Patriotism for Sale: WeChat Channels’ Information Ecosystem
Elena Yi-Ching Ho, Consultant Analyst, Doublethink Lab
Executive Summary
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s tactics in promoting its propaganda have evolved with the prevalence of social media. Amid the aggressive censorship the CCP continues to impose on all social media platforms, the CCP, China-based tech companies as well as platform users form an ecosystem that serves as a vehicle for the CCP’s broader propaganda campaigns.
WeChat, also known as Weixin, is an app that is considered an essential social media for everyday life for residents living within China and Chinese diasporas overseas. As there is a large Chinese population using the app, it provides an abundance of information and a foundation for outsiders to learn more about life inside the country, as well as how the CCP operates its censorship system and promotes propaganda inside the ‘Great Firewall’. However, due to the deliberate non-transparent design of the platform, there are a lot of limitations in conducting research on WeChat.
In this exploratory research report, Doublethink Lab focuses on what role Chinese patriotism plays in the information ecosystem among primarily Taiwan-based self-media content creators, WeChat, and the CCP. We attempt to better understand the content creators’ motivations and intentions, the extent to which they are incentivised by a desire to develop their business or simply to leverage WeChat Channels — public feeds of video and photo content searchable via hashtags — as a platform to share their everyday life. We experiment with different research approaches such as conducting social listening through open sources, actively monitoring content, undercover investigations, and content testing.
Our research found a batch of accounts with very similar operating profiles. We infer that the similarity of the operating profiles is related to audience building and engagement strategies, mediated by WeChat’s algorithms. We found that part of the similarity of these operating profiles is spreading CCP propaganda. This propaganda on WeChat is then reused by the CCP in its propaganda campaigns, and constitutes participatory propaganda. Therefore, we saw how the CCP’s algorithms (i.e. WeChat’s algorithms) and participatory propaganda strategy, and the commercial interests of self media, intersect dynamically to reinforce the CCP’s propaganda.
Key Findings
- A growing number of WeChat Channels content creators based in Taiwan are pushing soft culture content on their Channels accounts. They mainly use ‘lifestyle’ content to connect with their audiences. They share a similar pattern of account names, their content covers similar themes, they use similar sets of hashtags, and share similar narratives echoing the CCP’s propaganda about Taiwan. That said, it appears that they are mainly incentivised for commercial reasons. These content creators don’t necessarily have strong political opinions and don’t seem to intend to influence their target audience ideologically.
- Based on our observations, we suspect that WeChat’s algorithms are more likely to recommend content that mention particular narratives that are (in the CCP’s framing) ‘pro Taiwan reunification’. By using frameworks that echo or mirror CCP language, it seems that the content creators are rewarded by the system, as these types of content usually receive more engagements compared to others. As such, a self-perpetuating cycle emerges as content creators continue to use these tropes to widen audience reach.
- From our findings, while most content generated on the platform is either for individual users to record and share creators’ day-to-day life with the public or for commercial purposes, some of the content from these creators has been reused by CCP-controlled media for their propaganda campaigns.
- We infer that the target audience is Chinese who are interested in Taiwanese culture. The creators usually use topics related to Taiwan as an entry point for them to communicate with their audience, which then becomes part of the ecosystem for the CCP’s internal propaganda campaign.
Background
The business model of social media platforms coupled with the popularity of self-media, also known as we-media, has provided opportunities for typical online social media users to become online influencers or so-called key opinion leaders (KOLs). They are able to produce their own content and at the same time be rewarded by the platforms through engagements and reaching broader audiences based on the platforms’ algorithms. They are able to mobilise these social media platforms’ business models to generate profits for themselves, forming a symbiotic relationship with the platforms. For example, from major big tech platforms such as Meta’s Instagram and Google’s YouTube to Tencent’s Weixin1 or WeChat, based on their views and likes, they are able to generate profits through sponsorship, advertisements and platform partnering programs.
Mass participation in self-media has not only changed how traditional media works, but also dramatically altered the public’s understanding of how information is disseminated. According to Bowman and Willis (2003), self-media demonstrates how the general public is ‘empowered by digital technologies’ to communicate ‘their own truths and their own kind of news.’2 Thus, the dissemination of information, ideology and propaganda is no longer purely ‘top down’. Governments, traditional news media outlets, and people with higher social status no longer have a monopoly on discourse power.
However, for authoritarian regimes such as the CCP, which implement mass surveillance of their citizens and draconian online censorship, the emergence of self-media does not always positively impact how information is distributed. While the dissemination of information under the regime has been revolutionised, the suppression of speech, the control of algorithms and the heavy control over public communication, not to mention the lack of diverse viewpoints, ensures that
content complying with the CCP’s official guidelines advances its propaganda at home and abroad, in line with United Front objectives.
Besides censorship, taking control of how patriotism is defined and communicated has become a crucial element of CCP efforts to stabilise its regime. By politicising patriotism and promoting its version of Chinese nationalism, the CCP strengthens the legitimacy of its control over the country while solidifying support both domestically and internationally.
This ‘influencer-focused strategy’3 has achieved remarkable success on major western social media platforms. Research by the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (formerly Miburo) found the CCP has long struggled to find convincing messengers to promote narratives that favour the regime outside the country. However, by leveraging foreign influencers’ ‘remarkable power of persuasion’, the CCP is able to spread its propaganda to wider audiences internationally.
In addition, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), a Canberra-based think tank, has also argued that by coordinating and cultivating a group of content creators, especially from foreign countries, the government has skillfully sold narratives aligned with the Party.4 Those content creators’ ‘indirect’ connections with the Party provide the appearance of distance, making them harder to recognise as mouthpieces advocating or amplifying the Party’s propaganda. They present themselves as impartial individuals that are genuinely impressed by the development of the country. Furthermore, as influencers present themselves through a more ‘personal style of communication’, the challenges to build or strengthen trust with their existing or potential audiences are substantially lower, compared to the messages delivered by PRC state media.5
Building on these recent research findings, while most attention has been put on major social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, Doublethink Lab observed that there is a growing number of self-media accounts on WeChat Channels (视频号), which is a short video services provided on the platform, mainly pushing soft cultural content. These accounts try to promote patriotism by portraying an image that ‘Taiwan and China are all one nation.’
While it is highly unlikely investigators will be able to identify whether these accounts are coordinated or mobilised by actors with clear political intention or not, we assume most of them share one clear goal — using a soft culture push to gain traction through platform algorithm rewarding systems to monetise their content or promote their business attached to the accounts. We also noticed that most of the identified accounts demonstrate specific commonalities: having similar account names, using identical hashtags, and generating content sharing similar themes.
More than just being suitable for the WeChat platform’s business model, soft power influence drives a ‘symbiosis’ among content creators, the platform, and the CCP; content creators’ participatory propaganda is rewarded by the platform’s business model. Thus the platform serves the CCP’s security interest both through censorship and by providing a pool of ‘genuine’ or ‘grassroots’ material that can be reproduced in the CCP’s propaganda campaigns to give the public the impression of grassroots support for the CCP’s ideology.
In this research report, we aim to better understand WeChat content creators promoting soft culture content that is aligned with the CCP’s narratives or direct CCP propaganda. We will explore how the line between genuine content generated from individual accounts or content specifically amplifying propaganda from the state government has been blurred. Moreover, we also attempt to learn what role multi-channel networks (MCNs)6 play in the CCP propaganda system and how they help the content creators affiliated with them to promote their accounts through their marketing strategies. As such, we propose the following questions:
- Who are these accounts’ target audiences and what are they trying to achieve?
- Are these content creators affiliated with any MCNs?
- Are these MCNs connected to the CCP? What are the companies’ backgrounds?
- How do the narratives used by the content creators echo CCP propaganda directed at Taiwan?
- Do these content creators demonstrate coordinated behaviour? Is it solely for commercial reasons or is there a political agenda at play?
Methodology
Our research methodology mainly relies on exploratory digital ethnography. Our research aim is to explore what is in the digital space. Through collecting and identifying the patterns of the content as well as recording the accounts generating and amplifying the narratives, we seek to further understand the information ecosystem.
As WeChat Channels is a relatively new space for researchers and stakeholders attempting to understand how short videos work on the platform, there is little existing research that could be used as a reference. Due to the nature of the closed and comprehensive system built within WeChat, it is challenging to conduct research with a large dataset and conduct analysis in a systematic way. As such, the collected data is sourced solely from content recommended by the algorithm.
In addition, after our initial monitoring phase, we observed that certain content promoting nationalism, especially those echoing CCP propaganda, seem to receive more engagement compared to other content.
Furthermore, starting from an initial seed list of followed content, we observed that many accounts recommended by the algorithm shared some distinctive patterns: similar names, and some contracted with the same MCNs.
As such, initially we planned to investigate the relationship between these content creators and the MCNs, in the hope of piecing together the information and exploring whether the MCNs have any connection with the CCP.
However, due to limited information being disclosed through open sources, we then decided to conduct rapid content testing to explore how the algorithm works on the platform, essentially attempting to understand if the platform favours particular content, such as narratives, keywords or hashtags aligned with the Party’s interest. Apart from this, we also wanted to see whether being affiliated with a MCN would help the user reach a larger audience.
Nevertheless, due to the tight security requirements on the platform restricting the ability to publish any content on WeChat Channels, we had to suspend a planned message testing experiment. More details will be illustrated in the findings section.
Phase One: Exploratory digital ethnography: snowball approach
Due to the limited transparency of WeChat, the exploratory, digital ethnography-based methodology enables us to use a snowball sampling approach to identify more relevant content and accounts that are within our research scope.
This research phase can be described in three different stages:
Stage 1
When first using WeChat Channel, no specific keywords are used to look for certain content. However, because the account we use to monitor already has history searching for cross-strait issues and Taiwan topics, it is likely that the algorithm has associated the user preference with the recommended content.
Stage 2
After detecting a few similar patterns from what is promoted through the system, we dedicate at least an hour per day to scroll through short films recommended by the system and collect all relevant samples. In particular, we ensure we watch the entire short films if they are related to our research, in order to train the algorithm as a part of machine learning.
Stage 3
Once we have seen and recorded enough patterns such as similar account names and content as well as shared MCNs, we started to use the narratives and hashtags used by those accounts to search and accumulate more similar accounts.
Phase Two: MCNs Investigation
When monitoring feeds on WeChat Channels, we noticed that a lot of accounts use similar Channels names and generate videos sharing similar themes. As some of them are contracted with two specific MCNs, we want to understand what is the background of these two MCNs and how these content creators collaborate with them.
Hence, we use an undercover account to reach out to content creators affiliated with the MCNs, attempting to get some insights. More details will be illustrated in the following section.
Phase Three: Rapid Content Testing
From our observations, content that has strong patriotic language or using hashtags such as ‘We are Chinese Taiwanese’, ‘Taiwan is a part of China’ or ‘Taiwan should be reunified’ seem to help the content creators to gain more engagement compared to their other soft culture posts. For example, in a clip with the strong patriotic language, compared to their other content usually receiving less than or around 1K likes, the account owner got more than 80K likes, 3.5K shares and 4.5K comments.
As such, to test whether WeChat does have an algorithm that picks up certain content to help the creators reach out to broader audiences, we created an impersonated WeChat Channels, in the hope that through posting different content, we would be able to identify what is the preferred content on the platform. In total, we plan to post 9 soft culture push content including street views in Taipei, introducing New Taiwan dollar notes, tourist spots like Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, night markets, the metro, traditional markets, etc. The other 3 we would replicate content we observed on the platform that echoed the state propaganda directly. We would also use hashtags that are commonly used by the content creators we observe, for example, #台湾生活 and ＃台灣生活 (Taiwan life), #两岸一家亲 and #两岸一家親 (Both sides of the Strait are of one family), #中国台湾省 (Taiwan Province, People’s Republic of China) and ＃真实的台湾省 (The authentic Taiwan Province).
WeChat and Findings
Introduction
Often referred to as the ‘Swiss army knife’, WeChat provides its users with a wide range of services.7 From entertainment like social networking to day-to-day needs such as digital wallet and food or taxi ordering, the platform offers functions that most users would need to get from multiple platforms in one place. In 2021, according to Allen Zhang, the senior executive vice president and president of Weixin Group at Tencent, there are almost 1.09 billion users who open the app on their devices daily.8 As such, WeChat plays a significant role in most Chinese people’s lives.
First launched in 2011, based on the most recent report published by Tencent9, there are more than 1.3 billion active monthly users on the platform, and the number of WeChat users has been increasing tremendously.10 According to Statisa, as of Jan 2024, WeChat is the most popular non-western social media platform.11 Although WeChat does not seem to own a large market in Taiwan, it is in fact extremely popular among residents within the country and Chinese diasporas living around the world. The success of WeChat even became an ideal model for Elon Musk when he rebranded Twitter to X. In his own words, the billionaire businessman once said, ‘You basically live on WeChat in China because it’s so usable and helpful to daily life, and I think if we can achieve that, or even get close to that at Twitter, it would be an immense success.’12
However, with this success, the security concerns around the connection between the CCP and Tencent, where the platform stores its users’ data and how it uses users’ information have increased significantly. For example, in October 2023, the Canadian government banned WeChat from all government-issued mobile devices.13 Similarly, in Australia, the Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media recently has raised concerns about WeChat’s data security and foreign interference risks to its citizens and the country.14 The Committee further recommended that the government should ban the app on federal government devices.
WeChat Channels
Introduction
Almost a decade after WeChat was launched, WeChat Channels (视频号), a short video service provided on the platform was introduced in January 2020. Since it began operating, the number of users has increased enormously. According to Tencent, the usage duration of the total WeChat Channels users exceeds 80% of the ones using Moments (朋友圈).15 As the platform support more and more functions such as live streaming, live streamed shopping (直播带货), video editing, and commodity display (商品橱窗), the number of monthly users on WeChat Channel has surpassed those on short-video platforms Douyin and Kuaishou.16
How does it work?
In this section, to understand more about how WeChat Channels works, we use two different WeChat accounts — one created a while ago and has been active in engaging with the platform and the other one created a few months ago that has barely been used.
As an audience
Essentially, each WeChat account can own a WeChat Channels, however, it seems that not every account is able to turn on the Channels function on the platform to either watch films or generate content. For example, we created a new WeChat account a few months ago and have barely used it. It does not have the WeChat Channels service in the Discover (发现) tab (screenshot 1). To watch films from Channels, one has to search on the Chat tab (screenshot 2) then either watch from the list recommended by the system or put in specific keywords to find certain films (screenshot 3).
On the contrary, with the account that we created at least 5 years ago and have been actively using, WeChat Channels service sits under the Discover (发现) tab (screenshot 4). In Channels, one can choose to watch films that are generated by the subscribing accounts (关注), liked by friends (朋友) or recommended by the system (推荐) (screenshot 5). In terms of the recommending system, a recent study17 found the platform groups 30 videos as a batch. After users finish watching 30 of them, another group of 30 will be shown to them.
It is unknown why the Channels service is not available to all WeChat users and it also seems that this issue is not an independent event. Other users have reported encountering similar issues as well.18 Some suspect that it might be because the users are based overseas and for a period of time, the Channels service was only available for Weixin users.
As a content creator
Identity Verification
To be a content creator on the platform, a user not only needs to own the WeChat Channels function in the Discovery page, but also is required to share some ‘standard’ personal information with the platform before you can post any content on your Channels page. For example, for a user with no PRC identification document, one has to verify their identity through WeChat Pay (screenshot 6), which also requires real name authentication. Moreover, the user would also need to provide their banking details. For those who are not ‘mainland Chinese citizens’, depending on the their identity, they can provide passport details or use a Mainland Travel Permit for Hong Kong and Macau Residents (港澳居民来往内地通行证), Taiwan compatriot permit (台湾居民来往大陆通行证), Foreign Permanent Resident ID Card (外国人永久居留身份证), Residence Permit for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Residents (港澳台居民居住证), or Residence Permit for Taiwan Residents (台湾居民居住证). After submitting personal information (screenshot 7), the platform further requests the user to verify their identity through presenting bank card details (screenshot 8).
As for users with PRC identification documents, it seems that they would need to verify their identity through facial recognition in addition to providing personal details (screenshot 9). Interestingly, when on the facial verification page, the system does not forewarn you when it scans your face as the user filling in personal details. Then, if it fails to detect the user’s face, a message saying ‘the system is busy, please try again later’ is served (screenshot 10). This indicates that when trying to access the function on the platform, users would need to provide personal information that violates personal privacy.
We suspect that the barriers that WeChat Channel audiences encounter, as well as the strict personal verification steps one has to take to become a content creator on the platform, are due to the series of measures for ‘purifying the online environment campaign’ (清朗行动) that the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) (国家互联网信息办公室) has been executing for years. To minimise the risk of becoming a target for the government, the platform only allows regular users for specific services in case these accounts violate the government regulations.
As mentioned in the methodology section, initially, in our third phase of the research, we were hoping to test out whether WeChat Channels does have an algorithm that picks up certain content to help the creators reach broader audiences. However, due to the complexity of getting the account identified, we were unable to progress the rapid content testing.
MCNs
Multi-Channel Networks, also known as MCNs, are entities that have clear business strategies for content creators contracted with them. With MCNs, content creators produce content in a more systematic structure and are able to reach out to broader audiences and promote their brands across different platforms.19
According to the latest Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (中国互联网络发展状况统计报告) released by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), as of June 2023, the number of Chinese netizens has reached 1.079 billion and the internet penetration rate is now more than 76%.20 The report further mentions short video users are among the top three groups of Internet users, accounting for 1.026 billion. Hence, with such a large internet user base and self-media rising in prominence, the internet celebrity economy, also known as ‘wanghong economy’ has been thriving,21 and the impact of MCNs has also increased tremendously. Statisia show that since 2015, the number of MCNs in China has grown from less than 200 to approximately 34,000, and is expected to continue to increase.22 Similarly, Zhang and Tong (2024) argue that China currently has the largest Multi-Channel Networks (MCNs) market in the world.23
MCNs on WeChat
When monitoring feeds on WeChat Channels, we noticed that there are a lot of accounts using similar Channels names such as ‘xx in Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan xx’. Besides their names, they also generate videos sharing similar themes, mostly on lifestyle, such as Taiwan’s street or country views, and culture as well as livelihood. Some of them even have similar bio descriptions, for example, by using emojis for bullet points. We also noticed that there are a few accounts mainly affiliated with two MCNs: 佳悦传媒 (translated as Jiayue Media) and 七彩传媒 (translated as Qicai Media).
As we suspect this might be coordinated behaviour that is related to the CCP’s United Front work, we then wanted to investigate these two MCNs and understand how to contract with them. Moreover, we also wanted to understand if being affiliated with a MCN really benefits the content creators (screenshot 11).
To conduct our investigation, we used the account previously created with access to WeChat Channels. First, we reached out to a few accounts affiliated with either 佳悦传媒 (Jiayue Media) and 七彩传媒 (Qicai Media). After a few attempts, only one account (here referred as F) affiliated with 佳悦传媒 (Jiayue Media) responded. F told us to reach out to another person, who we suspect to be the middle person between the MCN and the content creators, telling them we were recommended by F. F also mentioned it is free to join the MCN, and if a Channels user wants to do live streaming, they need to be affiliated with a MCN.
After getting in touch with the middle person, they provided an invitation code to join the MCN (screenshot 12). We asked them whether the users always need to be invited to join the MCN and if we can refer other users to join the MCN through them. The middle person didn’t respond directly, only saying it is fine to refer other users to them. The middle person also once again mentioned that joining a MCN can help content creators with live streaming and making short films. But the main role of the MCN is to support content creators with their account traffic. When asked what kind of content would get the most traction, the middle person said for overseas users, ‘introducing scenery’ type of videos will be better (screenshot 13).
After scanning the invitation codes, a contract page is served where the user can read more details of the MCN and the services. It seems that the standard contract period is 3 years, and after a 7-day cooling period, the user needs to get approval from the MCN. According to the agreement, during the 3-year-timeframe, for video management, the user’s video data will be shared with the MCN. As for live streaming management, in addition to data sharing, the organisation will administer the rewards generated from live streaming (screenshot 14).
When affiliated with an MCN, the name of the organisation appears on the user’s Channels homepage. However, it does not seem to disclose the full name of the organisation or provide a hyperlink for other users to get further information about the entity. In our case, when trying to further investigate both 佳悦传媒 (Jiayue Media) and 七彩传媒 (Qicai Media), we were unable to find many details, as there are a lot of other MCNs using similar names. Without having the full name of both entities, investigators are unlikely to be able to identify the correct ones. For example, even after having the full name of 佳悦传媒 (Jiayue Media), which is 上海宏亿佳悦文化传媒有限公司 (translated as Shanghai Hongyi Jiayue Culture Media Co., Ltd.), information about the company available through open sources is still very limited.
According to BOSS直聘 (BOSS Zhipin), a Chinese online recruitment platform, the the company was only established in March 2023, and 宋国荣 (Song Guorong) is its legal representative. There is no open source information about this person. The size of the company is relatively small, with less than 20 employees, and the registered capital is 500,000RMB.24
It is unclear why there is not much information about both MCNs, but we infer that because even though WeChat Channels has been expanding rapidly, it is still a relatively new platform, so that MCNs targeting the platform will be set up even more recently. Moreover, it is also inconclusive whether these MCNs have a strategy to help the content creators to generate content that might help them to expand their audiences, even though the accounts we monitored sharing the same MCNs share similar patterns.
Findings
During the research period, at least 82 accounts that are either doing soft culture push or directly echoing state propaganda using terms such as reunification and ‘motherland’ (祖国大陆) have been monitored and recorded. Most of the identified accounts were recommended by the platform algorithms, and some were found through hashtags. As mentioned in the previous section, we identified some patterns among these accounts.
First, many of the accounts use similar names. For example, ‘xx in Taiwan’, ‘Taiwan xx’, ‘Taiwan Province xx’, ‘Taipei xx’ or ‘xx in Taipei’. Although this could be the nature of the algorithmic recommending system that keeps pushing similar accounts to our feeds, it is very likely that when creating their accounts, content creators have identified that using this type of name allows them to reach broader audiences.
We also observed these accounts to use a common set of themes and hashtags. For example, ‘＃两岸一家亲’ (Both sides of the Strait are of one family), ‘#中国台湾省’ (Taiwan Province, People’s Republic of China), ‘＃真实的台湾省’ (The authentic Taiwan Province) and ‘＃台湾生活’ (Taiwan life) are all common hashtags used by the creators. For themes, an inbound market (引流) strategy that focuses on attracting or mining more potential audiences seems to work well on the platform when some specific themes are used. It appears that the content creators attempt to use ‘lifestyle’ type content to appeal to their audiences. As such, to present the audience an ‘authentic Province of Taiwan’, livelihood is the most common topic.
As some researchers argue, the essence of WeChat is ‘private social software’ that is more prone to help establish ‘friendship relationships’. Hence, the focus of WeChat Channels is more on ‘long-term interpersonal relationships’ that make the business operations on the platform more ‘trustworthy’.25
For example, Content discussing what the New Taiwan dollar looks like, what its purchasing power is, as well as comparing it to the RMB are observed across different accounts. Other livelihood content such as street views and oil prices are also frequently generated (screenshot 15). Specifically, it seems that in the videos, using certain texts such as ‘we are Chinese Taiwanese, does our fellow in the motherland see us?’ or ‘when can we return to the motherland?’, etc, is also a common strategy.
As observed, while some of them self-identify as Taiwanese, the majority of content creators are Chinese who are married and living in Taiwan. While it is inconclusive who their target audience is, it seems that they have been focusing on Chinese residing in China, attempting to sell products, especially those from Taiwan.
As some accounts seem to be genuinely creating videos sharing their life, most of the accounts have turned on the commodity display (商品橱窗) function, trying to sell food like Taiwanese soy sauce or pineapple cakes and products for daily needs such as clippers, toothpastes or sleepers. In addition, it appears that not only do accounts affiliated with the same MCNs sell the same products (screenshot 16), most in fact also advertise the same items (screenshot 17).
We also observed that some accounts regularly post identical content with strong language such as ‘a large group of fellow Taiwanese are back to mainland China with their family members, do Chinese friends welcome them?’ or ‘we are leaving (Taiwan), do our fellow Chinese welcome us?’ (screenshot 18 and 19). Although the intention behind this type of content is unclear, we suspect that these account owners are trying to grow their audience base (养号) and later sell to them or even simply to start business functions on their Channels account. With this type of account, besides posting content resonating with CCP propaganda, they sometimes also post random content. For example, some might post about struggles in life, short stories of others, relationship issues or talking about mindfulness.
While these accounts could be generating content for either commercial purposes or simply recording daily-life events, the videos they create form a pool of stock footage that is used by both state media and inauthentic accounts for Party propaganda.
For example, one account constantly generates content mentioning ‘Taiwan is a part of China’ or featuring three kids calling themselves Chinese Taiwanese. While it seems that the creator is leveraging the Taiwan and China issue as an entrance for their business on the platform, their content has been repurposed on other platforms. One of the videos from this account was screenshotted with the text added ‘We are Chinese Taiwanese. We must go back to the motherland to worship our ancestors.’ This image was then shared on Twitter (X) with the caption, ‘A lot of Chinese Taiwanese have never been to the mainland. After I went there, I found many pro-green media (media that are pro Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) reporting a lot of rumours trying to discredit the mainland, so I decided to make posts on X to expose the authoritarian DPP.’ (screenshot 20)
While most accounts have avoided mentioning Taiwanese politics, there are some accounts generating content talking about Kuomintang (KMT) politicians during the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election campaign period (screenshot 21). An account named ‘Taiwan Province Waner‘ (台湾省婉儿) posted about Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕), the mayor of Taichung City in Taiwan, who expressed her sympathy and concerns regarding the Gansu earthquake in China. The post is then shared by the state media, ChinaTaiwan’s (中国台湾网)26 WeChat Channel account with the headline ‘Two sides of Strait are one family’ (两岸一家亲) (screenshot 22).
Another account ‘Taiwan Agong (grandpa)’ (台湾阿公), mostly collaborating with his grandson, recently disappeared on the platform, but had been posting a lot of soft culture videos and or content resonating with CCP propaganda. Most of this content has been republished by state media such as ChinaTaiwan (中国台湾网), Haixia Xin Ganxian (海峡新干线) and Nanyang Daily Nanyang Headlines (南阳日报南阳头条). It is unclear whether or not he is directly connected to the state government or simply just trying to portray himself as a patriotic person sharing his day-to-day life to build an audience. However, this demonstrates how this type of lifestyle content has become part of the propaganda ecosystem. (screenshot 23)
Dancing to the Party’s tune
Participatory Propaganda
Due to the evolution of social media, how we traditionally understand the dissemination of information, as well as how state actors promote propaganda is no longer applicable. Owing to the increasing penetration rate of internet and mobile devices, leading to the prevalence of self-media, then further blurring the line between content creators and content receivers, the understanding of the original ‘top-down communications model’ needs to be altered.27
As stated by Wanless and Berk (2017), participatory propaganda is ‘the deliberate, and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour of a target audience while seeking to co-opt its members to actively engage in the spread of persuasive communications…’.28 They further argue that while traditional propaganda focuses more on ‘one to many’ communication tactics, participatory propaganda has moved to ‘one-to-many-to-many more’.
Asmolov (2019) also argues that participatory propaganda serves as an influential tool to drive ‘socialisation of conflicts’ and amplify their spread.29 Essentially, the audience no longer plays a passive role in communication, they have also become important message distributors.
Conclusion
From our research, we found that soft power influence and participatory propaganda align seamlessly with WeChat’s business model, and also play a crucial role in the ecosystem among content creators, the platform, and the CCP. According to Asmolov (2019), participatory propaganda is a ‘meeting point’ between political and commercial interests.30 Content creators’ participatory propaganda gets rewarded by the platform’s business model, and WeChat actively plays a role in helping the CCP operate censorship and provides a pool of ‘genuine’ or ‘grassroots’ like material for the Party to run its propaganda campaigns.
Although it is inconclusive that all content creators have strong pro-CCP opinions and intend to influence their target audience ideologically, we suspect that they attempt to use narratives and keywords aligned with the CCP to maximise their engagement with a broader audience through algorithms so that they can sell products from their online shops or through e-commerce live streaming. Alternatively, content creators leverage this tactic to accumulate a larger audience base so that the accounts will more likely be commercialised.
The CCP’s aggressive censorship of online content has forced all platforms seeking to operate within China to abide by its regulations. WeChat, as the most popular social media platform in China, without doubt, has to not only operate under its control, but also implement preventative measures. According to Patrick Howell O’Neil, a cybersecurity journalist, research from University of Toronto’s CitizenLab31 has found that WeChat’s parent company, Tencent, is under great pressure from the government to ‘implement effective censorship tech’.32 According to Weixin Channels Operation Standards33, any content prohibited by laws of mainland China are not allowed on the platform. For example, those that ‘violates the basic rules determined by Constitution’, ‘endangers national security, leaks state secrets, subverts state power, and undermines national unity’, ‘damages national honor and interests’ and ‘incites ethnic hatred and discrimination, and destroys ethnic unity’.
While researchers are unlikely to completely understand how the algorithms on the platform operate, it is reasonable to infer that the platform will avoid having content violating government policy promoted to audiences and encourage content that is more aligned with the Party. In fact, from the Channels accounts we have observed, high quantities of content directly echoing state propaganda usually receives more engagements compared to other posts. Hence, content creators are incentivised to generate more similar content to attract more audiences to their platform and further enhance their prospects of conducting business successfully.
The ecosystem created by the intersection of the party-state, the platform, and content creators — the CCP enforcing aggressive censorship, the platform’s business model aligned with the government law, and the content creators generating content that seem to be more preferable for the system — has become a solid foundation for the CCP’s propaganda dissemination.
Recommendations
Although WeChat Channels may seem to be achieving great success in the domestic market in a short period of time since its launch, it is still far from dominating the global market like TikTok does. However, as WeChat remains the primary social media platform for residents within the PRC as well as Chinese diasporas around the world, it is important to understand how the platform works beyond its function of messaging.
Due to the nature of how WeChat was designed, it is difficult to understand how the general platform and algorithmic system works as well as how users’ data is processed and stored, especially those who are not applicable to the PRC regulations. Although countries like Canada, the US, and Australia have either been discussing or have banned WeChat on government devices over privacy and security concerns, it is crucial to acknowledge that WeChat plays an important role for many users, particularly for those who have friends and family living in the PRC. Besides, suspending the operation of the app will only make it even more challenging for researchers and relevant stakeholders to understand more about how information disseminates in the country under aggressive censorship and what tactics and strategies have been used by the PRC government as times move on.
We propose that more research on WeChat should be undertaken, especially on new services such as WeChat Channels. In addition to issues identified in this report, that content creators play an important role in the government’s propaganda ecosystem, we also saw how the platform has been leveraged to disseminate misinformation and create echo chambers for major social events. For example, during the 2023 Australian Indigenous Voice referendum, some content creators on WeChat Channels posted misinformation about the referendum, receiving large traction.
In addition to research, governments should not seek for an ‘easy fix’, namely completely banning the platform to solve the data and privacy regulatory problem. Governments should enforce stronger data and algorithmic transparency measures, and enhance accountability when it comes to social media platform regulation.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations we encountered in this research. By laying out these limitations, we hope researchers or relevant stakeholders conducting research on the platform in the future can avoid inconveniences.
- WeChat is an extremely closed platform and conducting research on WeChat is extremely labour intensive. It is impossible to use automated ways to retrieve large datasets to do analysis. The lack of data transparency results in giving us limited access to understand activities on the platform. As such, as we mainly rely on the platform algorithms to monitor content, our research findings might be biassed in unknown ways.
- It is also physically difficult to do monitoring on WeChat Channels. Although there is a WeChat app for computers or laptops, it seems that the app outside mobile devices always glitches. Users are only able to watch a few videos at a time on their WeChat Channels. In addition, there is less information about the Channels accounts being provided. For example, content creators’ MCNs don’t show up on the app for the computer or laptop version. As a result, we have to rely on our mobile devices to monitor feeds on the platform.
- As this is an exploratory research, we didn’t expect that identity verification might become a barrier in the process. For example, to be able to post content on WeChat Channels, you’d need to provide your personal information. As such, a more strategic approach should be considered for future research similar to this.
Acknowledgment
Special thanks to Shun-ching Yang, Tim Niven, David Green, Eric Hsu, Ai-Men Lau and Sophie Reiß from Doublethink Lab and Nathan Attrill for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Endnotes
1. WeChat and Weixin are the same app but two separate versions. With different servers, Weixin is for users within China while WeChat is for users based overseas.
2. Bowman, Shayne, and Chris Willis. ‘We media. How audiences are shaping the future of news.’ A seminal report. Reston: The Media Center at the American Press Institute (2003). https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/we_media.pdf
3. LT and Nirit Hinkis. ‘Chinese state media’s global influencer operation.’ Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (formerly Miburo) (2022). https://miburo.substack.com/p/csm-influencer-ops-1?s=r#footnote-1-47927362
4. Ryan, Fergus, Matt Knight, and Daria Impiombato. ‘Singing from the CCP’s songsheet.’ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2023). https://www.aspi.org.au/report/singing-ccps-songsheet
5. Ryan, Fergus, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai. ‘Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda.’ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2022). https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frontier-influencers
6. Gardner, Jacob, and Kevin Lehnert. ‘What’s new about new media? How multi-channel networks work with content creators.’ Business Horizons (2016). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0007681316000100
7. ‘List of features operated by Weixin.’ https://www.wechat.com/en/weixin_features.html
8. ‘The number of WeChat users is amazing! 1.09 billion people open WeChat every day, and 780 million people enter Moments.’ [微信用户量惊人！每天有10.9亿人打开微信，7.8亿人进入朋友圈]. Shanxi Evening Newspaper [山西晚报] (2021). https://web.archive.org/web/20240422122934/https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20210120A00ZQ700
9. ‘Interim Report 2023.’ Tencent [腾讯] (2023). https://static.www.tencent.com/uploads/2023/08/29/1d726a2226130c610975c21480cf1890.PDF
10. Thomala, Lai Lin. ‘Number of monthly active WeChat users from 4th quarter 2013 to 4th quarter 2023.’ Statista (2023). https://www.statista.com/statistics/255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/
11. Dixon, Stacy Jo. ‘Most popular social networks worldwide as of January 2024, ranked by number of monthly active users.’ Statista (2024). https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/#:~:text=The%20company%20currently%20also%20owns,monthly%20core%20Family%20product%20users.?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block
12. Milmo, Dan and Amy Hawkins. “‘The everything app’: why Elon Musk wants X to be a WeChat for the west.” The Guardian (2023). https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/jul/29/elon-musk-wechat-twitter-rebranding-everything-app-for-west
13. ‘Canada bans WeChat, Kaspersky applications on government devices.’ Reuters (2023). https://www.reuters.com/technology/canada-bans-wechat-kaspersky-applications-government-devices-statement-2023-10-30/
14. ‘Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media.’ Parliament of Australia (2023). https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/RB000062/toc_pdf/SenateSelectCommitteeonForeignInterferencethroughSocialMedia.pdf
15. ‘WeChat video account will achieve strong growth in 2022, the ecosystem will be improved and business potential will be further released.’ [2022年微信视频号实现强劲增长，生态系统完善并进一步释放商业潜力]. Tencent [腾讯] (2023). https://web.archive.org/web/20240422122341/https://www.tencent.com/zh-cn/articles/2201518.html
16. ‘The monthly active users of the WeChat video account exceeded 800 million, and the user penetration rate of Douyin was close to 60%.’ [微信视频号月活规模突破8亿，抖音用户渗透率接近6成]. Snowball Finance [雪球] (2022). https://web.archive.org/web/20240422122459/https://xueqiu.com/9374162244/226376652
17. Ma, Mingwei, Zixin Shen, and Yining Wu. ‘Comparative Analysis of WeChat Channel and TikTok in China Short Video Clips Market.’ In 2022 International Conference on Science Education and Art Appreciation. Atlantis Press (2022). https://www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/seaa-22/125976886
18. ‘Why you don’t have access to WeChat Channel.’ [为什么你没有视频号入口？]. Zhihu [知乎] (2020). https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/141163371
19. Gardner, Jacob, and Kevin Lehnert. ‘What’s new about new media? How multi-channel networks work with content creators.’ Business Horizons (2016). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0007681316000100
20. ‘The 52nd “Statistical Report on China’s Internet Development” was released: the number of Internet users in my country reached 1.079 billion’ [第52次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》发布：我国网民规模达10.79亿人]. People’s Daily Online [人民网] (2023).
21. Chen, Hen-an [陳亨安]. ‘Analysis of Mainland China Internet Celebrity Economy’ [中國大陸網紅經濟簡析]. Economic Development Department, National Development Council [國家發展委員會經濟發展處] (2020). https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzEwL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMzUwNi9kNDc1NWU1Yi0wMzkxLTRmNTQtYjllNS1hZTZkMjJiZDU1MjcucGRm&n=MTLkuK3lnIvlpKfpmbjntrLntIXntpPmv5%2FnsKHmnpAucGRm&icon=..pdf
22. Thomala, Lai Lin. ‘Number of multi-channel networks (MCNs) in China from 2015 to 2021 with estimates until 2023.’ Statista (2023). https://www.statista.com/statistics/1187287/china-multi-channel-network-number/
23. Zhang, Weiyu, and Tong Tong. ‘Contesting the intermediary power: How Chinese MCNs interact with platforms, creators, and advertisers.’ Media, Culture & Society (2024).
24. ‘Shanghai Hongyi Jiayue Culture Media Co., Ltd..’ [上海宏亿佳悦文化传媒有限公司]. BOSS Zhipin [BOSS直聘].https://web.archive.org/web/20240423114328/https://m.zhipin.com/companys/fefc39ba29cf3c0803V72t2_FFM~.html?ka=m_seo_companys_recommend_7
25. Ma, Mingwei, Zixin Shen, and Yining Wu. ‘Comparative Analysis of WeChat Channel and TikTok in China Short Video Clips Market.’ In 2022 International Conference on Science Education and Art Appreciation. Atlantis Press (2022). https://www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/seaa-22/125976886
26. ChinaTaiwan (中国台湾网) is a news website managed by Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (国务院台湾事务办公室).
27. Wanless, Alicia, and Michael Berk. ‘Participatory propaganda: The engagement of audiences in the spread of persuasive communications.’ Social Media and Social Order. De Gruyter (2021). https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/53725/9788366675612.pdf?sequence=1#page=123
28. ibid.
29. Asmolov, Gregory. ‘The Effects of Participatory Propaganda: From Socialization to Internalization of Conflicts.’ Journal of Design and Science (JoDS) (2019). https://jods.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/jyzg7j6x/release/2
30. ibid.
31. Knockel, Jeffrey, and Ruohan Xiong. ‘(Can’t) Picture This 2: An Analysis of WeChat’s Realtime Image Filtering in Chats.’ The Citizen Lab (2019).
32. O’Neill, Patrick Howell. ‘How WeChat censors private conversations, automatically in real time.’ MIT Technology Review (2019).
33. ‘Weixin Channels Operation Standards’ [微信视频号运营规范]. Tencent [腾讯].https://weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/readtemplate?lang=zh_CN&t=weixin_agreement&s=video&head=true
