Strengthening Philippine Digital Democracy: Lessons Learned from Doublethink Lab’s FIMI Investigation Training Program
Janina Santos, Analyst, Doublethink Lab
The Philippines has long since struggled with the challenges of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), which affects the decisions and policies that steer national interests and affect the everyday lives of Filipinos. The country’s propensity to use social media compounds its vulnerability to “fake news”, a prevalent phenomenon especially during the elections when Filipinos choose leaders whose platforms are often informed by their personal beliefs and agenda. Social media has also become a platform to create and shape opinions regarding national security, including the defense of Philippine sovereignty and sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).
As a part of Internews’ Initiative for Media Freedom (IMF) and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a project brought together a myriad of stakeholders, including media practitioners who are in the forefront of mitigating the effects of FIMI. Doublethink Lab (DTL), considered as an expert in investigating Chinese information operations (IO), was brought in to further capacitate these practitioners to better address FIMI. We conducted three online trainings and one face-to-face session with four media organizations, assisting them in conducting their FIMI investigations. The outcome for this training program is discussed in Part 1 of this series.
This endeavor did not only serve as a platform to learn FIMI investigation techniques but also as an avenue to share recommendations to improve the country’s resilience to foreign interference and, ultimately, build stronger Philippine digital democracy. Doublethink Lab, with the generous input of the media partners, developed the strategy framework below that we believe will contribute to achieving this end goal.
The policy framework is based on the lessons learned and stakeholder recommendations elicited from the DTL’s FIMI investigation training. With due consideration to these outcomes, there must be significant mobilization and investment of financial resources on FIMI mitigation. This investment will serve as a bedrock for the four pillars that shall contribute to a FIMI-Resilient Philippines, which ultimately advances our objective for a stronger Philippine digital democracy.
Pillar 1: Capable and Empowered Philippine Media Practitioners
The first pillar is “Capable and Empowered Philippine Media Practitioners,” which expands the capacity-building activities of the DTL’s FIMI Investigation Training. It takes into consideration what can be considered as the best practices of the FIMI Investigation Training Program, as well as the feedback of the media partners who were trained under this initiative. This pillar is extensively discussed in part 1 of this two-part series.
Pillar 2: Enabling Legislative Environment
The second pillar pertains to developing and passing laws that 1) allow journalists better access to information from the government, referring to the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill, and 2) disincentivize the conduct of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. Currently, the Philippine government practices FOI through Executive Order №2 of former President Rodrigo Duterte. However, a law must be passed to institutionalize this, as an executive order can be easily overturned. There are several versions of the FOI bill in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and President Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Jr. has expressed his support for the FOI[i]. The FOI shall not only allow regular citizens to monitor government officers and employees for unethical activities, but also prevent disinformation from spreading through official channels. It is thus a preventive measure against state-sponsored disinformation.
On the other hand, there have been attempts to penalize disinformation through legislation. In the Philippine Senate, a bill authored by Senator Grace Poe intends to hold public officials who “become a source of misinformation” accountable[ii]. Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada also filed a similar bill which seeks to revise the existing Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012[iii]. This expands the coverage to include ordinary citizens and criminalizes fake news. Recently, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is looking into banning AI and deepfakes for the 2025 elections. Chairperson George Garcia pointed that “there should be truthful” campaigning and that there are many falsehoods that can happen when AI and deepfakes are used.[iv] Garcia’s trajectory is understandable, as the legal exclusion of these technologies can hinder the rapid production, dissemination, and amplification of FIO products, as one can observe from the FIMI campaigns related to other elections that have happened and are happening this year.
While punitive legislations and regulations may indeed hinder FIMI operators, it is necessary to approach this intervention with deeper analysis, because such laws may be used against independent media and further oppress freedoms of speech and expression. What might be seen as a tool to achieve digital democracy may actually be weaponized to curtail Filipino’s rights both online and offline.
Instead, legislation to institutionalize and advance digital media literacy may be a more effective and less risky option. It is notable that the current administration had launched the Media Information Literacy (MIL) Program, with the Presidential Communications Office (PCO), Department of Education (DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWS), and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) last year. This multi-agency initiative aims to use education as a tool to develop a “culture of critical thinking, curiosity and responsible engagement” among young people and other vulnerable populations[v].
Pillar 3: Expanded and Intensified Stakeholder Engagement
Stakeholder convergence has several benefits, the most practical of which is resource sharing. Knowledge, skills, access to technology, and systems vary from organization to organization. Stakeholder convergence allows institutions to share what they have and benefit from what others can offer. Another advantage is the establishment of a united front and ultimately a more effective response to the problem at hand — in this case, FIMI. Technological advancements have increased the potency of FIO, compounding the effect that FIMI actors bring to the operations. The united front of diverse stakeholders serves as an impediment against FIMI actors fully exercising their influence to advance malign narratives. It may also bring more attention to the situation, and possibly more resources to better prevent its occurrence and mitigate its impact.
DTL’s FIMI Investigation Training has become a point of convergence for media practitioners, local and global subject matter experts, and civil society organizations. This collaboration contributed to the tangible and impactful outcomes of the project, including the exposure of several FIMI incidents in the Philippines. The next logical step is to engage more stakeholders. This will require a thorough stakeholder analysis to identify those with the interest to collaborate and the capability to contribute. It is also necessary to connect with organizations which share the same values of democracy and rights. These stakeholders may include think tanks, academic institutions, civil society organizations, advocates against disinformation and for cybersecurity, sectoral groups, like-minded international non-governmental organizations, and perhaps even the government, which, ideally should also be in the forefront of combatting FIMI.
Pillar 4: Dynamic Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for FIMI Investigation and Response
Effective and efficient response to FIMI requires the institutionalization of FIMI investigation procedures, through a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This must be tailored to the individual newsrooms’ capacity and culture. As such, it must take into consideration the resources available to the organization: the number of people dedicated to FIMI investigation; their level of skill and competence; the time allotted to complete the investigation and produce the communication product about it; and the availability and access to technologies that would optimize the process. The organization’s leadership must also be central to the SOP’s conceptualization and intervention. The newsrooms may also seek the advice of subject matter experts to develop SOPs that are tailor-fit to their organizations.
On the other hand, the SOP must be dynamic, to remain responsive to the rapidly changing global information environment. Advancements in technology have significantly contributed to more potent FIO campaigns. This must be taken into consideration when developing the SOP. As such periodic review of this document should be conducted, coupled with beefing up the newsrooms’ capacity to ensure that implementing the revised SOP is feasible.
Conclusion
DTL’s FIMI Investigation Program did not only result in more capable media practitioners, but also served as a platform to share ideas and recommendations towards a more FIMI-resilient Philippines. These include four pillars: Capable and Empowered Filipino Media Practitioners; Enabling Legislative Environment; Expanded and Intensified Stakeholder Engagement; and Dynamic Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for FIMI Investigation and Response. Ultimately, this contributes to a stronger Philippine digital democracy. These recommendations are summarized in the framework that DTL developed.
It is our collective hope that these recommendations be considered and adapted not only by the Philippine government, but also other stakeholders who are instrumental in defending the Philippine’s sovereignty from malign foreign influence.
Footnotes
[i] Cervantes, F.M. and Gita-Carlos, R. A. (2024, January 18). PH takes strides toward transparency. Philippine News Agency. Retrieved https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1217036
[ii]An Act to Further Promote Professionalism in Information Dissemination among Public Officials and Employees by ensuring that they do not become source of misinformation, amending for this purpose, pertinent provisions of Republic Act №6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, S.B. 547, 19th Cong. (2022) https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/3832434763!.pdf
[iii] An Act Criminalizing the Creation and Dissemination of Fake News for the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation, Amending for the Purpose, Republic Act No 10175, Otherwise Known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 10175, S.B. 1296, 19th Cong. (2022) https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/3832434763!.pdf
[iv] Aning, J. (2024, May 30). Comelec eyes ban on deepfake, AI in 2025 midterm polls. Inquirer.Net. Retrieved https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1946403/comelec-eyes-ban-on-deepfakes-ai-in-2025-midterm-polls
[v] Presidential Communications Office. (2023, August 14) PBBM admin to fight misinformation, disinformation through media literacy. Retrieved https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/pbbm-admin-to-fight-misinformation-disinformation-through-media-literacy/
