How China’s infodemic spreads to Taiwan and Southeast Asia

• Author: Harper Ke, Global Research Analyst
• Author: Lilly Min Chen Lee, Global Research Program Manager

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Key Findings

1. Taiwan serves as one of the critical nodes in disseminating COVID-19 disinformation from China to Southeast Asia. China has taken advantage of the language similarity between two countries and sabotaged democracy in Taiwan; for example, our research has found that overseas Vietnamese in Taiwan and migrant workers are also targeted by disinformation — written in Vietnamese — to create chaos both in their hometown and Taiwan.
2. Disinformation tinged with Chinese propaganda was shared by Chinese embassies’ Facebook fan pages in Romania and Slovakia and simultaneously shared by Myanmar and Vietnam Facebook accounts, later circulated into Southeast Asia. On the other hand, China state media — Xinhua, Global Times, and Reference News — would selectively debunk the disinformation that is against China’s so-called “cheerleading” narrative.
3. China-linked infodemic is not only “cheerleading” or “telling China’s story well” as previously assumed, but also negative and aggressive — harshly criticizing certain ideologies and fabricating conspiracies. Social media platforms have become hubs for effective dissemination of distorted content facilitated by WeChat, Weibo, and other social media.
4. Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, and the Philippines are influenced by WeChat official accounts while their Facebook groups and Twitter are used as hotbeds for disseminating disinformation.
5. According to our research, the first spotted disseminators usually serve for China’s propaganda by echoing China’s state media, while the second disseminators dial down their pro CCP inclination by posting politically-irrelevant videos and posts. On the other hand, the consumers of disinformation — urged by the anxiety epidemic — also spread twisted messages into local communities.

Doublethink Lab would like to thank partners and experts from Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Cambodia for contributing to this research and sharing insights on our findings. International Republican Institute (IRI) is sponsoring Doublethink Lab to conduct this report.

1. Methodology

A series of research steps have been applied in this research. First, Doublethink Lab researchers have been archiving and investigating COVID-19 disinformation which is suspiciously linked to China’s manipulation. Second, we filter the disinformation through two criteria: that have been circulated in Southeast Asian countries and have been debunked by local fact check centers or international news agencies such as Agence France-Presse (AFP).

Following the threads of disinformation dissemination, we have traced up to six different cases in Vietnam, Philippine, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Instead of analyzing the widely spread disinformation in Southeast Asian countries, DTL researchers pick out the China-linked disinformation on the coronavirus and trace the pathway to unveil not only the disseminators but the network behind the manipulation.

Discovery methods are based on an array of analytic tools, from searches based on China-linked disinformation to emerging issues tracked on public posts on Facebook archived on CrowdTangle¹, Weibo, TikTok, Twitter, WeChat, and content farm websites. Researchers rely on existing expertise and local knowledge as media analysts to define initial queries and iterate on those queries in response to findings.

2. Disinformation in Taiwan

To saturate Taiwan’s information space with disinformation, computational propaganda, and radical divided opinions, the adversary’s growing volume of informational warfare has drawn universal attention. In May 2019, the Swedish research institute V‑Dem published its annual Democracy report and pointed out that Taiwan is subjected to more foreign disinformation than any other country in the world. Most of it, though not all, correlated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

There was little doubt that PRC has stepped up political interference by disinformation campaign and attempted to sway voters in the 2020 Taiwan General Election. Some significant frames have dominated the disinformation ecosystem like democracy is a failure: a narrative supports the view that democracy in Taiwan has failed to give people good governance, positive international relationships, and that democracy leads to economic decadence.

It isn’t the only case, similar patterns and narrative frames are spotted through COVID-19 pandemic. As Chinese propaganda on COVID-19 grows, distinctive characters are more than flagrant: ideological control and nationalism proliferate in China while deflecting Coronavirus blame by shaping its discourse.

China’s COVID-19 disinformation campaign in Taiwan could be classified into several distinctive themes: starting from “#Just_a_little_(outbreak of)_pneumonia_in_the_mainland” and folk remedies for COVID-19 prevention to various countries’ inability to control the epidemic. On one hand, some significant themes have stretched to the Southeast Asian countries, such as “China began public use of coronavirus vaccine” and the disinformation of celebrities tested positive. On the other hand, China ravishes the world and avoids the blame by deploying disinformation tactics on murking the origin of coronavirus — further details please read two other reports from DTL.

Awash in disinformation in both the 2020 Taiwan General Election season and COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan has been flagged as a testing ground for PRC’s worldwide propaganda and information warfare. A wide range of disinformation meant to discredit democracy and amply discord has not only spread in Taiwan but Southeast Asia. We hence deep dive into case studies to look for clues into PRC’s cyber playbook and what might be used to undermine democratic standards and ideals.

3. China-linked COVID-19 Disinformation in Southeast Asia

Chinese Communist Party general­ secretary Xi Jinping has dispatched a platoon of 300 propagandists to Wuhan to “strengthen public opinion guidance²,” as China has bent the curve while other countries have been ravaged by the virus. To “tell China’s story well”, Xi has set the policy goal for winning international society favors³. Its success gives rise to a portrayal that other countries are failing to protect their people and any criticism of PRC’s “heroic donating protective gears” is Sinophobia. This sentiment serves well when Xi is desperate to vent out pressure from sluggish economic, unpopular domestic censorship, avoiding blame, and diverting people’s disappointment in how the government has handled the crisis.

Stories like Taiwan imposing a ban on exporting masks to China were inhumane, discriminatory, and wholly political and stood as concrete evidence that Taiwan’s true aim is to seek independence through the pandemic. Some China-linked COVID-19 disinformation has been spotted not only in Taiwan but also in Southeast Asian countries and overseas Chinese.

The case studies break down the China-linked COVID-19 disinformation disseminating pathways into steps: from where it has been spotted first, how it has been circulated, and by whom, to the admins of the specific Facebook groups.

3–1. Case A

The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam debunked this disinformation about an outbreak of COVID-19 in Taiwan and the CDC will have a press conference to announce it. This disinformation was firstly fabricated in Vietnamese on the website Đọc Báo Mỗi Ngày on March 6th.

Figure 3–1–1. Disinformation debunked by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam

Figure 3–1–2. The disinformation source is Website Đọc Báo Mỗi Ngày

After the disinformation was forged on the website, it was shared into the Facebook groups that are popular with the migrant Vietnamese workers in Taiwan commenting: “It’s time to go back to Vietnam.” That is to say, this disinformation, manipulated controversial issues on domestic and foreign policy, targets overseas Vietnamese in Taiwan, for it tries to create chaos in both countries.

Figure 3–1–3. Disseminating pathway of Case A

Table 3–1–4. Disinformation first spotted country, first spotted disseminators, 2nd disseminators, the circulating group and its admin’s location with details of Case A. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–1–5. Main disseminators in Vietnam

Figure 3–1–6. The profiles of main disseminators in Vietnam

3–2. Case B

The fact-checking organizations “MyGoPen” and “Taiwan Fact Check Centre” both debunked this disinformation about that COVID-19 is a combination of SARS and AIDS; patients would die from multiple organ failures and it was impossible to recover from COVID-19. The message was quoted from a Chinese doctor in Wuhan, but twisted by WeChat official accounts and forged the message origin: from a Chinese doctor in Wuhan to a doctor at National Taiwan University Hospital.

Figure 3–2–1. Disinformation debunked by “MyGoPen” and “Taiwan Fact Check Centre”

Figure 3–2–2. The disinformation source is an official WeChat account

The disinformation about COVID-19 was written in Mandarin Chinese on WeChat on March 10th and circulated on social media in Taiwan before it had been debunked on April 13th. It is worth noting that it was translated into English and circulated widely to Philippine, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The forged disinformation aims at improving its credibility by twisting its information source. It would be much more credible if the quotation is from a Taiwanese doctor instead of Chinese. In this case, the WeChat official account made up the disinformation in Mandarin Chinese and it was circulated into Taiwan society, then it spread to Southeast Asia countries in English. Taiwan was the transfer node in the disseminating pathway.

Figure 3–2–3. Disseminating pathway of Case B

Table 3–2–4. Disinformation first spotted country, first spotted disseminators, 2nd disseminators, the circulating group, and its admin’s location with details of Case B. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–2–5. Main disseminators in Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines

Figure. 3–2–6. The profiles of main disseminators in Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines

3–3. Case C

Aside from attacking the other governments’ efforts, another disinformation which tried to emphasize China’s success is disinformation — the People’s Liberation Army General Chen-Wei invented the COVID-19 vaccine and has already injected it — is debunked by Foreign media AFP. It is not only widely spread in Southeast Asia but also in Europe. It has stretched from China, Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, to the UK.

Figure 3–3–1. Disinformation debunked by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam

Figure 3–3–2. The disinformation source is the Global Times

The China state media Global Times and the WeChat official accounts fabricated the disinformation both in Mandarin Chinese and English. The Chinese version was widely spread in WeChat while the English one was shared to two Facebook groups — Chinese Sons and Daughters in Singapore and 21Silk which admins located in Hongkong, U.S.A., and Canada. The disinformation was shared 137 times in Facebook group 21Silk, along with commenting “good news.”

The disinformation was not only shared by Myanmar and Vietnam Facebook accounts but Chinese Ambassadors in Romania and Slovakia.

It’s noteworthy that the disinformation was shared on Twitter in China and Russia. Since the disinformation has hovered around Singapore as one of the disseminating nodes to Southeast Asia, it could be classified as Chinese propaganda that tried to manipulate the narrative, and coordinated efforts followed.

Figure 3–3–3. Disseminating pathway of Case C

Table 3–3–4. Disinformation first spotted country, first spotted disseminators, 2nd disseminators, the circulating group and its admin’s location with details of Case C. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–2–5. Main disseminators in China and Russia

Figure 3–2–6. The profiles of main disseminators in China and unknown countries

3–4. Case D

The disinformation regarding the China government donated 10 million face masks to Malaysia was debunked by a Malaysia Government. The disinformation originated from a Malaysian local Chinese-speaking media — China Press. The pro-China media twisted the news content from Bernama, a Malaysian National News Agency. After being criticized by Malaysians, the China Press rephrased the news piece.

Figure 3–4–1. Disinformation debunked by a Malaysian officer

Figure 3–4–2. The disinformation source is Website China Press

The disinformation was shared to the local Malaysian and Singaporean Facebook groups. It is hard to trace the dissemination pathway for the disseminators to copy and paste the disinformation, instead of sharing the link directly.

The disinformation was circulated in a facebook group — The overseas Chinese support China to be strong — and has been spreaded out at least 2,000 times. This pro-China group’s admins are located in China, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. The Taiwanese admin is identified as a local gangster by the Taiwan government.

Figure 3–4–3. Disseminating pathway of Case D

Figure 3–4–3. Disseminating pathway of Case D, the circulating group and its admin’s location with details of Case D. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–4–5. Main disseminators in Malaysia

Figure 3–4–6. The profiles of main disseminators in Malaysia and unknown countries

3–5. Case E

“Fact Crescendo”, a fact-checking center in India, has debunked the Trump tests COVID-19 positive disinformation on 20th May. The forged video originated from WeChat and Weibo adapted the video from Fox News by covering up the word “Valet” — from “Trump’s valet tests positive” to “Trump tests positive.” The video was circulated from Chinese apps to Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. To make it worse, the video was circulated on Weibo and Tiktok with Mandarin Chinese subtitles. It amplified the discord in Myanmar by stirring anti-Americanism and cheerleading for signing the Belt and Road Initiative with China.

Figure 3–5–1. Disinformation debunked by Factcrescendo

Figure 3–5–2. The disinformation source is the WeChat official account and Weibo

Figure 3–5–3. Disseminating pathway of Case E

Table 3–5–4. Disinformation first spotted country, first spotted disseminators, 2nd disseminators, the circulating group and its admin’s location with details of Case E. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–5–5. Main disseminators in China, Myanmar, USA, and Kenya

Figure 3–5–6 The profiles of main disseminators in Myanmar, U.S.A, Canada and Bahamas

3–6. Case F

China state media — Xinhua, Global Times, and Reference News — debunked the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, was tested COVID-19 positive and flew to a hospital in Singapore. The original photos were taken in 2017 when Hun Sen was hospitalized for an unrelated health condition.

Figure 3–6–1. Disinformation debunked by Xinhua, Global Times, and Reference News

Figure 3–6–2. The disinformation source is the WeChat official account

The disinformation was spotted from a Chinese Weibo account. It was circulated on Facebook, Twitter, LINE, and websites in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Canada, the United States, and Taiwan. It seems counterintuitive that the disinformation was debunked by China’s state media: Xinhua, Global Times, and Reference News. At the same time, the WeChat public account which is run by the Chinese community in Cambodia debunked the disinformation.

Compared to the Case E in Myanmar, China didn’t seem to bother to clarify and debunk disinformation about Trump. It is an open secret that Hun Sen has enjoyed a close relationship with President Xi, it isn’t a surprise that Hun Sen was the first foreign leader visiting Beijing during the pandemic. It might be a chance for China to leverage Hun Sen imposing censorship in Cambodia after Hun Sen announced that people who make disinformation should be treated as terrorists.

Figure 3–6–3. Disseminating pathway of Case F

Table 3–6–4. Disinformation first spotted country, first spotted disseminators, 2nd disseminators, the circulating group and its admin’s location with details of Case F. To click the hyperlink, please download the full-text PDF.

Figure 3–4–5. Main disseminators in China, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and USA

Figure 3–4–6. The profiles of main disseminators in Thailand, Hong Kong, U.S.A, Canada and an unknown country.

Reference

[1] CrowdTangle is a free Facebook-owned social media tracking tool. It is a tool from Facebook to help follow, analyze, and report on what’s happening across social media.

[2] The Australian (2020), Coronavirus: 300 propagandists sent to Wuhan

[3] Hoover Institute (2020), Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign To Shape Global Narratives