Since 9/11, A Frost And A Thaw In U.S.-Latin American Relations
By: Patrick Duddy
In 2001, as the horrific attacks of 9/11 unfolded in the United States, Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Lima, Peru for a hemispheric meeting to adopt the new Inter-American Democratic Charter. The charter would make adherence to representative democracy a condition for full participation in the inter-American system. Despite the tragic news of events in Washington, New York and Pennsylvania, Powell stayed in Lima until the charter was adopted. The charter was made possible by immense political progress. The preceding 25 years had witnessed both the restoration of democracy throughout the Americas (with the exception of Cuba) and the embrace of human rights as a critical component of the region’s development. The charter also symbolized a moment of broad rapprochement with the United States. Powell’s decision to stay in Peru until the Charter was officially adopted underscored the importance the U.S. attached to this achievement.
Unfortunately — but predictably — U.S. relations with Latin America became a less urgent priority for Washington after the attacks. For their own reasons, many countries in Latin America also shifted their priorities after 9/11. This divergence is still relevant today as the U.S. enters the final months of the 2016 presidential campaign.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, most Latin Americans were deeply sympathetic to their neighbors to the north. But President Bush’s announcement that other nations were either “with us or against us” did not resonate well in Latin America. In 2003, at the United Nations, neither Chile nor Mexico were supportive when the U.S. sought a new U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq — which deeply disappointed many in the U.S.
Meanwhile, it turned out that the election of Hugo Chavez as president of Venezuela in 1998 had presaged a wave of left-leaning populists winning power in the region. These leaders were resentful of U.S. influence and skeptical about U.S. prescriptions for economic development. They rejected the U.S. vision of market-driven growth and hemispheric integration that included the United States. Indeed, many of these new leaders considered the U.S. neocolonial, predatory and interventionist.
The practical implications of this antipathy became clear at a regional summit held in 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina. At the summit, the countries of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) led by Brazil blocked adoption of the the Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA), an agreement which would have brought all of the Americas (minus Cuba, of course) into a single giant free trade area extending from the Arctic to Patagonia. Prominent leftist leaders like Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, at an “alternate” summit held in a local stadium in the same city with the apparent blessing of Argentina’s Nester Kirchner, railed against President Bush and the FTAA.
Following Mar del Plata, the U.S shifted its focus in the region to forging more limited agreements with countries of the region interested in the sort of free trade agreements the U.S. already had with Mexico, Canada and Chile: the countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic, Peru, Colombia, Panama.
Meanwhile, Chavez, Morales, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, the Castros and others sought to marginalize and diminish the role of the U.S. in the Americas, encouraging the establishment of new regional institutions which excluded the U.S. At the same time, surging global oil prices gave Hugo Chavez the means to sell an anti-American vision of 21st century socialism many in the hemisphere found compelling — for a time. Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador all expelled the local U.S. ambassadors, including me from Caracas in 2008. The global financial crisis of that year exploded any illusions of the U.S. as a model of sober economic management and fiscal responsibility. And in an ironic reversal of historical patterns, the commodity-fueled strength of Brazil and other South American economies helped the U.S. to dig itself out of the great recession. This, in turn, gave Brazil’s ambition to lead the global South a significant boost.
Though the U.S. maintained a commitment to the region through out the years after 9/11 — combating drug trafficking, responding to crises in Haiti, signing individual trade deals — Washington’s reaction to the short-lived and ultimately failed coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002 left many in the region doubting U.S. commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The muddled U.S. response to Honduras’s coup in 2009 further undermined confidence in U.S. leadership in the hemisphere and left the impression that the U.S. was a somewhat diminished force.
But as commodity prices, especially oil prices, have softened and China’s commercial expansion in the region has slowed, Latin Americans have reexamined both their own economic and social policies as well as their relationship with the U.S.
Brazil and Venezuela, as has been extensively documented, have faltered badly. Brazil is suffering its worst recession since the 1930s and is also mired in a corruption scandal on a scale few countries have experienced. Venezuela is in even worse shape, with a moribund economy, alarming levels of violent crime and debilitated political institutions. Elsewhere, many of the region’s other leftist leaders are struggling and pragmatists of various stripes are emerging.
Fifteen years after the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, most of the countries of the region may be ready to embrace a closer and more cooperative relationship with the U.S. The question is, do leaders in the U.S. understand how profoundly this is in the national interest of the United States?
The American presidential campaign has, so far, mostly ignored Latin America as a whole.
Passing comprehensive immigration reform (in whatever form our own political dynamic permits), as compellingly necessary as it may be, is not the same as embracing opportunities in the Western Hemisphere. Oversimplifying and scapegoating our relationship with Mexico and Mexicans ignores the benefits of a relationship that, in fact, is deeper and more beneficial than either Republicans or Democrats seem ready to admit.
Both major candidates for president of the United States are questioning the sort of trade policies long considered of fundamental interest to the health of the U.S. economy. This seems to me disingenuous. To be sure, senior leaders in both parties have long understood that the benefits of international trade are not evenly distributed. Most also understand the benefits are real. Exports generate jobs and these days around 42 percent of all U.S exports flow to the Western Hemisphere. Mexico, in particular, buys vastly more from the U.S. than China does. Of course there are problems with some of our trade agreements but our relations with the region are increasingly symbiotic and those who aspire to lead the country should acknowledge that more clearly.
FIfteen years after 9/11 the Western Hemisphere is one of the most peaceful regions of the world but it is not without serious problems. The evisceration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions and looming economic collapse is a big one. Many in the region believe a humanitarian disaster is unfolding there. The violence and surging gang-related criminality in Central America’s northern triad is another. We know progress is possible on these and other challenges because we have seen it. The FARC recently signed a peace agreement with the government of Colombia. The U.S. and Cuba reestablished full diplomatic relations. A commitment from both Republicans and Democrats to work with the governments and the peoples of the region to consolidate gains, solve problems and build a more prosperous region would be in the interest of all, most especially the U.S.
Patrick Duddy, former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, currently serves as the director of the Center of Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Duke University.
