A Complex Impact: A Qualitative Dive into Its Effects and Local Context on Attitudes toward Pro-CCP Propaganda in New Zealand and Malaysia

Ai-Men Lau, Social Engagement Team Lead, Doublethink Lab
Eric Hsu, Researcher, Doublethink Lab

Introduction

Researchers have examined the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to co-opt and influence overseas Chinese communities through United Front Work Department policies. These efforts include the exposure and dissemination of pro-CCP propaganda targeting overseas Chinese communities. However, there is a lack of research on the effectiveness of these efforts on overseas Chinese communities and/or what factors may impact susceptibility to or agreement with pro-CCP propaganda.

In the report Unpacking the Power of Propaganda, Doublethink Lab conducted a quantitative survey to capture identifiable patterns within overseas Chinese communities that may lead to agreement with pro-CCP propaganda. Based on that report’s findings, we conducted qualitative interviews to further explore and understand the patterns identified in the research.

Methodology

Security

Each interviewee was given a unique randomly-generated code during the research to ensure the privacy and security of each participant and for labeling purposes. Furthermore, throughout this report, we remove any potentially identifying information in the transcripts of the interviews. Doublethink Lab does not retain any document that can directly identify the participants.

Recruitment

Recruitment used purposive sampling which offered the benefit of identifying and selecting participants most appropriate to the objectives of the study. As well, given the nature of our study, we first reached out to individuals within our trusted networks for interviews and requested recommendations for individuals who may be best suited for the project to ensure security. Furthermore, throughout the interview process, we asked our participants if they had any recommendations for individuals to interview, which led to further recruitment to this project.

Participants

In total, fourteen participants were recruited for this project with six participants residing in New Zealand and eight participants residing in Malaysia. All fourteen participants are part of their respective local Chinese communities and hail from different professional and personal backgrounds.

Interviews

Interview Structure

A nine-question interview guide was drafted prior to the interviews to ensure standardization of questions asked in each interview. The interview guide is attached below in the appendix for reference. A semi-structured interview format was utilized as it allowed for rapport building, greater flexibility in the coverage of issues, and thought-provoking comments to be further explored. Questions were occasionally combined or reordered depending on the flow of information and concepts introduced by the participants[1]. The average length of the interviews was thirty-five minutes. Each interview was conducted on an encrypted online video platform and audio recorded for transcription with prior consent given by the participant. Interviews were conducted both in Mandarin and English. All research-relevant data were saved in Doublethink Lab’s own private and encrypted server, and the audio records will be deleted at the end of this project.

Data Analysis

Processes of data analysis included: (1) line-by-line coding, (2), the categorization of codes within and across transcripts, and (3) amalgamation and interpretation of codes into themes[2]. This allowed for the qualitative data to be analyzed across all interviews. Themes represent recurring ideas, thoughts, or concerns gathered from the participants. Data gathered for this project showed significant repetition and reflected the same themes and ideas across all interviews.

Data collected from participants in the interviews are based on the participants’ knowledge and include participants’ opinions, personal anecdotes of the overseas Chinese community in their country of residence, and their lived experiences.

Limitations

A primary limitation of qualitative research is the potential for subjectivity and bias. Qualitative data collection methods, such as interviews and observations, involve human interpretation, which can introduce researcher bias. Researchers may inadvertently shape data through their own perspectives, leading to results that reflect their viewpoints rather than objective reality. To mitigate this limitation, researchers must maintain reflexivity, transparency, and rigor in their data collection and analysis, making their own biases explicit and considering alternative interpretations.

Another limitation of qualitative research is the relatively small sample sizes typically used. Qualitative studies often involve in-depth exploration of a few cases or participants, making it challenging to generalize findings to larger populations. While this focused approach is well-suited for understanding specific contexts and phenomena, it may limit the external validity of the research. Researchers must acknowledge the boundaries of their findings and recognize that qualitative research is context-specific, emphasizing rich descriptions and in-depth insights over generalizability.

Furthermore, qualitative research can be time-consuming and resource-intensive. Collecting and analyzing qualitative data often involves transcribing interviews, coding data, and identifying emerging themes. Additionally, qualitative research may require specialized training and skills to ensure the quality of the research process. These practical constraints can limit the scope and scale of qualitative studies, making it important for researchers to carefully consider the trade-offs between depth and breadth when designing their research projects.

Important Considerations

As tensions continue to rise between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the West, it is important to consider how a new era of geopolitical relations comes with increasing racial tensions. The following research aims to examine the impact of influence operations undertaken by the CCP on overseas Chinese communities and what factors might make local Chinese communities among different regions more likely to agree with pro-CCP propaganda.

However, it is important to emphasize that the local Chinese communities in different regions are not a monolith and should not be treated as such. Those who identify as ethnic Chinese should not be presumed to support or be loyal to the CCP regime; such a claim is reductive and harmful. These misconceptions pose a real threat to public safety and could exacerbate xenophobia and anti-Asian sentiments.

Results

Our quantitative survey found that identity, specifically the Chinese identity, appeared to show a more significant correlation with higher levels of agreement with pro-CCP propaganda in New Zealand. Thus, in our qualitative interviews, we delved further into the Chinese identity and how it may impact one’s view of the PRC. Our qualitative findings on identity illustrated a more complex picture whereas the Chinese identity plays an influential role in both agreement and disagreement with pro-CCP propaganda.

Many participants, in both New Zealand and Malaysia, noted anxieties in preserving the Chinese identity in their respective countries. However, how that anxiety manifests is significantly different in each country largely shaped by domestic history and tensions. Participants noted that the way they conceptualize the Chinese identity in their country is largely shaped by local contexts rather than foreign influences or efforts. The theme of the Chinese identity can be broken down into further subcategories which will be further explored below: diaspora dynamics in New Zealand and ethnic tensions in Malaysia.

Overall, participants identified a strong sense of belonging to their country of residence, stating that they viewed themselves as a New Zealander or a Malaysian as a core tenet of their Chinese identity.

“I feel strongly about being a Malaysian citizen. I’m not sure how….how should I respond to that question being Malaysian. I was born here, raised…grew up here, raised here, studied in the schools here, and of course I identify with Malaysian.”

“I’m second-generation New Zealand Chinese….if you want to look at age, I’m in my late forties. And I’m pretty much part of New Zealand. Part of New Zealand society.”

When asked how they felt about their sense of identification back to China and their Chinese identity, participants had a diverse range of answers and spoke of varying degrees of connection back to China.

“You know, I’m a third-generation Chinese New Zealander. So…you know, termed a ‘banana’. Yellow on the outside, white on the inside. But very strongly…I suppose, connected to my ethnic background, my Chinese background. As a Chinese person. And my identity as a Chinese person.”

“My attachment and identification with Malaysia as a nation and a homeland are quite strong. Regarding the notion of a Chinese identity, whether it’s tied to China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, I don’t feel a particularly strong connection to any of them.”

“It’s a deep emotional connection. I’ve spent time in China. I feel like growing [up?] as a Mandarin speaker, more than a diaspora. I always…felt a bit removed from the very Cantonese body of the diaspora here in New Zealand. So, when I went to reconnect with my culture, I felt like I went to China to do that. I went like two, three, four times to spend time in China. Traveling and studying. And yeah, you know, I wasn’t under illusions of like, ‘oh, I’m going to feel at home here,’ but it was something that was really meaningful to me.”

Notably, one participant expressed that if they had a desire to work in China, it would be driven by professional opportunities and financial incentives rather than ethnic identity or a sense of belonging.

“However, if there were a scenario where I decided to work in China, it wouldn’t be driven by any sense of ethnic or cultural identity. If I were to consider such a move, factors like the remuneration offered to foreign university lecturers in China, which tends to be significantly higher than in Malaysia, might be the primary consideration. My decision would be pragmatic rather than influenced by ethnic identity.”

One participant noted their hesitancy and discomfort to be identified as being part of the Chinese diaspora or overseas Chinese communities as it denotes citizenship to China.

“I’m the fourth generation of Chinese immigrant…in Malaysia. However, I don’t think I am Chinese citizen. I don’t have this kind of so-called diaspora. I don’t think I am part of China, right….I’m quite reluctant, and quite hesitant to say I’m a Chinese immigrant because it’s sort of like you are still connected back to your so-called, China.”

Diaspora Dynamics: New Zealand and China

A significant finding linked to identity was that participants in New Zealand spoke of the dynamics within the local Chinese community. Participants pointed to the wave of migrations and most notably, the most recent migration wave from the PRC. New Zealand has a well-established Chinese community with a long history. The community has a strong Cantonese demographic as many of the first migrants hailed from Guangdong; the first wave of Chinese migration to New Zealand in the late 1800s was made up of Cantonese gold miners seeking better economic prospects [3]. Since then, the Chinese community has grown in size and diversity. The reasons for immigration ranged from economic opportunities to political reasons as illustrated below:

“You know, we’re very diverse here in New Zealand, in our Chinese community. We have the original migrants, who are sort of…my group, or my community that I belong to that came out from the 1860s, gold-mining, through to market gardeners in the early nineteen-hundreds. Then sort of 1949, post-China Civil War, and then you’ve got the Malaysian Chinese, the Hong Kong Chinese that came around ’79 to escape…takeover from China. And then recently, basically from late 90s or early 2000s you had all the new migrant Chinese from mainland China. Who basically outnumber everyone in terms of population.”

These dynamics have contributed to growing anxiety about preserving the Chinese identity in New Zealand. New Zealand’s Chinese communities have had a long history within New Zealand which has given rise to a unique identity — the New Zealand-Chinese identity. Many participants noted that the New Zealand-Chinese identity is one that has been fostered by the more established Chinese communities and shaped by various factors such as culture, history, racism and marginalization. However, the recent wave of ethnic Chinese migrants are largely from the PRC and participants noted a growing anxiety within more established Chinese communities about the potential erasure of their unique identity, heritage and various Sinitic languages, especially Cantonese. This has given rise to a tense dynamic between newer PRC migrants and longer established Chinese communities. As one participant states:

“What’s happened in the last few years, I’d say the last ten years, is that mainland Chinese people [PRC migrants] have gone from a slight minority to a slight majority of the Chinese population. And the…non-mainland Chinese born population [established New Zealand-Chinese communities],… there’s rivalries, and there’s distrust, and there’s increasingly reasons to revisit the dominance of the mainland Chinese community as a community, but as connected to the government, the Chinese government’s influence over that community.”

Some participants in New Zealand highlighted that due to the most recent wave of migrants from the PRC, newer and more recently established communities are naturally more likely to agree with pro-CCP propaganda compared to the long-time Chinese community in New Zealand.

“To put it very simply, there’s an older Chinese [community?], established, who are probably more Cantonese speaking, or who have been here for a longer time. And…are probably more understanding of New Zealand’s outlook and values. And there are more sort of recent migrants, some of them may have been here twenty or thirty years, they’re loyal and leaning more towards the PRC. And definitely, they would be more susceptible and agreeable to whatever is being put out there.”

One notable finding within the qualitative interviews observed by participants was the pride in China’s rise as a global economic power among older generations of their respective Chinese. Some participants observed that within older generations both domestic and international factors impact this sentiment of pride. Some domestic factors include a country’s history of discrimination and racism. Within the quantitative surveys, it was noted that higher concerns with racism and a lower sense of belonging were correlated with higher levels of agreement with pro-CCP propaganda.

“Probably with the older generation of my migrant community. I’ve come across some very…funny views from the older generation from our community. I think that…stems from Chinese and New Zealand, when they were growing up, we weren’t wealthy. We hit the poll tax, like head tax like Canada and like Australia. There were very few Chinese in the country, so we were a very small minority. There was legislation against Chinese coming to New Zealand. We weren’t allowed to get a pension until the fifties I think it was, probably late fifties. For those…older generations who remember those times, when China was poor, and how it was the way it was dealt with, I suppose by the Western world. And so they…have become proud of where China has come to. And bringing with them millions, hundreds of millions out of poverty. Becoming a world power. Which, I suppose is a great thing, but in saying that, there’s a lot of other stuff that obviously happens. It isn’t good and stuff like that. But they don’t hear that, they are blind to that.”

The quantitative surveys found that concerns with racism and a lower sense of belonging were correlated with higher levels of agreement with pro-CCP propaganda.

“So you’ve got the older generation who are proud with, you know, the growth of China and its current power. And then as I said, you know, it’s a great thing. You know, politics aside, being that…whole proudness. But we’ve also got an older generation. So people who’ve been here in New Zealand for five, six generations. They are very proud, because…so they’ve been invited to a lot of overseas Chinese events in Beijing. They’ve been invited to a lot of events by the embassy of the consul general here in New Zealand. It’s partly I think to do with [the fact that] a lot of the Chinese community has been facing racism in this country, so whether it is the state racism or general everyday. And when they…see how great China has become, they feel that sense of proudness. It’s like, oh look, our country is doing better and we’re probably going to have less…we’re going to be stronger, and fight back, you know, and like that proudness is what makes them align more with China. Also I find it quite ironic, because a lot of the early Chinese settlers that came here, a lot of them actually came during the Cultural Revolution. So…many came to New Zealand as refugees. But yet their descendants have decided to align themselves with China and the…you know, the political party. It’s kind of ironic but that’s what’s been happening. We’ve been seeing more and more of that. Because some of these groups that I used to work with, they aren’t as aligned and over the last five, six years, they have been a lot more aligned to Chinese propaganda.”

Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia and China

In contrast to New Zealand, many participants observed that existing ethnic tensions in Malaysia have an impact on perceptions towards China and Chinese identity. While in New Zealand, the tensions of identity are an intra-community phenomenon, tensions of identity of the Malaysian Chinese are with the Malaysian government and politics. There have been government policies implemented that favor the Malay majority and the Bumiputera community and some participants highlighted the Green Wave[3] in the 2020 Malaysian general election as having a potential impact on overall feelings of marginalization. As some participants noted, this local context has shaped positive perceptions of the PRC within the Malaysian Chinese communities. As one participant noted below:

“I think there is a prevalent feeling among Chinese Malaysians that we are second-class citizens in the country. And that is something that is tolerated as long as…our major expression of our way of life is not truly affected. But when China started to make its appearance felt [in] the international arena, I think that a significant number of Chinese Malaysians feel that, again, their day has come.”

Furthermore, some participants pointed out that this strong sense of cultural preservation has already existed in Malaysia and this motivation has created an impactful opportunity for the CCP to leverage. This could potentially explain why Chinese Malaysians may have positive attitudes and views towards the PRC.

“For China, I think…partly because of this local ethnic identity issue, there has always been a strong sense of preserving our local culture, Chinese culture and language. And it’s definitely odd, only in the sense that we developed these ingenious efforts without China being in the picture for a very long time. That was before China became a powerful country. In fact, Taiwan used to offer this kind of support back in the sixties, seventies when we needed, you know, some materials and resources to support the preservation of Chinese language, culture, schools, and so on and so forth. But I think [the] vast majority of it is locally driven, and it shouldn’t be attributed to external[ly] driven phenomena. So, that strong sense of cultural preservation will resonate in a way with the emergence of China as a major power. Many see that as a reaffirmation of their efforts in preserving their own culture.”

The PRC has leveraged these positive trends and a domestic issue in their favor. One participant observed an incident in which the PRC positioned itself as an alternative source of protection, like a guardian, for the Malaysian Chinese community. This example below, as discussed by the participant, demonstrates a clear use of a domestic issue to leverage favour and positive influence within the community. However, it is unclear to what extent this incident had an impact on the Malaysian Chinese community more broadly.

“I was quite surprised actually, when the Chinese ambassador at the time, I think he was Mr. Bai, I can’t remember his full name. And he went there and said something like, the Chinese government will look out, will take care of the Chinese diaspora, and the Chinese citizens who live overseas who are facing oppression. That was something, I don’t think it was entirely in line with diplomatic protocol. Or international bounds of behavior.”

When asked if respondents believed there was an impact of Chinese propaganda on local Chinese communities, Chinese Malaysian participants observed there was a consensus there was an overall positive view of China. However, many denote

“Well, overall, I think the Malaysian Chinese are influenced. It’s just that I’m not sure how to answer. They are certainly influenced, but they are influenced by many other factors besides China. So, in the end, it’s somewhat challenging to determine whether it’s because China has been very successful in its influence. As I mentioned earlier, it’s not just about media influence; it also involves soft power initiatives and Chinese associations. These efforts indeed have a significant impact on Malaysia’s Chinese community.”

“I think many people will tell you…we face the discrimination and China is kind of like a big mother that will protect you from [discrimination]…yeah of course you can’t solve the local problem. Then you have someone to protect you. I think that kind of sentiment kind of exists in some way.”

One participant did note that there is a divide among the Chinese community in Malaysia when it comes to their opinions and perceptions of China and the CCP. These two camps are the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-democracy camp as explained below:

“The Chinese community in Malaysia can be roughly split into two camps. One would be the pro-Beijing camp, who really take in everything that the CCP puts out. Some of them even have said something like ‘oh, those Hong Kong protesters should be shot for challenging Xi Jinping’ and all those things. So that’s one camp. The other camp would be the pro-democracy. But not necessarily pro-US and all that. They are pro-human rights, human liberties, and all that. And these two camps, sometimes you see them (inaudible) issues, and yeah. So there is a significant impact. The first camp would be very much impressed with the economic accomplishments of China. The second one not so much, but they want to focus more on how…Beijing is behaving on the international stage, and how it responds to issues of human rights and civil liberties.”

Building Closer Ties with China

In New Zealand, most participants expressed concerns about building closer ties with China and negative opinions of China due to human rights issues and CCP influence in New Zealand. Additionally, these concerns seem to originate from familial histories and experiences with the CCP as some participants noted that their families had left China due to political reasons and persecution. As one participant highlighted:

“New Zealand has already started building quite a lot of closer ties…Northland has an agreement with China for the Yi Dai Yi Lu (One Belt One Road) thing. And there has been, or there was quite a lot of Chinese investment here. I personally am uncomfortable about it. My maternal grandmother experienced CCP when she was still in China. And I keep sharing the stories about how she had a very bad experience with the Communist Party. So when we decided to move to New Zealand, that was one of the factors, because of that worry about what happened with the Communist Party. So our family have not really been a supporter of that anyway, so we’ve always been quite concerned. And watching the influence they are having in the greater China, or Asia area, and also in New Zealand, I am not in favour of it.”

Many participants in New Zealand also stressed that they can distinguish between culture and ethnic belonging and support for the PRC and its actions. As one participant states:

“I think a lot of us can recognize the difference between, we are proud of the culture and the history, but not very proud of the politics and what’s happening in the greater China.”

Whereas in Malaysia, some participants expressed they would be supportive of building closer ties with China, however, the motivations were largely driven by pragmatic reasons and economic opportunities for Malaysians overall. Some participants did note that there were concerns and risks to building closer ties with China. However, in their view, there are more benefits than disadvantages.

“I think most Malaysians have no issue building ties, closer ties with China, including myself. I

think for…pragmatic reasons…if cooperation with China benefits Malaysia, why not, alright. So, economically and culturally, people to people, educationally or whatever. Of course we have to be very careful. There will always be some risk and some costs involved. But I think the risks and costs are…have to be evaluated but that doesn’t mean we are…not going to work with China or…and we can improve. I think we can learn from lessons, and then try to make our cooperation or collaboration better, in a way, and protect our interests better.

Participants also noted that Malaysia’s physical location, socioeconomic ranking, and geopolitical presence presents significant considerations in how they conduct international relations. For the same reasons participants would support building closer ties to China, the same participants also were supportive of building closer ties with the United States. As this participant stated:

“I think Malaysia should build closer ties both with the US and China. I think you are aware that Malaysia has always been non-aligned in terms of the different conflicts and all that. And I think that works well for us. If not for political reasons, it should be for geopolitical reasons. We are on the Straits of Malacca, the busiest straits in the world. We have to do business with everyone who is willing, because we are not a big country, we’re an exporting nation you know. And…any breakdown in ties with either country would have an impact on the Malaysian people. So, yeah basically of course we should build closer ties with either.”

Chinese-Language Media

Chinese-language media was highlighted by both Malaysian and New Zealand respondents as a significant channel of pro-CCP propaganda in their respective countries. Many New Zealand participants noted that Chinese-language media within New Zealand is quite small, lacking diverse political perspectives and overall had a largely pro-CCP bent.

“And of course, New Zealand…the new migrant media space for the Chinese migrants is… small and much of it is pretty much, hundred percent of it, is captured by Beijing in terms of (inaudible) CCP propaganda lines etcetera.”

Furthermore, Chinese language media in New Zealand are financially constrained and vulnerable. Participants pointed to how Chinese investment in overseas Chinese media has shaped Chinese language media through advertisements and punitive economic actions.

“If a Chinese-language media outlet is seen as not pro-CCP, Chinese companies or those with Chinese investments will pull their advertisements from that outlet. For instance, there’s a case involving a newspaper called Mandarin Page, run by Malaysian Chinese. They were relatively neutral but interviewed Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen once, and immediately, Chinese businesses in New Zealand pulled all their ads from the newspaper. So, in New Zealand, these Chinese-language media outlets are economically vulnerable if they are not pro-China or pro-Chinese government.”

However, participants also noted that for the established overseas Chinese community in New Zealand, the impact of pro-CCP propaganda differs. Participants pointed to differences within information environments and media literacy within the New Zealand Chinese community as factors that would influence the impact of pro-CCP propaganda.

“It’s partly due to language. The first-generation Chinese immigrants, in particular, often have limited English proficiency, so they rely heavily on Chinese-language media for information.”

“I think we’re definitely at risk from it [exposure to propaganda], because the options for our news are limited. So… [the] risk is definitely there. However, for most of our community, we’ve been around long enough to…sort of, figure out what’s propaganda and probably what’s more legitimate balanced independent news.”

In Malaysia, some participants noted that television was a primary source of potential propaganda and influence from the CCP. It was observed that Chinese language programs in Malaysia were largely reliant on the PRC’s content rather than content created by and catered to the local Chinese population in Malaysia. This also marked a shift in the type of content consumed. As one participant noted below, Chinese language content in Malaysia previously drew from more diverse regions, but in recent years PRC content has been dominant.

“My direct observation, the strongest [medium?] should be television. Because the…Malaysian government doesn’t really support the languages and cultures of the minorities, right, we talked about that before. We don’t really have good television programs, channels, to cater to the local audience in terms of… the Chinese language programs. So in the past we watched a lot of Hong Kong shows. The southern Malaysians watch a lot of Singaporean Chinese shows. And some Taiwan [shows] will be interesting also, but I think the past couple of years or even decades it was clear China’s shows have become very very popular. They can be the soft kind of entertainment shows. They are very good shows. For those who like the shows, I think they are a good show. But of course, the entertainment, the soft side, will be mixed with the propaganda side. There is the big [networks?], the CCTV, the Phoenix TV, and all these. And then of course all these channels also produce good documentaries, (inaudible) and all these things, that continue to, I will say actually, are very attractive to the local television watchers. But then their news programs, their current affairs commentaries, of course, these are very very strongly government propaganda in that way.”

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to develop insights into targeted audiences of CCP propaganda and to examine and further explore identifiable factors within overseas Chinese communities who were more likely to agree with pro-CCP propaganda. Our results have revealed insights from those who are more likely to agree or disagree with pro-CCP propaganda and how these opinions relate to various facets of the Chinese identity, including diaspora dynamics, ethnic tensions, pride in China’s economic rise. The study also found that opinions of the US and China and perceptions of local Chinese media were influenced by identity. However, these results are limited due to a small sample size. Thus, further research is needed to better understand the impacts of pro-CCP propaganda on overseas Chinese communities.

Reference and footnotes

1. Smith, Jonathan A., Paul Flowers, Michael Larkin, and Osborn Mike. “Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.” Chapter 4. In Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis Theory, Method and Research, XX–XX. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2009.

2. MacCracken, Grant. The long interview. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988.

3. 作為 1890 年代紐西蘭的華人。Being Chinese in Aotearoa in the 1890s | National Library of New Zealand (natlib.govt.nz)

4. Green Wave/ 绿潮: This political phenomenon involves the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and an ultraconservative voting base. Notably, this movement espouses increased Malay-Muslim hegemony and further marginalization of Malaysia’s minority groups and religions.