Capacitating Filipino Journalists against FIMI
Digital Intelligence Team, Doublethink Lab
The Philippines is no stranger to the use of false, misleading information. Deliberately seeded and propagated with the aid of emerging technologies, these narratives influence public opinion, distort public discourse, and ultimately affect national and local policies.
In the 2019 national elections, state-sponsored information manipulation and interference activities were observed, including the propagation of “us-versus-them” narratives. This further deepened the fissures in society, between the supporters of then-populist ruling party and the opposition which was branded as the elites and the oligarchs. Mainstream media was painted to be biased and in cahoots with the opposing party, increasing the potency of social media as a platform for deceptive narratives and campaigns. Influencers propagated these platforms with short- and long-form content that promoted those who they supported and degraded their political rivals. Candidates hire Public Relations (PR) firms that use conventional tactics to improve their employers’ image, but also make use of content farms to significantly widen the reach of their online campaign materials. Chiefs of Staff and employees of several politicians were also found to be using fake accounts to spread disinformation. These activities contributed to the victory of candidates aligned with the ruling party, both in the national and local posts.[i]
Recently, what is possibly Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)[ii] incidents have also been observed. As tensions between Manila and Beijing in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) rise, so do possible malign information operations. Statements from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding the WPS are promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). These narratives are either amplified or echoed by local actors, including so-called think tanks, academics, and even politicians[iii] [iv]. Offline activities including rallies and forums are also conducted to drumbeat these narratives. These personalities are also often featured in Chinese state media such CGTN and Xinhua where they present their opinions on Philippine-China relations which are aligned with Beijing’s narratives.
Capacity building as a decisive response
With the national elections less than a year away and the tensions in the West Philippine Sea escalating, it is not improbable to infer that FIMI incidents will also surge in the near future.
Under the Initiative for Media Freedom (IMF), a five-year program implemented by Internews and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a project brought together a network of trusted partners of Filipino organizations and global subject matter experts (SMEs). The goal: inform Filipinos’ ability to understand and recognize foreign influence operations (FIO). Front and center in combating FIMI are the media practitioners who must rapidly identify and report on these incidents.
As a member of this initiative to build the capacity of news organizations to understand and monitor disinformation and influence operations in the Philippines, Doublethink Lab brings its years of expertise, proven and tested strategies, and accessible tools for FIMI investigation to Philippine shores. From December 2023 to May 2024, DTL conducted a series of training sessions on FIMI investigations for the media partners. DTL developed materials which communicated both knowledge and skills necessary for FIMI investigation. These are based on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) methods shared among the members of the OSINT community and encompass DTL’s research experience with FIMI. To ensure that the training materials were responsive to both the Philippine information environment and the peculiarities of the media partners’ newsroom, the training needs of the journalists were elicited after every session. From this, new materials were created and old ones updated. The materials used throughout the training helped turn challenges into strength by clearly stressing the most substantial aspects of FIMI research methods.
Mentorship was also central to DTL’s FIMI Investigation Training Program. Conducted in between the second online training up until the face-to-face training in March 2024, DTL analysts introduced concepts, tools, and the necessary research mentality for examining this phenomenon. These included the concept of information manipulation from foreign entities, evidence-based thinking, and identification of the malicious actors’ possible objectives and related actions. Mentorship also included introducing the media partners to tools such as STIX, the DISARM Framework, and Miro Board, which are useful for organizing their investigation results and visualizing relationships among the elements of the FIMI incident.
DTL also provided hands-on experiences and comprehensive guidance as the participants dive into their own FIMI investigations. This process encompassed several key activities: determining if an incident is truly FIMI, identifying and locating the suspicious content involved in the FIMI incident, discerning the message or narrative of the FIMI incident, connecting the suspicious contents to map the information dissemination path, analyzing the potential objectives and motivations of the malicious actor, coding the techniques employed by malicious actors using the DISARM framework, and systematically organizing the findings to compile a comprehensive incident summary. This skills-building exercise was the highlight of the program.
Impact
The results of the pre-training survey vis-a-vis the post training scores tell the story of Doublethink Lab’s FIMI Investigation Training Program. Overall, participants’ self-assessed awareness/capability rose from an average of 2.50 to 3.33. This score encompasses the ability to identify foreign information manipulation campaigns, use tools to investigate it, document it using the FIMI Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) Codebook, and determine the tactics and techniques used in the campaign using the DISARM Framework.
Notably, the media partners mentioned that the tools introduced during the training were quite useful. Specifically, the MIRO Board was used to visualize connection between observables while the FIMI STIX Spreadsheet, while complicated, was essential in organizing the data elicited from the investigation. The DISARM Framework introduced and used throughout the training was also lauded as useful in identifying and even determining its possible causes. The attack pattern has also guided the media partners in establishing narratives of actors, including their motives and possible participation in “bigger events”. In general, the tools discussed, explored, and used throughout the training can also be used to generate leads, as they can be the starting point of news stories and further contextualize it.
One of the most important outcomes of the training is the media partners’ publication of news stories regarding FIMI. DTL’s mentorship and assistance contributed to the successful publication of news stories and reports exposing possible FIMI incidents. It was observed that these incidents are aligned with the Philippines-China tensions in the West Philippine Sea, as previously mentioned. One such article focused on Congressman Pantaleon Alvarez’s statement on separating Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines, since President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s stance on the WPS will lead to war. PRC-related accounts both locally and in China were found to be amplifying these messages. Former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte resides in Davao, which is located in Mindanao. Duterte is notorious for his pro-PRC leanings, a tune he continues to carry even today, and Alvarez served as Speaker for the House of Representatives during this time.
Another article from a media partner exposed how several actors are amplifying the narrative that the Philippines is the aggressor in the WPS tensions, particularly during resupply missions and civilian activities in the Ayungin Shoal. These actors include the PRC state media, foreign websites, social media pages, and local “experts.” The article also touched upon the audio deepfake of President Marcos depicting him directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to respond to China’s aggression. Chinese social media platforms painted the US as being responsible for the deepfake to escalate tensions between Manila and Beijing.
Doublethink Lab also conducted its own investigation of Beijing’s allegations last year that the Philippine government promised to tow away the warship BRP Sierra Madre from Ayungin Shoal (also known as Second Thomas Shoal), which has for years served as an outpost for military personnel in the area. This narrative has resurfaced again in 2024, and has expanded to involve the previous administration, which is notoriously pro-Beijing.
Our Ways Forward
The Philippines’ experience with FIMI and state-sponsored disinformation is not unique. This has become a worldwide phenomenon, well-documented by legitimate and credible institutions. It has had widespread effects in the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and military spheres. Due to this, disinformation, an element of FIMI, was found to be the most impactful global risk within the next two years and one of the top ten most severe risks in the next ten years.[i] Rapidly evolving and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), will significantly improve FIMI’s effectiveness. It will simplify the creation and dissemination of FIMI products, cut down on the resources needed for its production, vastly expand its reach through more complex and, as these technologies further develop, near-undetectable coordination of inauthentic coordinated behaviors, and allow it to dominate the information environment.
Given this current situation and logical prognosis, DTL recommends three possible strategies geared towards capability building, informed by the best practices and lessons learned from the project, as well as the recommendations of the media partners. These will require investment of adequate financial resources for the capability build-up. Ultimately, these recommendations will contribute to creating a more FIMI-resilient Philippines and stronger digital democracy. The figure below summarizes these recommendations:
The first, and possibly the most impactful recommendation on a short-term basis, is the sustainment and expansion of the FIMI Investigation Training. Under the project, DTL was able to train four media organizations in three online sessions and one face-to-face activity. Using a combination of lectures, workshops, and mentorship, the program significantly improved their FIMI investigation skills, as reflected by the post-training survey, as well as their final outputs. However, sentiments from the trainees also highlighted the need to extend the training, possibly with more focus on hands-on and guided activities on using investigative tools and application of the skills. Furthermore, to truly sustain this initiative, DTL, with the support of the partners, may develop a Training of Trainers Course for FIMI Investigation, in which individuals who have been capacitated to analyze Foreign Information Operations can also teach others. This knowledge management intervention will contribute to the sustainability of the program’s objective, beyond the natural life of the program itself.
Related to the first recommendation is the sustainment and expansion of stakeholder convergence. The FIMI Investigation Training Program was successful in bringing together various stakeholders to work on one common goal: improving our collective competence to investigate FIMI and create resilience by communicating these incidents to the public. The IMF’s activities served as an avenue that brought together subject matter experts from both Taiwan and the Philippines with media partners. Doublethink Lab was also able to touch base with some civil society organizations in the Philippines, thus building relationships for future collaboration.
However, stronger ties for stronger future partnerships can be pursued. The Philippines has a rich and diverse traditional and online media landscape, using English, Filipino, and local dialects to bring news to the different islands of the archipelago. Most media companies have both online and offline presence, and have significant reach and influence over public opinion. Engaging these organizations, training them, and provisioning them with an avenue for better collaboration will further improve their capability, especially through knowledge and technology sharing between and among newsrooms.
To truly bring these stakeholders together, cooperative mechanisms such as a memorandum of agreement and informal groups can be used in tandem to foster and strengthen partnership as well as commitment to the cause.
Lastly, financial assistance can be provided for media partners to acquire tools and technology that will aid them in their investigations. During the training, DTL lectured about several tools that can be used to facilitate investigations, organize findings, and ensure the safety of the personnel and system conducting the analysis. Some of these tools include Miro Board and DTL’s FIMI Investigation Dashboard, which the organization developed. This Dashboard crowdsources information on FIMI incidents and other relevant details from its partners across the globe. While some of these tools can be accessed for free or as an extension of DTL’s subscription, the partners will need financial support to subscribe to these tools long term. It is also necessary to delve into other tools that may automate processing massive amounts of data, especially for medium- and long-term investigation activities, such as during the elections.
Doublethink Lab’s FIMI Investigation Training has significantly contributed to capaciting Filipino journalists to better address foreign information operations. Nevertheless, much work must still be done to improve the potency of this endeavor. It is necessary to expand the training, both in scope and in beneficiary, acquire the commitment of the media partners for greater cooperation, and ensure they have access to technology that will allow them to be at par with those who commit information manipulation and interference.
Footnotes
[i] Ong, J., & Tapsell, R. (2021). Mitigating disinformation in Southeast Asian elections. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Retrieved https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/publications/download/nato_mitigating_disinformation_web_20may-1.pdf?zoom=page-fit
[ii] The European Union External Action Service (EEAS) defines Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) as, “pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory.”
[iii] Chalk, P. (2023, May 19). PRC influence operations in the Philippines: Can Beijing flip the South China Sea script? The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved: https://jamestown.org/program/prc-influence-operations-in-the-philippines-can-beijin g-flip-the-south-china-sea-script/
[iv] Macaraeg, P. (2023, November 1). How pro-China propaganda is seeded online in the Philippines. Rappler. Retrieved: https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/ways-how-china-propaganda-seede d-online-philippines/
