issues (Importance: 2.5)
From May 2021 onwards, the PRC launched coordinated high-level attacks across a large number of fake accounts on former DPP Health Minister Chen Shih-chung, creating a wide range of conspiracy theories relating to Covid-19. However, this wave came to an abrupt end in mid-2022. From September onwards, the same accounts focused on a fight between Tsai Ing-wen and (Vice-President) Lai Ching-te, discrediting Chen Shih-chung, and undermining trust in the National Security Bureau (NSB), Taiwan’s national intelligence agency. Importantly, having initiated various Covid-19 conspiracy theories, PRC actors stepped back from taking an active role in pushing them as the election approached in September, leaving Taiwan’s domestic political parties to take up epidemic-related criticisms of the ruling DPP. As we have seen, the CCP has had some success allowing Resonators to amplify conspiracy theories and disinformation that aligns with their values or domestic objectives, and such methods may play a more important role in the future.
IV. Example events illustrating impacts on Taiwanese society
If we solely study cases where the PRC was the Attacker and Operator during the election, it may appear that the impact of its disinformation efforts is waning. However, we contend that the critical period for information operations was beforehand, in the non-election period. In other words, when the PRC plants the seed of a considerable number of conspiracy theories in the pre-election period, their impact can be maximized during the election without the need for a secondary attack (i.e. the creation of new content). On the contrary, if no preparatory work is done, even timely and relevant information operations may have limited negative impact on Taiwanese society during the election itself.
Using the three examples below, we conducted a preliminary assessment of possible impacts on Taiwanese society were this theoretical assumption to be true. Further analysis and discussion will be conducted after the completion of other research, such as exit polls and follow-up interviews.
1. TSMC is ‘hollowed out’ by the US
After the news of TSMC’s charter flight to the US broke, although it did not initially receive widespread public attention, PRC state media and Facebook anonymous foreign fan pages were able to energize the pre-existing “TSMC is being hollowed out by the US” narrative among Taiwan’s public. Resonators such as traditional Taiwanese media, political figures, and online opinion leaders then gave the narrative further impetus. When Chang confirmed that the 3 nm process will be produced in the US, the existing conspiracy theory was given an additional boost, and the narrative that the DPP betrayed TSMC to the US was fully fleshed out. This particular line of attack echoes two consistent themes in the PRC’s information operations targeting Taiwan: undermining the reliability of the DPP as protectors of Taiwan, and undermining confidence in the U.S. as an ally in the defense of Taiwan.
2. Kaohsiung floating corpses and Tsai Ing-wen failed to mention the Taoyuan kidnapping case
The Kaohsiung floating corpse cases of suicides and unexplained drownings were linked to poor DPP governance, instilling an impression among the public that Kaohsiung is corrupt. Likewise, the kidnapping case in Zhongli, Taoyuan was directly linked with President Tsai Ing-wen so as to reduce the public’s trust in the ruling party and the counties and cities they govern. This may constitute a shift in focus worthy of observation in the year ahead, as security-related disinformation and issues are leveraged to directly impact local election outcomes. In the past, public security issues were not a major focus of PRC information operations, and those that existed primarily linked underworld activity and the DPP, with limited impacts. Post-election, underworld discussions seem to be slowly returning to prominence as the primary security theme.
3. Broken Ming and Qing porcelain in the National Palace Museum
Taiwan’s media and politicians are still arguing about smashed porcelain in the National Palace Museum in early 2023, indicating that “the genuine artefacts were sold to the US and Japan, and the broken ones are fakes” narrative has taken root. Having initially been discussed on Weibo and Facebook, the issue gradually spiralled to become a political tug of war around the idea that “the KMT has never destroyed cultural relics, but the DPP can destroy three in a short time.” Symbolically, the National Palace Museum links Chinese culture on both sides of the Strait, and PRC state media and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council leveraged the incident to strengthen notions of cultural commonality. The CCP has long promoted cultural unity, and this instance did not move the needle on engagement on the issue. Moreover, the impact was less prominent than in the previous two items.
V. Changes in modes and techniques
A paradigm shift has occurred since we published our Deafening Whispers report on information operations launched during the 2020 presidential election. The PRC’s attack mode this year is mainly based on two of the four modes proposed in the past, namely the “pink mode” and the “collaboration mode.” Below we list three key research takeaways on how the PRC disinformation methods have evolved.
The content farm mode is in decline
Content farms, one of four modes of disinformation distribution Doublethink Lab identified in 2020, used to be a mainstay of the PRC’s information operations agenda, but that has now changed. Search engines, social platforms and websites that helped promote content farms have taken measures to prohibit sharing or reduce the reach of such content. This has had a huge impact on the PRC’s Taiwan-facing information operations. In today’s information environment, disinformation content sources are more decentralized. Currently, suspicious information is often released collaboratively across different fan pages and personal accounts, before other accounts amplify the content, expanding its reach and scale.
Efforts to amplify existing social conflicts are on the rise
Our observations indicate that the PRC’s information manipulation methods are evolving. Tactics no longer revolve around a single creator-sharer approach to information production and dissemination. Instead, greater attention appears to be paid to identifying divisive issues already current in Taiwanese public discussions, and/or citing reliable sources (such as Bloomberg or the Wall Street Journal), to invigorate existing controversial issues, and heighten their impacts on Taiwanese society.
Resonators are playing a more prominent role
Resonators, which do not require CCP instructions or funding to achieve results, are filling the void left by the decline of the content farm mode, and have become more prominent in light of the adjustment in strategy to amplify existing social conflicts. Our previous research, “Taiwan Facing the COVID-19 Epidemic: New Variations of Disinformation,” illustrated how the PRC’s information operations are precisely timed. This year, for example, epidemic-related disinformation disappeared in the last few months of 2022. As we have suggested, the PRC invested resources in seeding conspiracy theories across various social media platforms via fan pages. While initial impacts were limited, these efforts ensured conspiracy theory frameworks were familiar to the target audience, and Resonators then picked up on issues aligned with their values to promote them further.
It must be emphasized that Resonators’ comments can be considered legitimate within the scope of freedom of speech. People will naturally join in promoting issues with which they sympathize. In response, we can only advocate for greater efforts to foster a sound media environment, improve media literacy, and strengthen democratic literacy.
VII. Appendix
As Taiwan’s 2022 election coincided with the 20th National Congress, we used Weibo hot search rankings to observe how the nature and scope of public opinions regarding Taiwan changed over time. We screened hot searches for the word “Tai,” and excluded Chinese characters that could be confused with Taiwan, using the dates of the 20th National Congress (Oct. 16 to 22) as a boundary to observe the situation in the two weeks before and after.
Before the 20th National Congress, we primarily observed entertainment-related topics, with only “#馬斯克涉台言論#” (a Global Times-hosted speech by Elon Musk that referenced Taiwan) making much of an impression. As the 20th National Congress approached, at 6:00 pm on Oct. 15, the topic #統一有好處台獨是絕路# (Unification has benefits and Taiwan independence is a dead end) appeared, primarily hosted by state media CCTV News.
During the 20th National Congress, in addition to continuing to threaten Taiwan independence, observed topics also emphasized that Taiwan is China’s internal affair, and foreign forces are not allowed to interfere, such as #解決台灣問題是中國人自己的事 (Solving the Taiwan issue is China’s own business) and #外交部有力回擊裴洛西竄台等倒行逆施# (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) responds strongly to Pelosi’s treachery and other perverse actions). On Oct. 20, towards the end of the 20th National Congress, the People’s Daily hosted the topic #連續拿下台灣當局9個所謂的邦交國# (PRC MOFA won over 9 so-called diplomatic allies from Taiwan). From 2 pm on Oct. 20, this topic ranked among the top three most searched terms, and did not drop out of the top 40 until after 8 am the next day.
After the 20th National Congress, hot searches about Taiwan proliferated. In addition to continuing to target Taiwan independence, and emphasizing that Taiwan is an internal affair, such as #國防部稱台獨是絕路統一是正途# (The Ministry of National Defense said Taiwan independence is a dead end and unification is the right path), #解決台灣問題是中國人自己的事# (Solving the Taiwan issue is China’s own business), attacks were also launched relating to Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, such as #中方就台大科考船遭日方干擾提出交涉#, #日方不得插手台灣問題# (both about Japanese interference in Taiwan), and so on. In terms of culture, the (now familiar) topics “#台北故宮3件文物破損照曝光#”(Photos of 3 damaged cultural relics in Taipei’s National Palace Museum exposed) and “#台北故宮歷年共計359件陶瓷器傷損破裂#”(Taipei’s National Palace Museum sends 359 ceramics for repair) also surfaced at this time.
Besides hard-line topics such as the PRC’s declaration of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the aforementioned softer, cultural themes, many topics referenced TSMC. Some referred to an adjustment of supply due to lower demand, for example, #TSMC issued an internal letter encouraging employees to take a vacation (due to supply shortages)#, while another hosted by Guancha flagged potential supply issues #台積電被曝大砍供應鏈訂單# (TSMC exposed for cutting supply chain orders). Furthermore, an edited video hosted by the CCCYL, #台灣教授呼籲台灣人要覺醒# (Taiwanese professor calls for Taiwanese to wake up), emphasized that Taiwanese are being suppressed by the US.
Please see our past investigations, and analysis of the “Nazification” of Ukraine by the Chinese information environment, for information on the prominent role played by Guancha and the CCCYL in the PRC’s previous information operations.
